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This thesis is concerned primarily with the use of law and courts as strategic assets in 
insurgency.  Its subject is ‘lawfare’. Recent discourse on insurgency and counterinsurgency 
has focussed on ‘population-centred’ activities-the idea of the ‘people’ as a ‘prize’.  An 
indispensible ingredient of any effective government is the ability to adjudicate – usually by 
a judiciary. At the heart of many insurgencies (not all), is the realisation that the ability to 
decide disputes and enforce those decisions bolsters legitimacy. The perceived ability to do 
this is important to the narrative of the insurgency.  
Counterinsurgents (incumbents) have often concentrated on the security aspect of courts 
and ‘justice’.  This can work where there is no competitive system in operation in the 
operational area. This was so during supposedly successful operations by the British in the 
1950s.  Even in such cases there is the potential for what is termed here ‘rupture’ and 
‘disruptive litigation’ where incumbent courts may be used to blunt both operational 
effectiveness and even the legitimacy of incumbent rule.  
When insurgents set up competing justice systems within their own communities, provided 
that these are seen as ‘fair’, they may be highly effective.  Indeed some insurgencies, 
sometimes with causes rooted in the vital matter of land, have levered their ability to 
adjudicate and enforce into power.  The role of courts goes well beyond land however, as 
the cases of the Irish War of Independence (in Western Europe), and the Afghan Taliban (in 
so-called ‘ungoverned space’) have demonstrated.   
Often knowledgable colonial incumbents ruled through delegated authority in so-called 
‘ungoverned’ (or ’differently governed’) space. They were acutely aware of the importance 
of ‘lawfare’. Whilst the applicability of lessons drawn from those experiences should not be 
overstated, they should not be ignored.  A brief study of the west’s efforts areas of 
Afghanistan demonstrates some of these factors. Attempts to impose an alien system there 
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Kingdoms are won and lost in the realms of law and legitimacy1 
This introduction is divided into two sections: the first is an outline of the background to this 
thesis, its objectives and general overview; the second is aimed at introducing the concept 
underlying the main body of the thesis – specifically insurgency – by way of a review of the 
literature moving from definitions and critical approaches to insurgency and 
counterinsurgency and courts and insurgents. 
Section 1  
In his study of warfare in the eighteenth century, The Verdict of Battle, James Q. Whitman 
describes the institution of pitched battle in his period as ‘a form of trial ... a contained and 
economical way of resolving a dispute between two warring parties or countries’.2 He saw 
battle and war in that period as a form of legal process. The idea of warfare, or more widely 
armed combat, as a form of legal proceeding was also a feature of combat in the Middle 
Ages.3  
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate that matters have progressed from battle, 
perhaps, being seen as a ‘trial or legal proceeding’4 to legal processes themselves being a 
form of warfare. That insight itself is not particularly new. As will be described below, the 
concept has been refined into the word ‘lawfare’. However, one of the original ideas that 
this thesis seeks to encapsulate as its contribution to learning and scholarship is the degree 
to which the use of law and legal procedures has long been a tool of insurgent and 
counterinsurgent warfare – a weapon, no less.  
David Kennedy in his War and Law states: 
 In large measure, our modern politics is legal politics; the terms of engagement are 
 legal, and the players are legal institutions, their powers expanded and limited by 
 law … To say that war is a legal institution is not only to say that war has also 
                                                          
1
 Whitman, James Q., The Verdict of Battle (Harvard University Press, 2012), p94 
2
 ibid. p3  
3
 Whetham, David, Just Wars and Moral Victories: Surprise, deception and the normative framework of 
European war in the later middle ages (Brill, 2009). See particularly Chapter III ‘The role of law as a legal 
instrument in the middle ages’, p71  
4
 Whitman, The Verdict of Battle, p3 
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 become an affair of rules or the military a legal bureaucracy. It is also to say 
 something about the nature of the politics continued by military means.5  
This is certainly true of warfare today. Law has become a part of modern warfare. Like 
cyberspace, ‘legal space’ has become a key battlefield, and combatants are still feeling their 
way around it. It is not new in nature: at the tactical level – the level at which soldiers 
operate – the law has long been an environment within which soldiers have had to work. In 
1837, General Napier put the officer’s dilemma with black humour: 
 Confronted by a mob, his thoughts dwell on the (to him) most interesting question; 
 ‘shall I be shot for my forbearance by a court-martial, or hanged for over-zeal by a 
 jury’.6 
At the strategic level, however, the necessity of ensuring a sound, coherent judicial strategy 
has not been fully realised in insurgency warfare. This thesis seeks to show the importance 
for both insurgents and those who oppose them of developing and implementing a sound 
and coherent ‘judicial strategy’.  
Background 
The genesis of this project lies in my work. Since the mid-1990s, I have worked in many 
countries and regions as an advisor on the development of institutions of justice: the 
Balkans, Iraq, the Central Asian states, Afghanistan, Libya and Ethiopia. Occasionally I have 
been called up to be deployed as a reserve military officer, in the Balkans and Iraq,. Almost 
every country in which I have worked has been either in the middle of conflict or recovering 
from it.  
Upon my return from Afghanistan, I wrote two articles. The first was published in the RUSI 
Journal, the second in the Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs.7 In those pieces I 
suggested that despite a plethora of reports streaming from Afghanistan on the justice 
sector, and the efforts being put in to reform it, very little had been written on its role in 
                                                          
5
 Kennedy, David, Of War and Law (Princeton University Press, 2006), p13  
6
 Cited in Townsend, Charles, Britain’s Civil Wars (Faber, 1986), p20 
7
 Ledwidge, Frank, ‘Justice in Helmand: the challenge of law reform in a society at war’, Asian Affairs, 40:1 
(2009), p40; Ledwidge, Frank, ‘Justice and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan: a missing link’, RUSI Journal, 
154:1 (2009), pp6–9 
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both powering and countering insurgency. The focus of the work being done in the sector 
had been on assessing and critiquing (largely negatively) the international efforts so far – 
often only from the point of view of development and the so-called ‘security sector’, mainly 
the police and military. I suggested that within the world of ‘counterinsurgency’ the justice 
sector was, at best, a poor cousin of the Security Sector Reform field. The strong implication 
was that the justice sector should take a far more prominent role in the effort to ‘stabilise’ 
Afghanistan. It was not simply another ‘social good’, such as hospitals or roads, but was 
intimately bound up with concepts of legitimacy and justice. It was a key element, in other 
words, of any insurgency with political ambitions – which is to say, all of them.  
 
By the same reasoning, in the end any successful counterinsurgency operation, if it has 
ambitions of political effect, must take steps – or, more importantly, be seen to take steps – 
to address the legitimate grievances that insurgents use to generate and sustain popular 
support. A corrupt, discredited justice system only serves to fuel an insurgency that bleeds 
legitimacy from the government in key strategic areas of the country; and in current 
counterinsurgency thinking, ‘legitimacy’ is a vital component of the overall effort. 
 
The articles suggested that while the central importance of justice had to some extent 
eluded counterinsurgency (COIN) theorists at that time, successful insurgents had often 
historically placed it at or near the top of their objectives.  
 
The parameters of this thesis  
While there is some discussion of the use of law and courts at home to influence operations 
overseas, the focus is on courts within the theatre of operations of the insurgency.  
This thesis deals with insurgency, not terrorism. While some see what used to be called the 
‘global war on terror’ as a ‘global insurgency’, others see it as such only on the terms of the 
jihadists waging this ‘war’. The idea is accepted here that insurgency is a ‘popular 
movement that seeks to change the status quo through violence and subversion whilst 
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terrorism is one of its key tactics’.8 This thesis is concerned with insurgencies largely, though 
not exclusively, with objectives that do not relate to a notional ‘world caliphate’, but rather 
with achievable and defined political aims usually within a national context. In other words, 
this thesis locates ‘insurgency’ where it has generally been located throughout history. This 
does not imply that such struggles take place only within the borders of a given country. As 
will be seen, successful insurgencies generally have transnational elements.  
The title of the thesis ‘Judicial Strategy in Insurgencies’ is inspired by a work of the radical 
French lawyer Jacques Verges.9 The idea behind it is that as part of a successful struggle, the 
insurgent (or indeed any contemporary combatant) may have at his disposal, in addition to 
military or indeed propaganda means, legal means that (if correctly used) may assist in the 
achievement of the insurgency’s objectives. Equally, though, by virtue of being a functioning 
state, the counterinsurgent already has the legal weapon at his disposal. He, too, will 
require a legal strategy and, in the absence of one, the way is laid open for the insurgent to 
fill the gap. This gap may not only be in the context of maintaining security. Security is a 
necessary though not sufficient precondition for an insurgent to use the justice weapon, and 
the fight for that ground takes place at least partly in the judicial realm.  
Methodology 
The bulk of the work done for this thesis has been literature based. Original research has 
been carried out in law libraries (on the colonial and Irish legal experiences – see Chapter 2). 
There has been some archival work, and I believe such work (specifically concerning Malaya, 
Kenya and Cyprus) has not been done before. From the literature perspective, a great many 
disparate secondary sources have been consulted.  
While I had hoped to carry out significantly more research in the field, particularly in 
Afghanistan, security concerns precluded this. Such research in the field as I have done (in 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Libya) appears more as background, with occasional reference in 
the relevant sections, rather than empirical evidence.  
Due partly to the changes in the security situation, I shifted the theme of the thesis from a 
focus on the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan to a more global and rather more 
                                                          
8
 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (Hurst, 2009), p15  
9
 Verges, Jacques, De la Strategie Judiciare (Minuit, 1968) 
13 
 
historical emphasis. I have also carried out a number of interviews with key actors in the 
field of justice and insurgency. These were conducted in the United Kingdom or over Skype.  
The greatest challenges that have been encountered relate to the paucity of evidence in the 
literature. Very little work has been done on the interfaces of lawfare and insurgency.  The 
original contribution this thesis aims to make to scholarship is to demonstrate how the law 
and courts may often be a vital asset, or even weapon in complex, developed insurgencies. 
Research questions 
The intention of this thesis was to take those thoughts further and examine what impact 
courts (by which is meant agreed dispute resolution mechanisms, which include so-called 
‘informal systems’) have had on insurgency and counterinsurgency. As will be seen, such 
systems range from the shuras of Pashtun Afghanistan or the xeer of the Somali lands, 
involving a few men sitting under a tree, to the highly technical supreme courts in well-
developed societies such as the United Kingdom and the United States. While the focus is on 
insurgencies in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, reference will be made to 
events further back in the past, for example the United States Civil War and the English Civil 
War of the 1640s.  
Research question: How does the use of courts and dispute resolution systems as 
characterised in the term ‘lawfare’ impact on the conduct and outcome of insurgency?  
A second question that flows from the first is what does the use of courts and dispute 
resolution mechanisms tell us about the validity of contemporary counterinsurgency ideas 
as a doctrine or set of tactics? Traditional (or even current) counterinsurgency posits at its 
centre that the great bulk of the effort must concentrate on civilian efforts. Clearly justice, 
as a theme, must be a key, perhaps even pivotal, element in this effort. In recent years, the 
use of courts in the various ‘counterinsurgencies’ fought by the UK and others has focused 
on security aspects. Indeed this is the function of criminal courts. There is, of course, far 
more to courts than crime, as will be seen. Courts and mechanisms of justice also go to the 
heart of questions of legitimacy, which are said to be central to current ideas of COIN. 
Finally, if the ‘west’ is to continue involving itself in ‘insurgencies, or indeed any 
‘interventions’, what can the ‘justice sector’ and its intersection with counterinsurgency 
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contribute towards attempting to ensure success in whatever strategic objectives are set (or 
seem to be set). What in terms of ‘judicial strategy’ can assist intervening powers to 
succeed in their objectives? On occasion, such objectives may well be concerned with 
assisting, rather than countering, insurgencies. Indeed Western powers are engaged in 
doing exactly that in Syria, and are using the provision of ‘justice’ to do so.10 
Chapter summaries 
Following this introduction and a review of the literature on insurgency in general, to the 
extent that it is relevant to insurgency and lawfare, Chapter 1 moves on to an overview of 
matters within the field of insurgency studies that are relevant to the conduct of legal 
warfare in insurgency. First, it has been said that lawyers have almost entirely ignored 
counterinsurgency theory.11 It is equally true that insurgency experts have all too readily 
overlooked the relevance of law to their field. Section 1 looks at this often ignored vital 
element of the law in insurgency. Section 2 moves on to confirm the relevance of law and 
society to insurgency. Section 3 discusses the ‘key battleground’ of legitimacy: what is 
legitimacy, and how can it be acquired and maintained? Current thinking on ‘why people 
obey the law’ is discussed, and an excursion into jurisprudence provides a foundation for 
later material on legal pluralism. Section 4 briefly introduces the idea, central to the thesis, 
of ‘lawfare’; and Section 5 continues that line of thinking by examining how lawfare affects 
the key domain of narrative. 
Chapter 2 focuses on how counterinsurgent, or what Stathis Kalyvas calls ‘incumbent’ 
government courts may be used by parties in insurgencies. In 2012, Thomas Nachbar wrote: 
‘Law has a dual use in counterinsurgency, both as a tool for defeating criminal insurgents 
themselves (by imprisoning them) and as a means for governments to build legitimacy.’12 
Counterinsurgents have two basic options, characterised by what this thesis has called 
‘Kitson’s Dilemma’: namely, shall the law be used as a weapon, or as a means of bolstering 
legitimacy. Section 1 of the chapter examines how the courts were used, in this case by the 
                                                          
10
 The UK’s Department for International Development is, at the time of writing, engaged in a programme 
called ‘Syria Tamkheen’, operating out of Turkey. Its objectives are community security, and one component is 
to ‘encourage’ human rights compliant courts among the insurgent groups 
11
 Sitaraman, Ganesh, ‘Counterinsurgency, the war on terror, and the laws of war’, Virginia Law Review, 95:7, 
(2009), p1747 
12
 Nachbar, Thomas B., ‘The use of law in counterinsurgency’, Military Law Review, 213 (2011), p142  
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British, in one set of insurgencies in what has been called the ‘high’ or ‘classic’ period of 
counterinsurgency. The differing approaches mirror well the ideas of ‘Kitson’s Dilemma’. 
Incumbent Courts may also be used by insurgents, and two main techniques are identified. 
The first is ‘rupture’, a term coined by the French radical lawyer Jacques Verges and used to 
mean having the courts turned against themselves: attempting to expose the internal 
contradictions of courts that purport to provide justice, but that use injustice in the process. 
The second is what I call ‘disruptive litigation’. This in turn can be divided in two: hostile 
disruptive litigation (intended to disrupt counterinsurgent operations); and non-hostile (in 
that while the effect may be disruptive, the intent is not necessarily hostile). The damage 
that can potentially be done to incumbent operational capability by disruptive litigation has 
yet fully to be realised.  
 
From the use of litigation, Chapter 3 moves on to look at the use of courts themselves and 
at legal institutions as weapons. First, the lack of relevant mechanisms to deal with central 
issues at stake, such as land or satisfactory justice provision itself, is a driver of insurgency. 
Particular weight is given in the chapter to insurgent courts. In some ways this is the 
centrepiece of the thesis, in that it crystallises several matters: the contest for legitimacy, 
shadow states, the potential for law and the narratives of law to provide strategic effect. 
Many conflicts are sampled, ranging from the Philippines, by way of Western Sahara, to the 
Syrian rebels and the Islamic State of today. Two in particular are argued to demonstrate 
the potential in the right circumstances for ‘insurgent justice’ to be, if not decisive, then at 
least essential to success. These are the ‘Republican Courts’ of the Irish War of 
Independence (1919–21) and the Afghan Taliban of today.  
 
Contemporary insurgency, such as that within which the Afghan Taliban thrived, is often 
said to take place within ‘ungoverned space’, and it is to this topic that Chapter 4 proceeds. 
While this concept is challenged, there remains an extensive bank of experience, writing and 
scholarship in dealing with the practice of ‘justice’ in such areas. A pragmatic commonality 
of approach was developed by regimes during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
for development of policy in ‘differently governed’ areas, ranging from Yemen and Albania 
to French West Africa, Sudan and the North West Frontier of British India. Unfortunately (it 
is argued in Chapter 4), recent Western practice in counterinsurgent lawfare has displayed 
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ignorance – or at least a lack of awareness in practice – of whole fields of scholarship, 
notably legal anthropology and legal pluralism, which draw heavily on these heritages. The 
chapter goes on to take the case of the British in Helmand, themselves acting against the 
Afghan Taliban’s provision of justice, as a particular study. It concludes by drawing a series 
of lessons, which might be summarised by the thought that in such alternatively governed 
spaces, the counterinsurgent becomes the insurgent.  
 
Section 2  
Insurgency and counterinsurgency 
The objective of this section is to introduce the concepts relevant to the main body of the 
thesis by way of a review of the literature. The section begins by looking at what insurgency 
and counterinsurgency are – or are said to be in ‘doctrine’. It looks at the proponents of the 
ideas that have dominated much of the discourse on war since 2001, and indeed some of 
the thinking before then. The review will then focus on ideas of justice and rule of law and 
on how those have been discussed. It will include sections on the literature, such as it is, on 
insurgent courts. 
‘Orthodox’ doctrine 
Over the last decade and a half, and especially since the large-scale interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, insurgency and its counterpart counterinsurgency (hereafter abbreviated to 
‘COIN’) have been at the very forefront of discussion of military matters. Many books have 
been written, websites set up,13 long-out-of-print texts about previously forgotten 
campaigns have again been sent to press and commentaries have been penned. Indeed very 
many PhD and other theses such as this have been produced. Before embarking on the 
central discussion, it may be helpful to outline the parameters of what will follow. What is 
meant by insurgency? Where does justice fit into it (if at all)? And how does current military, 
and to a lesser extent political, theory incorporate insurgency and COIN into its ideas? For if 
nothing else, insurgency – like all forms of warfare – is a political act: insurgencies (or at the 
very least secular insurgencies) are usually fought in pursuit of political aims.  
                                                          
13
 Most notably Small Wars Journal http://smallwarsjournal.com/ Many others along those lines have been set 
up to promote discussion amongst COIN ‘practitioners’  
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There is an orthodox stream of thinking on this topic that can be seen to flow from the 
1920s up to the present day. There have been very many changes to it, but always there is 
the sense that at the heart of the topic is a focus on the ‘people’ as the target of both 
insurgent and counterinsurgent operations. We open by examining what some of this 
current orthodox doctrine has said about what insurgency actually is today; we then move 
on to some older texts, before looking at opposing approaches. 
One window into what might be described as an insurgency is provided in military doctrine. 
The US Army/ Marine Corps Manual of Counterinsurgency14 was drafted in 2006, to great 
public acclaim, against the backdrop of what was generally perceived as a failing war in 
Iraq.15 It contained what was often proclaimed to be a ‘new’ approach to insurgency – or at 
the very least a new consolidation of old theories. As military doctrine, the new manual was 
replete with definitions. It defined an insurgency as follows: 
 An insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to 
 weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government.16 
In 2013, a new version was authorised and was published in May 2014.17 This does not 
define insurgency at all, but rather takes the nuanced view that ‘insurgency’ can take place 
within the context of intrastate conflict with the characteristics of rebellions, insurrections, 
civil wars and revolutions.18 It indicates a far more flexible approach than its predecessor.  
In 2009, the British Army (as opposed to the UK armed forces as a whole) produced its 
equivalent of the US Manual.19 Its definition qualified insurgency as:  
                                                          
14
 Known hereafter as FM 3-24. It was published in 2006, and an updated version (2013) is available online at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf  
15
 See, for example, Gordon, Michael, ‘Military hones a new strategy on insurgency’, New York Times, 5 




 US Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM 3-24) Counterinsurgency (2006 Edition), available online at 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FM_3-24.pdf, paras 1–2  
17
 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (May 2014), available at 
http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf  
18
 FM 3-24 (2014), paras 4-2–4-9 
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 … an organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control as a 
 challenge to established authority.20  
As we will see, these definitions may be said to differ from traditional legal definitions in 
that they focus on the objectives of the rebellion, rather than on the actual effect of the 
rebellion on the ground (although it should be said that, in the absence of a definition, the 
new US FM 3-24 allows space for a broader response).21  
It should be noted that the important element in any successful insurgency is the 
subversion, rather than the supporting violence. Violence without subversion or without a 
concomitant political objective is simply criminal activity, although there are theorists who 
see insurgency and organised criminal activity as shading into one another. David Kilcullen 
makes an attempt to identify insurgency with some elements of criminal activity or 
racketeering; he draws strong comparisons between the control exercised by Jamaican 
drugs gangs22 and Taliban courts over the people within whom those organisations reside. 
As we will see below, this is related to his advocacy of an idea that he calls ‘the theory of 
competitive control’.23  
The key point recognised implicitly in the US version of the definition is the political element 
of the struggle against ‘legitimate’ government. Those ‘subversives’ successful in today’s 
struggle will (or intend to) form tomorrow’s government; such is the nature of insurgency, 
as defined in Western doctrine.24 In those terms, if the premises of the ideas in the various 
manuals of military doctrine are accepted, success in the struggle is largely dependent on 
‘offering a better deal’ – winning, as it were, the ‘competition’ for the ‘people’. It is not 
going too far to suggest that insurgency in these terms is, in essence, an attempt to 
renegotiate the terms of any notional ‘social contract’, with the intention of giving the 
insurgency the upper hand.  
Both definitions – and indeed the entire corpus of US and UK counterinsurgency doctrine – 
are concerned with ‘insurgency’ in countries other than the UK or the US. Insurgency is 
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something that happens elsewhere.25 There is no hint in either definition of military forces 
dealing with internal subversive violence of the kind that beset the United Kingdom for 30 
years in Northern Ireland. The predicate of both is that US and UK forces will be engaged in 
putting down, or assisting in putting down, insurgencies that either arise from or are 
incidental to ‘interventions’. This in turn is known as ‘third-party’ or ‘exogenous’ 
counterinsurgency.26 
The precise approach any government takes to defeat an insurgency depends very much on 
the character of that government, as we will see below. However, as commonly understood, 
the term ’counterinsurgency’ has developed something of the nature of a doctrine based 
around the extensive literature on what might be termed ‘population-centred 
counterinsurgency’. Hereafter, the commonly used shorthand COIN will be used to mean 
‘population-centred counterinsurgency’.  
 
It has been claimed that ‘about 80% of all conflicts since the end of the Napoleonic era have 
been insurgencies or civil wars’.27 Certainly there have been a great many ‘savage wars of 
peace’, a term coined by Rudyard Kipling, incidentally, in his poem ‘The White Man’s 
Burden’.28 David Kilcullen points out that  
since the mid-19th century, in fact, the United States has been drawn into literally 
dozens of small wars and irregular operations. Even the few conventional wars 
during this period – including the US Civil War, the Spanish-American War, the First 
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and Second World Wars and the Korean War – involved guerrilla conflict, stability 
operations, and post-conflict nation-building.29  
British doctrine  
Much of what has been called here ‘orthodox’ counterinsurgency doctrine is founded on 
supposed British successes in the wars of imperial retreat of the 1950s. It was in the 1950s 
that the British reinforced their reputation in fighting the wars that were to become known 
as ‘insurgencies’. One author has referred to this (somewhat poetically) as the ‘high period 
of British counterinsurgency’.30  
The scholar of British counterinsurgency, Colonel David Benest, says that ‘there is no 
comparable history of counterinsurgency anywhere in the world to match that of the British 
record’.31 If by ‘comparable history’ he means experience, there can be no doubt that this is 
true. But whether experience has translated into expertise and success is a different matter, 
and is the subject of several works.32 Until the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
British expertise in such matters was taken for granted. As one of its own doctrinal 
documents put it, the British Army ‘has much to teach a world increasingly challenged by 
the problem of internal war’.33 Has it anything to teach about the application of law in the 
pursuit of legitimacy? 
From the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837 to her death in 1901, the British Army fought 
no fewer than 250 campaigns, large and small.34 Indeed, since the Second World War, 
Britain has fought a great many wars: at least one credible study has suggested that it has 
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fought more conflicts than any other country in the world.35 As for the results, the British 
Army (like most professions) loves keeping score: in the post-war period, the British have 
been involved in no fewer than 70 military campaigns (by no means all of them wars) of 
varying sizes, 18 of which may be classified as ‘counterinsurgency’ actions. The Army Staff 
College official handbook on counter-revolutionary warfare gives the tally as seven 
successes, three partial successes, five failures and one draw (plus two more recent wars 
ongoing).36 Many of these struggles were rebellions by people who (or whose rulers) did not 
wish to be ruled by the Empire. ‘So perverse is mankind that every nation prefers to be 
misgoverned by its own people than to be well ruled by another’, as one of the Empire’s 
leading generals, Charles James Napier, put it.37 This is a theme that will recur throughout 
this thesis. 
In the early twentieth century, the British fought dozens of small campaigns, with greater or 
lesser degrees of success. They developed techniques which, although sporadically applied, 
were to become the keynote of a ‘British way’ of ‘counterinsurgency’. These ideas revolved 
around a strong degree of civil–military cooperation and respect for a basic level of rule of 
law. It was ‘not the annihilation of an enemy but the suppression of a temporary disorder, 
and therefore the degree of force to be employed must be directed to that which is 
necessary to restore order and must never exceed it’.38 In essence this was ‘minimum 
force’.39 These ideas were developed further in the 1930s, with the publication of a range of 
books on suppression of rebellion, notably Charles Gwynn’s Imperial Policing with its focus 
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on minimum force, and HJ Simson’s Rule and Rebellion in the British Empire with rather 
more of a stress on the use of force and the enforcement of law.40  
In his study of UK counterinsurgency doctrine, Colonel Alex Alderson reviews how the UK 
military framed its thinking over the century or so prior to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars of 
the early twenty-first century.41 It is striking that there is a consistency of rhetoric 
concerning the requirement to comply with legal strictures in ‘low intensity’ military 
operations. Alderson affirms that legitimacy and minimum necessary force ‘are critical to 
the British approach to counterinsurgency and have underpinned it since Duties in Aid of the 
Civil Power was published in 1923’.42 That publication43 was the first of several official or 
semi-official doctrinal guidance documents produced between the First and the Second 
World War. All stressed minimum force, subordination to the civil power and the necessity 
of compliance with the law, all to ensure the maintenance of support and legitimacy.  
Unfortunately, in none of the doctrinal documents or founding texts did there seem to be 
an indication of what ‘legitimacy’ actually meant. Even in the British doctrine which 
supposedly governed the operations of the early twenty-first century, the 2001 edition of 
‘Counter Insurgency Operations’,44 as Alderson points out ‘legitimacy per se is not explained 
at all, neither is the need for British forces to safeguard their own legitimacy through their 
conduct, nor the evident problems of maintaining, if not re-building legitimacy faced by a 
government dealing with an insurgency’.45  
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There has been extensive questioning of the extent to which there was in fact any working 
system of transmission of doctrine in any event in the UK’s ‘small wars’.46 If in fact doctrine 
was not consulted, and instead there was a rather more informal transmission of 
‘institutional knowledge’ of the kind promulgated by John Nagl in his Learning to Eat Soup 
with a Knife, it might be asked whether the many writings on British counterinsurgency 
doctrine could be characterised more as rhetoric than as guidance. Professor Hew Strachan 
points out in a study of recent military campaigns, British Generals in Blair’s Wars, ‘doctrine 
may exist, but that does not mean that it is read’.47  
While principles are easily articulated in doctrine and other military literature, practice is 
rather more challenging. The British Army of old was not averse to using a very great level of 
coercion, and was indeed not averse to the occasional atrocity. Indeed, as we will see, it was 
this kind of behaviour that characterised the British approach in Ireland during the ‘War of 
Independence’ (1919–21) – along with an extraordinary degree of chaos in command and 
control arrangements.48 The brutality of the ‘Black and Tans’ irregular military force is 
remembered today – and the Irish Nationalist response will be examined in the next 
chapter. The activities of such units as the ‘Black and Tans’ contributed heavily to British 
failure in Ireland. In Palestine, between 1936 and 1939, the way in which the first intifada – 
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otherwise known as the Arab Insurgency – was put down by the British, complete with 
punitive village clearances and massacres, is still recalled.49  
 
As to the prominence or otherwise of justice and law, in his study of British 
counterinsurgency doctrine Colonel Alex Alderson identifies only rare and fleeting mentions 
of justice in UK military doctrine, prior to its recent redrafting.50 As part of what he calls the 
‘expanding torrent’ of realisation that fighting insurgency might require cogent doctrine 
going beyond the fighting of insurgents, he identifies the 1969 edition of the British Army’s 
Counter-revolutionary Operations as a key indicator that the complexity of the insurgency 
problem was being realised and considered. Unfortunately, the ‘justice sector’ is aligned in 
importance with freedom of expression, religion and amnesty plans.51  
 
The Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, better known as Countering Insurgency is 
reluctant to address justice in any more than terms that are of little practical consequence. 
Although an entire chapter is devoted to ‘counterinsurgency and the law’, most of that 
chapter deals, rightly, with the basis for intervention (ius ad bellum), status of forces 
agreements,52 and domestic frameworks. The bulk of the chapter is concerned with the laws 
and rules of war, such as those relating to the use of force,53 rules of engagement,54 types of 
armed conflict,55 discipline and detention,56 and the questioning of prisoners.57 Internal 
matters such as the duties of a military legal advisor (LEGAD) take up most of the rest of the 
chapter.58 There is a short paragraph on ‘rule of law’ – but it is of no practical use in terms of 
the expression of any awareness of the importance of justice.59 A mere nod is given to 
analysing ‘the perceptions and experiences of local people particularly the poor, women and 
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marginalised groups’. In practice, no LEGAD will ever analyse anything of that nature. There 
are few LEGADs on operations who have the time for such matters, or indeed the 
experience to undertake them.60 
 
JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation, the Military Contribution is a substantial document.61 It 
displays a close awareness of the dangers attendant upon allowing insurgents to grab the 
initiative in the justice sector. Indeed, it quotes an article written by the present author 
concerning Taliban courts and the effective competition they offer to corrupt state 
systems.62 The manual takes a realistic approach to reform of justice, recommending that 
government efforts should focus on building on existing systems, rather than on inventing 
new and probably impracticable (not to say inappropriate) structures: ‘By building on 
existing structures, the expansion of governance is more likely to succeed than a system 
imposed by outsiders.’63 
 
With the exception of the UK’s JDP on stability operations, there is no mention in the 
tactical doctrine of the pragmatic necessity of addressing the reality of existing systems and 
of reflecting on any threat they might present to the mission. One overriding principle –
familiar to anyone in any field of international assistance, or indeed any doctor – is (or 
should be) ‘do no harm’. For aid workers, this precept is absolutely central. That ‘doing no 
harm’ is a lesson to be drawn from history is explicitly stated in a short but excellent account 
of British counterinsurgency practice written to supplement JDP 3-40 for the Ministry of 
Defence by retired Colonel Michael Crawshaw.64  
 
COIN methods are predicated on the idea, now called the ‘population-centred approach’, 
that the ‘people are the prize’65– as if they are the subject of a sporting contest. They are, of 
course, not a ‘prize’, inert and without autonomy; they are the environment within which, 
                                                          
60
 A statement based on extensive conversations with UK army legal advisors in Afghanistan and elsewhere 
61




 JDP 3-40, para 615, p172 
63
 JDP 3-40, para 617, p173 
64
 Crawshaw, ‘The evolution of British COIN’  
65
 Brigadier Andrew Mackay’s command guidance to 52 Brigade, Helmand, October 2007  
26 
 
by definition, ‘wars among the people’ take place. They live and breathe and have their 
being. They are dynamic agents. Taking the perspective of a ‘counterinsurgency’ advocate, 
albeit within a contemporary framework, David Kilcullen sees the ‘people’ as manipulators 
of the counterinsurgent:  
 
 We think of the population as lacking in agency … nothing could be further from the 
 truth; not only are non-combatant civilians in these environments extremely active 
 and highly influential, but they are in many cases masters of manipulation and 
 experts in leveraging the presence of rich, ignorant and gullible outsiders in order to 
 get what they need, outsmart their rivals and survive another day.66  
 
This analysis, albeit framed differently is at the heart of Stathis Kalyvas’s work on civil war 
actors.67 This, it is submitted here, is entirely right. Yet the ‘people’ are curiously absent 
from much formal military and academic discourse on insurgency, except as an abstract 
entity or as ‘extras’. This is crucial when matters of justice are concerned – and particularly 
judicial systems that may not accord with Western paradigms. 
 
Critics of ‘COIN’ as a concept 
Criticism of counterinsurgency is nothing new. A commentator writing in the early 1960s 
took the view that: ‘There is a muddy verbosity and pompous profundity that are beginning 
to mark the whole subject of counterterrorism and guerrilla war.’68 The eminent Israeli 
historian Martin van Creveld has asserted that: ‘The first, and absolutely indispensable, 
thing to do is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counter-
guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is 
of little value.’69 Expanding on those views, a view has developed within the vibrant (relative 
to the UK’s) United States military intellectual world that the theory is nothing more than ‘a 
strategy of tactics’. A serving professor at the West Point US Military Academy, Gian Gentile, 
takes the view that population-centred counterinsurgency  
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 ... has become the only operational tool in the Army’s repertoire to deal with 
 problems of insurgency and instability throughout the world ... It has reduced rather 
 than promoted flexibility ... it is a method and no more, merely a set of tactics. To 
 elevate it, as has been done, to a strategy is to confine the options of the armed 
 forces whose role, in essence, is the application of extreme force ... It should not be 
 viewed as strategy, or even policy for that matter.70  
Another highly regarded American former soldier and academic, Andrew Bacevich, has 
compared the current enthusiasm for counterinsurgency and its relations with the 
disastrous financial constructs which brought the banking world to its knees. He argues that 
counterinsurgency  
 
... is the military’s equivalent of the financial sector’s relationship with collateralized 
debt obligation, or CDOs. In the past few years, financial and military leaders have 
embraced complexity and believed that uncertainty and complexity if properly 
managed and monitored could be controlled. Both COIN and CDOs have proponents 
who believe in taking giant risks in endeavors because of their belief in the triumph 
of intelligence and motivation over chaos and uncertainty.71  
 
It has been argued that the pantheon of COIN theorists is filled with losers and sometimes 
war criminals who would have won but for ‘betrayal’ or ‘if only this had been different’.72 
The truth, Douglas Porch and others suggest, is that ‘the wars were lost because the 
strategic context of the wars defied a tactical remedy. The results ranged from tactical 
disappointment to strategic catastrophe.’73 
 
He suggests that there was and remains in counterinsurgency theory a lack of overall 
awareness as to how societies actually work. For example, he says, there is no entry for 
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‘women’ or ‘female’ in FM 3-24.74 Further ideas that ‘consent’ or ‘legitimacy’ plays a part in 
traditional counterinsurgency are misplaced. 
It is also often argued that advocates of ‘COIN’ misunderstand the history whereof they 
write. All ‘counterinsurgency’ is hard-edged and exceedingly resource intensive. It is almost 
always accompanied by a significant degree of repression. This was amply in evidence in 
conflicts such as Malaya, and in many other British ‘small wars’. The successful suppression 
by the US armed forces of the Philippines Insurgency in the early twentieth century – exactly 
contemporary with the British efforts in the Second Boer War and displaying many similar 
techniques, such as concentration camps – stands both as an object study in savagery and 
murder, and as an excellent early example of ‘classical’ techniques of COIN, according to the 
perspective of the historian Mark Moyer.75  
It has been observed by Alex Marshall that in recent years, the only readily identifiable 
success against an effective guerilla war was in the savage and utterly ruthless campaign 
conducted by the Russians in Chechnya in the 1990s, long after the return of Chechens to 
their country following the death of Stalin.76 The Russians set their strategic goal – the ‘logic’ 
of the campaign – as reintegration ‘no matter what the human or material cost’ and the 
removal of Chechnya as a threat to the stability of the North Caucasus.77  
Another British commentator said of Russian ‘counterinsurgency’ activities in the 
nineteenth century ‘let it be emphatically repeated that, while individually any man might 
have the right to condemn it, collectively, as nations, it is a case of glass houses all round’.78  
In more recent years, the west has been fighting several conflicts it has characterised as 
‘insurgencies’, in such places as Iraq and Afghanistan. In some ways, the source of much of 
the discourse (although not necessarily the material) of current thinking on 
counterinsurgency was written (initially as a PhD thesis at Oxford University) by John Nagl, 
who described British counterinsurgency practice in the Malayan insurgency. He saw the 
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British Army as a ‘learning institution’ and compared it favourably to the US Army in 
Vietnam.79 This drew on the ideas of Robert Thompson and, to a lesser extent, such 
practitioners as Frank Kitson. The early twenty-first century brought insurgency back into 
public discourse, in particular through David Kilcullen’s various books.80 All of these 
accepted that there was a coherent and workable doctrine and approach called 
‘counterinsurgency’, based essentially around supporting ‘legitimate government’ and 
taking a ‘population-centred’ approach. In essence this was a descendant of the idea of 
‘hearts and minds’, espoused (or so it was argued) in successful counterinsurgencies such as 
Malaya. Having said that, in a recent essay on insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 
Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,81 Kilcullen speaks of ‘post-
classical COIN’. In so doing he distances himself from ‘classical’ COIN – a position which, in 
fairness, he always took, although not so strongly. He makes the telling point that much of 
‘classical’ COIN was developed to counter rural peasant insurrections in a post-colonial 
environment. In a fascinating discourse on the historiography of COIN, he argues that the 
term ‘counterinsurgency’ was invented only in the 1960s, and that its ‘case-study basis 
draws on an extremely limited and perhaps unrepresentative sample of conflicts’.82  
The conceptual problems inherent in answering the question ‘what is a counterinsurgency?’ 
are not lost on some more perceptive COIN theorists. They are addressed head on by David 
Kilcullen. Drawing on research by Ben Shepherd,83 he concedes that there were Nazi officers 
who saw the importance of the ‘need to protect, win over and cooperate with the local 
population’ in counter-partisan operations in the occupied Soviet territories. 
The debate over COIN and its evident problems in meeting expectations has become 
particularly vociferous, and indeed occasionally vitriolic when it concerns Afghanistan and 
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Iraq.84 Kilcullen has alleged that some critics take on ‘strawmen of their own creation’.85 For 
instance, Colonel Gian Gentile ends his book Wrong Turn with these words:  
 
American strategy has failed in Afghanistan (and Iraq) because it was founded on an 
illusion – that American style counterinsurgency could win Muslim hearts and minds 
at gunpoint and create viable nation-states on the Western model virtually from 
scratch in a short time. The idea that any of this ever made sense or has ever worked 
should be buried deep in the ground, yet the belief that counterinsurgency works 
persists like a vampire among the living.86  
 
Colonel Gian Gentile places a lack of political strategy at the heart of the problem. In this he 
is echoed by Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, former UK ambassador to Afghanistan, who quoted 
Edmund Burke at the time of the American War of Independence: ‘The use of force alone is 
but temporary. It may subdue for a moment but it does not remove the necessity of 
subduing again; and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered … An 
armament is not a victory.’87 Cowper-Coles goes on to echo Gentile (and an increasing 
number of other commentators) in pointing out that each insurgency is different and each is 
a political fight as much as a military one; and that what decides the outcome of 
insurgencies is not a series of prescriptions that can be derived from military studies of old 
conflicts, but the circumstances surrounding each one. As Douglas Porch puts it, ‘each 
insurgency is a contingent event in which doctrine, operations and tactics must support a 
viable policy and strategy, not the other way around’.88 
 
The ecology of insurgencies is far more complex than military doctrine will allow. Indeed 
ecology is not the only analogy from science that may be used. As the academic (and to a 
lesser extent practitioner) dialogue has developed over the past decade, some of the 
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language and analogies have become abstruse. Even some practitioners have begun to 
discuss insurgency in abstract fashion. General Stanley McChrystal and another researcher 
at Yale University, Kristina Talbert-Slagle, compared insurgency to disease and 
countermeasures to an immune response: ‘In fact what we have to do is create in the nation 
state the equivalent of an immune system so that they have the ability to deal with the 
problem.’89 According to this characterisation, complete as it is with a detailed outline of 
‘infectious agents waiting to get inside a warm nutrient laden environment’, countries are 
termed ‘infected’ with insurgency. This insurgency may result from the failure of one or 
many inter-dependent systems. Perhaps this is going too far, not least in its value-laden 
characterisation of insurgency as something malignant. However, the insight here is that an 
insurgency is indeed attacking elements of an inter-dependent system.  
 
To extend the analogy, one of the systems that may not be working in a society is its legal 
system. The case is made in this thesis that one aspect of countering insurgencies is that of 
law. The fact that this area has, until recently, been largely overlooked is itself testament to 
a failure of COIN doctrine to deal effectively with more difficult elements within any society. 
One reason for this may well be that military enthusiasts for COIN have, over the past 
decade, inevitably been foreigners in the lands within which they have worked and fought. 
 
In a short essay on the intellectual foundations of contemporary COIN, Stathis Kalyvas asks 
what the political theoretical framework underlying contemporary COIN is, or at least that 
version of it revealed in the US Manual – an attitude echoed in large part by contemporary 
British theory. He points out that ‘Policy guides, including field manuals, tend to be based on 
an intuitive rather than explicit or theoretical understanding of the issues with which they 
deal’ and that the US FM 3-24 is no exception.90 As he says, the implicit direction of the 
manual – and by extension, faute de mieux, of Western COIN – is given primarily for a 
specific type of situation:  
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U.S. interventions in ‘host nations’ (its writers did not contemplate the possibility of 
a domestic insurgency). It is possible, therefore, to characterize it as a guide to 
‘benevolent occupation’, benevolent in the sense that occupation is perceived as a 
temporary device until authority can be devolved to a (friendly) government. 
The form of warfare dealt with by current COIN thinking might be categorised as 
nationalistic/idealistic conflicts of the kind fought in Vietnam and Iraq. These, Kalyvas says, 
are what the authors had at the back of their minds. Very little emphasis  
 has been placed on other potential forms of warfare, such as those 
 characterized by the fragmentation of rival actors, as well as the economization, 
 criminalization and privatization of their motives and goals. Think Sierra Leone or the 
 Congo, or for that matter Bosnia or, some might argue Kosovo. These are the kind of 
 struggles described in Mary Kaldor’s recent works.91  
One might indeed argue that the war(s) in Afghanistan fall more into the last category –
namely a ‘new’ form of war, as Kaldor might call it . Finally, as Kalyvas puts it: 
By adopting the People’s War model, it misperceives the insurgent battlegrounds as 
places where the population interacts directly with either governments or insurgents 
(a problem, by the way, common to both the counterinsurgency and the revolutions 
literature of the 1960s). Sever the link with the insurgents, the thinking goes, and the 
population will have no choice but to turn to the government.92 
The fallacy here is clear. Rarely is such a binary option available. Local and regional networks 
may be far more complex than a simple choice between ‘government’ (whatever that might 
mean in such places as Iraq in 2006–07 or Afghanistan today) and the ‘insurgents’. This is 
very much the central thread running through Kalyvas’s masterwork The Logic of Violence in 
Civil War.93 Incidentally, it is worth mentioning that in this work Afghanistan is the only 
major insurgency over the last century that is not covered and commented on with 
penetrating analysis. Taking criticism of FM 3-24 a step further is Wendy Brown in the same 
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series of reviews. She is bluntly dismissive of the whole document, accusing it of ‘shoddy 
scholarly practices’.94  
With the publication of the new FM 3-24, some of these criticisms may no longer be valid in 
their detail. For example, it can no longer realistically be claimed that it proposes ‘people’s 
war’ as its paradigm. However, the new document does not differ in essence from the old 
one, in that it continues to view insurgency/counterinsurgency as a binary endeavour, 
rather than a flux of interests and motivations.  
The rather binary notion of ‘the government’ against ‘the insurgent’, with the ‘people’ 
somewhere in between, is accepted by serious commentators even today (although it is 
expressed rather more elegantly). One such writer, Ganesh Sitaraman, whose work on the 
relationship between law and insurgency is generally rather more subtle, says this: 
 But in the midst of insurgency the population has the opportunity to reject the 
 illegitimate government and can easily take up arms against it. In legitimate 
 governments, by contrast, the population supports the political authority’s actions 
 and complies with them out of obligation. Because insurgents and 
 counterinsurgents seek to win the population’s support, both attempt to bolster 
 their legitimacy whilst diminishing the legitimacy of the other.95 
This kind of approach, though tempting, ignores the kind of deep fieldwork carried out by 
researchers (such as Kalyvas), who argue that rarely, if ever, is such a binary approach 
appropriate.  
Here we come to something of a conceptual elephant in the room. For underpinning much 
of current COIN thinking is the idea of the social contract, which might, at a stretch, be 
linked with the idea of ‘legitimacy’ touted in current COIN theory.  
It could be said that insurgency might be described as an attempt to renegotiate the social 
contract by offering a better deal. This was expressed in its simplest form by the well-known 
US military commentator Bing West in August 2010:  
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 Counterinsurgency is based upon a social contract: Our soldiers bring money and 
 honest government officials; in return, the people cease passively and actively 
 supporting the insurgents.96  
West was dismissive of this approach. There is, however, a far deeper problem than that 
rather simplistic objection – or indeed the problems outlined by Kalyvas, clearly expressed 
and compelling though they are. The problem is that in many places in the world, including 
much of Iraq and most of Afghanistan, to use the terms adopted by COIN theorists, 
legitimacy does not derive from the provision of social goods or an improved link with 
government. More accurately, it does not derive from more or better social goods from 
government, combined with diminished links with insurgents. To begin with, the problem is 
not always (or even often) the how, but is rather the who – who provides those social 
effects? Even in Western countries, the provision of excellent health and education made no 
impact whatsoever on the process of sophisticated insurgencies in such places as Ireland – 
or for that matter Spain or France. 
A revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political, as the leading 
counterinsurgency strategist David Galula has put it.97 Usually that ‘political action’ is 
framed within the context of the state. Within Western culture there is a deep presumption 
of state primacy – what Kalyvas calls ‘grand politics’98 – that often ignores the deep 
pragmatism inherent at the local level or in societies where state failure is the common 
experience.  
Then there is the problem of perspective. David Ucko and Robert Egnell make the 
interesting observation that:  
 Most accounts [of COIN] are written by military officers or academics with a specific 
 interest in military history and perhaps for this reason they tend to deal 
 predominantly or even exclusively with the role of the armed forces.99 
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Anyone looking at the covers of many books in the large ‘counterinsurgency’ sections in 
military libraries might be forgiven for thinking that, contrary to Galula’s prescriptions, 
countering insurgencies is the work of well-armed male soldiers in desert uniforms.  
Exogenous COIN100 – the problem of being foreign 
 
The issue of who is providing the social goods that are designed to bring ‘legitimacy’ – chief 
among them ‘justice and rule of law’ – is surely important. Closely linked to the problem of 
the old saw ‘my insurgent is your resistance fighter’ is the reality that the wars being fought 
by the Western powers over the last decade have almost by definition been occupations. 
 
When Kilcullen claims that ‘our too willing and heavy handed interventions in the so-called 
war on terrorism to date have [created] tens of thousands of accidental guerrillas and tied 
us down in a costly series of interventions’,101 he is ignoring one key factor – indeed, it is 
argued here, the key factor. This is that the wars being fought have been and are 
interventions by foreign forces. The consequence is that the forces in those areas are 
essentially seen as occupiers.  
 
The corollary of this uncomfortable reality is that there may well be factors involved in the 
insurgency that might not necessarily be described as ‘accidental’. There may well be the 
very simple factor at play of resistance to invaders. If this key element is not addressed head 
on, it could have potentially fatal consequences for any notion of ‘legitimacy’. 
 
Kalyvas, in his critique of current military approaches referred to above, suggests that the 
current doctrine shies away from a fact that is clear to many observers – the real problem 
facing ‘counterinsurgents’ is their occupation:  
 The manual does not appear to entertain the idea that some identities (say ethnic or 
 religious ones) are maybe so hard-wired as to preclude reconstruction or reshaping 
 and while it does recognize that in the age of nationalism there is little love or 
                                                          
100
 A term used, so far as I am aware, for the first time by Ashtri Surke. She uses the term ‘exogenous’ to apply 
to state-building. See Surke, ‘Exogenous state-building’ 
101
 Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, p264 
36 
 
 patience for foreign intervention or occupation, it brushes such considerations 
 aside.102  
In his highly acclaimed Insurgent Archipelago, Mackinlay expresses the same reservation: 
 [FM 3-24] fails to engage with the idea that a counterinsurgent campaign conducted 
 on someone else’s territory is per se an invasion of that territory. It may be possible 
 to put a legal gloss on its status but the reality on the ground is that the arrival of an 
 overwhelming military force has the effect of an invasion.103 
These considerations echo Robert Pape’s aphorism concerning the source of suicide 
bombing: ‘It’s the occupation, stupid.’104 Pape argues that suicide terrorism specifically is 
not the result of Islamic fervour, but rather it is used as a weapon against occupiers.105 It 
may well be the case, then, that no amount of ‘counterinsurgency’ doctrine can succeed, as 
the problem is not one of how ‘COIN’ is done, but rather that ‘COIN’ is being done at all. 
 
Huw Bennett agrees, claiming: ‘There is scant empirical evidence to prove COIN measures 
are successful. The doctrine expects local people to accept foreigners imposing their modes 
of governance.’106 This is particularly true of ‘justice’ and, as will be argued in Chapter 4 
below, this is a very dangerous and unproductive approach.  
 
Gil Meron’s How Democracies Lose Small Wars examined France in Algeria, Israel in 
Lebanon and the US in Vietnam.107 ‘Democracies fail in small wars because they find it 
extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure 
victory; they are restricted by their domestic structure.’108  
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A slightly more nuanced critique was offered by Douglas Porch, who argues that at its heart 
‘population-centred’ counterinsurgency is simply another form of combat.109 He is joined in 
this argument by Gentile, who has argued in several articles and a book that ‘a strategy of 
tactics’ is highly unlikely to produce success, and that the history of the last century has 
demonstrated this.110 Seeing the situation otherwise is to indulge in a re-imagining of 
history. This in itself may not be damaging, were it not for the influence that these intensely 
Western-centric ideas have on actual operations. The arguments presented in such critical 
works are, of course, interesting in themselves. Their importance for the present purposes 
lies, however, more in the theme of ideas failing to address the reality experienced by those 
subjected to the ‘strategy of tactics’ that is ‘counterinsurgency’. They draw out the absolute 
necessity of seeing ‘insurgencies’ as war, and as war experienced by a population that is 
neither inert nor automatically amenable to Western notions of democracy – or, more 
importantly for the present purposes, to the ‘rule of law’.  
David Ucko and Robert Egnell’s Counterinsurgency in Crisis deals predominantly with the 
British experience, and does so within the framework and narrative of not ‘doing’ 
counterinsurgency properly, rather than attacking the premise itself.111 However, in an 
article published in late 2013, Robert Egnell touched on a topic which is indeed central to 
this thesis, articulating the realisation that to the ‘population’, the counterinsurgent may 
well look rather more like an insurgent.112 This realisation hints at the thought that 
perspective may be of key significance. From a survey of the critics of counterinsurgency 
doctrine and practice in general terms, we move now to look at how the literature has dealt 
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Insurgency, justice and military doctrine 
 
Despite assertions that ‘the primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster 
development of effective governance by a legitimate government’,113 all too often a narrow 
view of security is taken. Institution-building focuses heavily on security institutions. The 
importance of this with respect to the ‘justice sector’ is very great. Despite the 
overwhelming military focus, there is no lack of reference to ‘rule of law’. The term is 
mentioned no fewer than 30 times in the 2006 edition of FM 3-24, which, as Thomas 
Nachbar says, ‘suggests an attachment to the concept’.114 The 2014 edition demonstrates 
an even closer attachment, with no fewer than 41 mentions.115 There is an entire section of 
FM 3-24 (2006) dedicated to ‘establishing the rule of law’ (albeit only one page out of 360). 
It includes a somewhat ponderous definition of ‘rule of law’.116 The 2014 version also 
contains a section dedicated to ‘establishing the rule of law’.117 It contains pages that are 
very similar indeed to those found in its predecessor, but with some differences, including 
some more comprehensive advice on how to effect the establishment of the rule of law.  
 
The importance of who is writing the doctrine is great. Despite the much advertised wide-
ranging consultation before the publication of FM 3-24 (2006 edition),118 there is no 
escaping the fact that this is a military document. It is highly questionable whether 
dissenting (as opposed to questioning or slightly critical) opinions or voices without links to 
the military-academic community were in fact included. The same applies to the equivalent 
British documents. As will be stressed in this thesis (and will already be obvious), there is far 
more to ‘rule of law’ than – as one commentator has put it – ‘cops, courts and 
corrections’.119 Mistaking the mechanisms of justice for the activity of justice is a very major 
error. Disputes over land, money or other resources are common everywhere, and where 
the ‘state’ does not provide any or any adequate dispute resolution procedures, societies 
will evolve their own.   
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The implication of this is that justice must be seen in a far wider context. As will be 
examined below, failure to address disputes at the local level (or indeed failure to set up 
mechanisms to do so) can have national implications. Likewise decisions at the national level 
– for example on changes in land tenure law – can have a serious impact on the legitimacy 
of government at the local level; and if it does not necessarily provoke insurgency, it can 
serve to exacerbate it.  
 
There is a well-defined canon of works that are sometimes said to constitute ‘informal 
doctrine’ concerning insurgency and counterinsurgency, and some of these do deal to some 
extent with law within the insurgency context, although admittedly in rather cursory 
fashion. For example, General Sir Charles Gwynn, in the classic Imperial Policing, sets out the 
doctrinal basis of what has been called the ‘British approach’ to counterinsurgency: 
minimum force, unity of effort (of military and civilian authorities) and control, and the 
necessity of working within a well-understood legal basis, be that martial law or otherwise. 
Further, Gwynn is conscious of the military being ‘a reserve of force in support of the civil 
administration’120 and of the ‘importance of seeing events from the other side’.121 
The necessity of maintaining a constant awareness of the law and its potential is central to 
Sir Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency.122 Frank Kitson, another highly 
experienced practitioner, was well aware of the importance of law to the conduct of 
insurgency (as indeed explicitly was Thompson).123 Kitson’s insight was that a decision had 
to be made between using law as a weapon and seeing it as part of ‘good governance’, 
which is not by any means the same thing. A ‘rule of law’ approach does not necessarily sit 
well with a ‘law as a weapon approach’, and this challenge will be addressed in Chapter 2. 
There has been little else in ‘informal doctrine’ – books by practitioners – on justice within 
insurgency, aside from what has been discussed (or at least not until the last decade). Even 
David Galula passes over the need for judicial strategy – rather strangely, perhaps, given the 
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stress he places on narrative and/or propaganda, and indeed the success in Algeria of 
Jacques Verges, the lawyer who coined the term ’judicial strategy’.124  
While there is awareness in current counterinsurgency theory of the ‘shadow state’,125 the 
strong presumption is, as will be seen, that such a shadow state is the same (or at the very 
least has similar objectives as) a substantive, or what Kilcullen may call a ‘legitimate’, state. 
This is not necessarily the case, as many societies are run on a basis that neither requires 
nor is suited to ‘state’ structures. Nonetheless the idea persists that the ‘state’ model is to 
be promoted, and this is an idea that is deeply embedded in current ‘formal’ military and 
civilian doctrine and thinking. 
These ideas of ‘legitimacy’ suffuse the US Army and Marine Corps’ highly influential 
doctrinal documents (both versions of FM 3-24, from 2006 and 2014 and their rather less 
influential British counterpart Countering Insurgency. The heritage of British 
counterinsurgency doctrine, both ‘formal’ (military documents) and ‘informal’ (memoirs and 
works by individuals) was extensively described in Alex Alderson’s PhD thesis (as yet 
unpublished), which provided a fine survey of doctrine taken against the background of 
British performance in Iraq.126 Rarely is there any reference to justice and law and their 
importance to ‘population-centred’ counterinsurgency and legitimate government, although 
ideas of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘rule of law’ are regularly to be found. As has been seen when the 
literature is examined in more detail, ideas of the influence of courts and justice are 
regarded tangentially, with some rhetorical stress on ‘bottom-up’ approaches to civic 
governance. Suffice it for now to state that the importance of using courts as ‘weapons of 
war’ – an idea advocated here – is not appreciated in current doctrine.  
Aside from military doctrine and comment on it, the literature concerning courts, justice and 
insurgency is disparate, though it certainly exists. To some extent, what follows in this thesis 
is a synthesis of literatures. These range from primary sources in the form of law reports 
contemporary to the historical period being considered through to legal theory in the form 
of jurisprudence. There is basic political theory and the history of political thought, and 
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historical sources both primary and secondary. There is the extensive literature on legal 
anthropology and the more defined work on legal pluralism, alongside (and often within) 
work done on reform of the ‘justice sector’ in conflict-affected states. However, none of the 
literatures deal separately with the matter at hand, namely the use of courts in insurgency, 
particularly as a tool or weapon in the pursuit of operational or strategic objectives. 
Works concerning the law of war abound. No overview of the literature of law and war 
could fail to lead with a look at David Kennedy’s short but powerful Of War and Law.127 This 
book operates at the grand strategic level; but its ideas, which might be summarised by 
quoting one of its aphorisms ‘Law as the landscape of war’,128 heavily influence the 
approach of this thesis.  His ideas are centred on war being a ‘legal institution’.129  
There is some discussion of insurgency in Of War and Law, within the context of Iraq and 
the use of legal language in the condemnation of atrocities by US forces there: 
… the insurgents have a point of view which can also be expressed in the vocabulary 
of the modern law.130  
There is no discussion of the potential of the use of law or courts as a weapon within the 
‘landscape’ he describes, although in fairness it could be argued that the idea is implicit 
throughout the book. Interestingly for present purposes, Kennedy mentions the possibility 
of using the laws of armed conflict as a narrative tool and the effect this can have: 
Lawfare – managing law and war together – requires a strategic assessment of these 
various claims [of war crimes], and active strategy by military and humanitarian 
actors  to frame the situation to their advantage.131  
In saying this, Kennedy touches on – but then veers away from – the central argument of 
this thesis: that the landscape of war requires a judicial strategy by which to navigate.  
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As Kennedy points out, the study of law and war – and the interaction between the two – 
has been at the centre of discussion about the ‘war on terror’,132 within which the Iraq and 
Afghan wars rightly dominate the literature.133 These books tend to deal with the ius ad 
bellum and indeed the ius in bello aspects of the conflicts. However, works looking at the 
interaction of the law and courts with the operational level in any given conflict are rather 
rarer. With respect to the war in Afghanistan, a key work is Whit Mason’s Lost in Inaction, 
which contains a fine collection of essays.134  A similar work, with a wider geographical focus 
but a similar thematic approach, was edited by Deborah Isser: Customary Justice and the 
Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies covers the interface between rule of law development and 
rule of law reality in several conflict-affected zones.135 There are particularly interesting 
contributions concerning Iraq and Sudan. As a study of customary law in conflict, it is 
excellent, although it perhaps suffers from the faults of any edited volume of contributions, 
in that issues generic to all conflicts are dealt with several times over. Ganesh Sitaraman’s 
highly original Counterinsurgent’s Constitution provides another set of suggestions as to 
how to deal with restructuring a legal system in the context of an insurgency.136 The theme 
is similar to this thesis. Counterinsurgent’s Constitution is understandably very Afghan 
focused, and this has produced a somewhat excessive stress on the nostrums applied to 
that country in recent years. However, despite the significance of the Taliban’s justice 
system (which will be examined in Chapter 3), there is no mention at all of ‘competitive’ 
judicial systems.137 Nonetheless, the idea of counterinsurgency as, essentially, a struggle 
between the incumbent (as Kalyvas would call the counterinsurgent government) and the 
insurgent for the ‘support, or at least the acquiescence of the population’ reflects a highly 
conservative approach to insurgency.138  
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It might therefore be argued that Sitaraman makes the mistake of treating the ‘people’ as 
an object, rather than a dynamic agent. It is surprising in such a work that Kalyvas is not 
discussed, and indeed does not seem to be referenced. Nonetheless, Sitaraman’s idea of 
‘Organic Rule of Law’139 is nuanced, and his discussion of ‘Indirect Rule’ (which will be 
looked at in Chapter 4) is useful and penetrating, as is his final prescription for an 
eponymous ‘counterinsurgent’s constitution’, which in its wide-ranging nature might echo 
the idea within this thesis of a judicial strategy.  
Literature on insurgent courts 
Work on insurgent use of courts is rare, and it is to that literature that this thesis partly 
aspires to add. An early example is Jon Lee Anderson’s popular Guerrillas, which contained 
an entire chapter on the ways in which insurgents regulate themselves and others.140 It is 
this book, more than any other, that provided the seed for this thesis, thanks to the idea 
that, in setting up their administrations and particularly their courts, insurgents are engaged 
in a ‘revolutionary rehearsal’ of the rule they aspire to wield.141 As a popular work on travel 
in war zones, it does not aspire to be a study of the nature of the use of law in insurgency. 
However, it is fair to say that there is enough in it to give pause to any counterinsurgent. 
Works focusing on the role of courts in particular conflicts are rare. One such conflict was 
the United States Civil War, and the role of the law in that conflict is covered in some detail 
by Justice in Blue and Gray, which was concerned precisely with how the courts and the law 
in both the Confederacy and the Union impacted the strategy, and to some extent the 
conduct, of the US Civil War – in other words, how law was used as a weapon, precisely the 
topic of this thesis.142 A similar approach was adopted to another conflict – that between 
Irish Nationalists and the British state in the Irish War of Independence – by David Foxton in 
Sinn Fein and Crown Courts,143 which covered in some detail the deliberate strategy adopted 
by the Irish Nationalists of using both their own courts and the British courts to undermine 
British legitimacy. This focus on the use of the law as a strategic tool was placed in an Irish 
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historical context by Heather Laird in Subversive Law in Ireland 1879–1920;144 it also 
considered the wider context of subaltern studies in places such as India. The doyen of 
scholars of British counterinsurgency in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and 
specifically of the Irish War of Independence and the early days of the Irish Republican 
Army, is Charles Townsend. His most recent work, The Republic, deals extensively with the 
importance of courts to the overall strategy of the Irish struggle for independence.145 The 
Sinn Fein courts themselves and their work (looked at in Chapter 3), has been examined in 
some detail already.146 
The interplay between the law and British counterinsurgency in the so-called ‘classic period’ 
of counterinsurgent wars during the 1950s was intensively dealt with by David French in 
2012.147 He covered in detail the legislative strategy taken by the British during that period. 
This ground-breaking book made abundantly clear – if not explicitly, then certainly implicitly 
– the importance of a sensible judicial strategy in general and during the period in question. 
In its later pages, French even introduces the contemporary term ‘lawfare’ – although he 
confines the definition to its use in the international context.148  
Afghanistan is an exception to the lack of discussion on justice. The sheer investment made 
in the country in the justice sector has produced a vast amount of official reports and 
assessments. Most are concerned with the planning or results of ‘formal’ justice projects, 
which is to say the construction of courts and the funding of training for judges and 
prosecutors.  
As for the link between insurgent courts, the justice sector and justice, the two articles I 
wrote on my return from Afghanistan (mentioned above) were probably the first.149 With 
hindsight, they are rather rudimentary, based as they were on far less data than similar 
literature is today. From the early days of the campaign, however, several scholars were 
working on Taliban justice and its importance to their strategy. Foremost among those was 
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Antonio Giustozzi. His several books and edited volumes contain interesting detail about the 
Taliban’s justice system.150 However, his work on justice was distilled in the form of a more 
recent report, Shadow Justice: How the Taliban run their judiciary?, which deals in detail 
with the procedure, personnel and strategy of the Taliban judicial system.151 At the granular 
level of a single province, the key role played by justice in Afghanistan (and by extension all 
similar conflicts) was clearly outlined in Michael Martin’s PhD thesis and subsequent book 
An Intimate War.152 This was a step forward from the perspective of justice and insurgency, 
as it evidenced how much of a priority the provision of justice was for the majority of 
Helmandis at a time of insurgency and/or civil war.153  
It is at this more granular level that the current literature begins (but only begins) to take 
into account a very rich seam of scholarship in two highly apposite fields: legal anthropology 
(and particularly the area within it of legal pluralism) and ‘rule of law development’. Both 
fields of study have long heritages that, it is argued here, are highly relevant to the 
dilemmas facing those who find themselves involved in combating (or indeed fomenting) 
insurgency. However, it is surprising that almost none of the military doctrine, either 
‘formal’ or ‘informal’, of the last five decades has made more than a passing reference to 
the extensive and indeed connected work done in those two fields.  
A very notable exception to the lack of discussion of insurgent courts has been the work of 
Sandesh Sivakumaran. His authoritative Law of Non-International Armed Conflict154 contains 
a section that digests the work he did on insurgent courts for a 2009 article for the Journal 
of International Criminal Justice.155 He takes a very pragmatic view of such courts, believing 
that:  
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 Rather than ignoring them [courts] or criticizing them without offering concrete 
 suggestions for improvement, the international community needs to grapple with 
 them and consider how best they may be utilized in order to aid enforcement of the 
 law.156  
Jonathan Somers takes the view that international humanitarian law, the law of armed 
conflict, should act as if it meant what it said about ‘equality of belligerents’ and allow the 
possibility of insurgent courts to have certain judgments recognised.157 In this he is 
supported by Parth Gejji.158 The arguments on these issues will be revisited in more detail in 
Chapter 3.  
It might be contended that many of the arguments concerning the nature of insurgency, its 
social role and causes sit at least partly within the discipline of anthropology. We turn first 
to the chronologically (and indeed conceptually) earlier area of legal anthropology. Its very 
history is infused with the dilemmas faced by colonial administrators struggling with the 
problems presented by attempts to impose a set of legal structures on societies that already 
have deeply entrenched systems. In essence, this is an early version of the idea of the 
‘shadow state’, a term which carries within itself some embedded assumptions (chiefly that 
of the ‘state’, and indeed the assumption that such a state is ‘shadow’). There was much 
discussion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of what would now be 
termed ‘legal pluralism’ (see Chapter 4 for a more complete discussion), the existence on 
the same territory of two or more legal jurisdictions. In India, and particularly the North 
West Frontier provinces bordering Afghanistan, the debate concerning how to exercise 
judicial power went on for decades. This was also true in other areas, including West Africa, 
where Lord Lugard crystallised the British approach (and indeed the approach more 
generally in the British Empire) in The Dual Mandate in British Tropical West Africa, which 
discussed in detail the concept of ‘indirect rule’.159 Indirect rule meant, essentially, the 
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acceptance of local laws and customs, and the countenancing of them (within reason). This 
policy ensured minimum conflict between ‘formal’ government and the peoples notionally 
subject to it. The explicit link between war and social anthropology was reflected in the 
collection of key (indeed sometimes classic) anthropological articles in the 1967 Law and 
Warfare by Paul Bohannan.160 At a more generic level is Can Intervention Work?, by Rory 
Stewart and Gerald Knaus. 161 The significance of this empirically derived work is that it 
understands that principles and practices which seem self-evident to those intervening are 
in no way as obvious to those into whose countries interventions are directed.  
Here we have introduced the concepts essential to the remainder of the thesis and have 
reviewed the literature that has hitherto addressed the central ideas. The next chapter looks 
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THE LAW AND INSURGENCY 
This chapter provides an introduction to the legal environment within which insurgency 
takes place. It is divided into five short sections dealing with the legal background to 
insurgency, the social and political background, legitimacy, lawfare and narrative.  
In a 2009 essay for the Virginia Law Review, Ganesh Sitaraman, whose work was briefly 
discussed in the literature review above, rightly observes that ‘Despite counterinsurgency’s 
ubiquity in military and policy circles, legal scholars have almost completely ignored it.’162 
The same is true in reverse, in that counterinsurgency scholars and practitioners have 
largely ignored the legal aspects of their topic.  
Section 1 takes a legal approach to insurgency, with the objective of casting some light on 
how the law sees that form of war and assesses the status of those who conduct it. It aims 
to highlight the importance of understanding the fact that the law can have a critical impact 
on outcome. Section 2 looks at the areas where legal, political and social theory impinges on 
insurgency; it looks at such matters as legitimate monopoly of force and rule of law. Section 
3 engages briefly with ideas of legitimacy that wind through current counterinsurgency 
doctrine. Section 4 is an introduction to lawfare, the confluence of law and war. Section 5 
asks how the law might be used as an instrument of narrative.  
Section 1 
A legal approach to insurgency 
Rebellions and insurgencies have been subject to some form of international legal control –
or at the very least definition – for centuries. Initially this was for the rather simple and 
undeniable fact that insurgencies, particularly effective ones, could have an impact on third 
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parties, namely other states.163 There is always the risk of intervention by those third states, 
often ostensibly to protect their own interests.164  
In more recent years, states have begun to see themselves as having some degree of 
responsibility. This is exemplified most clearly by the idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
seen recently in Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011. It is not necessarily a 
recent innovation. For example, Britain intervened as far back as the Greek War of 
Independence in 1824 ostensibly to prevent massacres of Christians; similarly, the French in 
Syria in 1860 and the Russians in Bulgaria in 1877. At this time there was much rhetoric in 
the UK concerning Ottoman actions in the Balkans. Finally, universally accepted 
international law (in the shape of the Geneva Conventions) now protects those involved as 
both combatants and non-combatants in ‘cases of armed conflict not of an international 
character’.165 What, though, does international law have to say about the definition of 
‘insurgency’? And is such a definition important, particularly in the context of insurgent 
courts?  
Historically there have been three types of what are now called ‘internal armed conflict’: 
rebellion, insurgency and ‘belligerence’. The principal distinction between the three has 
related to the intensity of the violence.166 Traditionally, rebellion was treated as an internal 
matter. It is ‘a modest, sporadic challenge by a section of the population intent on gaining 
control’.167 Provided the rebellion was put down in good time, international law considered 
it to be a matter to be dealt with under the criminal laws of the state involved. 
An insurgency was a rather more serious matter, involving ‘serious violence coupled with 
the inability of the government to suppress the violence’.168 ‘Insurgency, as far as foreign 
states are concerned, results from the determination not to recognise the rebellious party 
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as a belligerent on the grounds that there are absent one or more of the requirements of 
belligerency.’169  
There were no formal advantages accruing to a group which had been recognised as 
‘insurgents’. Recognition ‘regulated the relationship between the insurgents and the 
recognising state’.170 The recognition of insurgency by an outside state, therefore, was not 
the result of the satisfaction of certain defined conditions, but rather the realistic 
acceptance of the situation on the ground, in order to ensure national interests.  
However, recognition as ‘belligerents’ was of even more importance. The status of 
belligerency was set out initially by the eighteenth-century Swiss jurist Emerich de Vattel in 
his book The Law of Nations. There was a rather more clearly defined set of criteria to be 
fulfilled. Traditionally these were: first, that a civil war existed – the most important 
criterion, as this distinguished the situation from simple acts of criminal violence; second, 
that the insurgent group occupied and conducted a measure of ‘orderly administration’ in 
that area; third, that insurgents should abide by the laws and customs of the law of war;171 
fourth – and rather more controversial – was that there was a practical necessity for states 
to define their attitude to the civil war. If those criteria were fulfilled and insurgents/rebels 
were recognised as belligerents, there could be considerable advantages, including trade, 
regulation of the conflict and the law of war, from the perspective of the recognising state, 
with implications for combat immunity and prisoner of war status, for example.172 The 
recognition of belligerency was as much a decision based on the facts on the ground as it 
was a political decision, although clearly such recognition had political potential. In the fight 
for legitimacy, recognition of belligerency was if not vital, then certainly very important; it 
was, in a sense, the first step to the ultimate objective for many insurgents – recognition as 
a state, about which a vast jurisprudence exists.  
As Stephen Neff says in his legal history of the United States Civil War, one of the greatest of 
all ‘insurgencies’ in history, Justice in Blue and Gray, ‘specific issues beyond number hinged 
on this most basic question’ of what the precise legal nature of a given conflict is, and 
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specifically whether the parties, one or both, are to be seen as ‘belligerents’.173 One key 
factor in making that decision might be framed around the question ‘are these rebels 
merely disgruntled individuals or must they be treated as other soldiers might?’ Clearly this 
is largely a question of perspective, and in some ways is a reframing of the 
terrorist/freedom fighter question. The matter was succinctly framed by the US Supreme 
Court in one of the cases brought at the time, concerning the status of Confederate Navy 
ships:  
 When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of 
 territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have 
 organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the 
 world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest as a war.174 
Surely this is, to some extent, a matter of observation and common sense, as the court 
implicitly recognises. As it implies, belligerent status is a different quality from the status of 
independence. This dilemma can go to the heart of policies of countries far from the locus of 
the insurgency itself. In the US Civil War, for example, the awarding of ‘belligerent’ status to 
the Confederate States of America (and the consequences flowing from that) was driven to 
a great degree by the requirements of the cotton business in the north-west of England. It 
was in the interests of those managing that trade that such trade should be legal. In turn, 
the way in which the United States treated British vessels acting in accordance with that 
decision to treat the Confederate States of America as ‘belligerent’ (i.e. having status 
sufficient to trade with) deeply impacted US–UK relations.  
While the terminology may have shifted, many of the same questions are, then, clearly alive 
today. Are insurgents to be treated any differently from criminals, or do they have another 
status? That is only one of several questions, the answers to which depend on the status, de 
facto, of the insurgency. The huge legal controversies concerning how Taliban fighters are 
treated by US forces are only one facet of this field of legal controversy. 
The provisions outlined above are somewhat antiquated, in that the term ‘belligerent’ is no 
longer used in common discourse of international law. However, international law does not 
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operate like municipal law, where laws can be abrogated or repealed. There is no doubt 
that, even with the advent of provisions such as the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions,175 the ideas running through these concepts of, for example, ‘belligerent’ still 
exist. While there have been no incidents of explicit recognition specifically of insurgency or 
belligerency since 1949, for example, there can be little doubt that the recognition by 
several states of the National Transitional Council (NTC) of Libya in 2011 was implicit:  
 In line with our assessment of the NTC as the legitimate interlocutor in Libya 
 representing the aspirations of the Libyan people, the Government has invited the 
 NTC to establish an office in the UK. This will enhance our existing relationship with 
 the NTC ... It will help us to work more closely together on sharing information and 
 formulating our policy towards Libya. This arrangement does not affect our position 
 on the legal status of the NTC: the British Government will continue to recognise 
 States, not Governments.176  
It is important to note the caveats in this statement: it stops short of recognising the NTC as 
the government of Libya, at least at that point. A similar statement was made concerning 
the Syrian National Council.177 While the terms ‘insurgency’ and ‘belligerency’ are not used, 
in both these cases the UK clearly went beyond treating the Libyan and Syrian insurgents as 
mere rebels.178 On 6 March 2013, the Syrian National Council was granted Syria’s seat at the 
Arab League,179 indicating extensive recognition that was analogous to ‘belligerency’. It is 
well worth mentioning here that the question of state recognition, as hinted at by William 
Hague in his statement above, is a discrete and complex topic in itself.  
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These questions continue. The controversy surrounding the ‘Islamic State’ which burgeoned 
in mid-2014 illustrates the problems concerning recognition and the relationship it has with 
insurgency. For example, the difficulties that may arise might be illustrated by a speech 
given by British Prime Minster David Cameron in August 2014. Cameron said that it was 
‘abhorrent’ that British citizens had ‘declared their allegiance’ to groups such as the Islamic 
State. The consequence could be, the strong inference was, that at least those with dual 
nationality would have their passports removed.180 These are dangerous waters, as the 
question might be raised whether ‘allegiance’ to such groups as Islamic State was of a 
different order and magnitude from allegiance to criminal groups such as, for example, the 
Mafia. If so, is there an implicit recognition that Islamic State has some attributes of a state, 
or at the very least of ‘belligerents’?  
These issues notwithstanding, the treatment in classical international law might be regarded 
as rather more helpful in developing a workable definition of ‘insurgency’ than more recent 
military doctrine. It is telling that neither US nor UK military doctrine refers even in passing 
to the extensive and deep academic and political discourse on the legal nature and effect of 
insurgency.  
 What are the consequences of this form of largely historical recognition (be it ever so rarely 
addressed today) for the present topic? Practically, it must be conceded, little. However, the 
extensive analysis carried out, particularly in the nineteenth century, remains useful, if only 
to demonstrate that there is little new in the discourse of insurgency itself, even if 
‘counterinsurgency’ has become rather more complex. Clearly the establishment of a 
civil/administrative regime that is adequate to provide support to a working system of 
criminal or civil dispute resolution is telling. As this thesis will demonstrate, it may also be 
vital, if not decisive, to the success of an insurgency.  
The status of insurgents and international law 
There has been a great deal of controversy over the past decade as to what distinguishes an 
insurgent combatant from a criminal – or indeed, as the United States terms them, 
‘unlawful enemy combatants’. The current law relating to status is based on the Additional 
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Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977), and particularly article 44 of the first 
Additional Protocol, which governs the status of combatants. The Additional Protocols 
themselves are not free of controversy,181 but it is generally accepted that they are unlikely 
to be changed or supplemented.  
The law surrounding these issues and the status of insurgents has become abstruse and a 
specialist field in itself, particularly in the United States.182 The details of that debate are of 
little or no relevance here, though it might be noted that the efforts by the West to 
establish some form of moral ascendancy have been vitiated by credible accusations of 
torture, rendition, failure to accord due process and overall hypocrisy. None of this has 
assisted in achieving notional objectives of establishing democratic values. It may well be 
that this also impacted on the degree to which the West’s activities in places such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq have been regarded as legitimate. What is relevant is that current 
international law accepts insurgents as combatants so long as certain conditions are 
fulfilled, mainly the carriage of weapons openly at all material times.183 It is also of relevance 
that article 1(4) of the First Additional Protocol states that all the Geneva Conventions apply 
to non-international armed conflict, as well as to conflict between states – including ‘armed 
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’.184  
As we saw above in connection with the policy of David Cameron’s government to 
‘returning’ Islamic State fighters, the controversies concerning the Islamic State (which at 
the time of writing are still very much ongoing) demonstrate that these matters have very 
deep potential practical import, and care must be taken in terms of how domestic counter-
terrorism law concerning ‘allegiance’ impacts on effective, if illegitimate, insurgencies 
elsewhere.  
The specific and connected question of the status of insurgent courts in international law is 
addressed in Chapter 3. 
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Counterinsurgent judicial strategy, occupation and the law 
To some extent the parameters of counterinsurgent judicial engagement, at least in the 
context of occupation, are defined by law in the shape of the Hague Regulations of 1907185 
and the fourth Geneva Convention.186 These set out the duties of ‘belligerent occupiers’. 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations states:  
 The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the 
 occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as 
 far as is possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely 
 prevented, the laws in force in the country. 
Clearly, to some extent, this gives very wide latitude indeed to an occupier, while at the 
same time creating some very definite obligations, the most onerous of which, as the British 
and American occupiers of Iraq discovered, is the ‘restoration of law and order’.187 
Nevertheless, as Christopher Greenwood points out, ‘the fact that the principles we have 
considered are difficult to apply does not remove their validity’.188 
However, concerning judicial authority, the latitude available to an occupier is reduced 
somewhat by article 54 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: 
 The occupying power may not alter the status of public officials or judges in the 
 occupied territories or in any way apply sanctions to or take any measures of 
 coercion or discrimination against them, should they abstain from fulfilling their 
 functions for reasons of conscience.  
This must be read alongside article 64 of the same Convention, which states that ‘the penal 
laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force’ subject to provisions that may be 
essential to fulfilling the occupying power’s obligations to ‘maintain orderly government’ 
and ensure the security of the occupiers. The strong implication here is that an occupying 
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power can set up its own courts, if that is deemed necessary.189 ‘In general the courts of an 
occupier will have no part to play’, save that actions of the occupying forces may be subject 
to judicial review by their own courts.190  
It may be argued that the thrust of these provisions is pragmatic, and the assumption within 
them is that the administration of the occupied territory is temporary. Within the context of 
the present work, these provisions are relevant, not so much for their application in 
situations of occupation, but for their importance (or potential importance) in operational 
planning – either to prevent insurgency or to counter it. This matter is looked at in Chapter 
2. 
 
Section 2  
Law, society and insurgency 
The importance of law to societies 
 
The anthropologist Sally Falk Moore has said that ‘there is an intimate relation between law 
and society, that law is part of social life in general and must be treated analytically as 
such’.191 Surely no activity, certainly in the field of conflict and warfare, is more bound up 
with society than counterinsurgency. It is surely incumbent, therefore, on counterinsurgents 
to understand fully the parameters of the societies in which they work, and specifically, for 
present purposes, those relating to law and dispute resolution. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the way courts have been used by insurgents and 
counterinsurgents, particularly in the decade after 2001.192 All societies at whatever level of 
sophistication develop or evolve methods of resolving disputes. The traditional framing of 
the ‘separation of powers’ includes the judiciary as one of the key elements of government. 
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The degree of complexity by which those systems – whether framed as ‘judiciary’ or with a 
cognate role – resolve disputes increases according to the complexity of the society using 
them. Within small, tribe-based societies in which all members know each other, dispute 
resolution is carried out within extended families. For the small groups that constitute 
hunter-gatherers, the motivation behind resolving disputes often lies in the group retaining 
its cohesion as a self-supporting unit, which becomes ever more fragile as it loses members. 
In other words, it cannot afford to lose people through ostracism, death or injury as a result 
of conflict. Survival is marginal.193 As anthropologist Jared Diamond points out in The World 
until Yesterday, disputes in such societies often occur between members of families, and 
negotiations may involve all members of the extended family affected.194 This is a situation 
where all members of the community are known to each other.  
  
As societies develop, so necessarily does the sophistication of the mechanisms used:  
 
… there is a virtual continuum, from small societies with no centralised authority or 
justice system, through chiefdoms in which the chief resolves many disputes onto 
weak states in which individuals often still take justice into their own hands and 
concluding with strong states exercising effective authority.195  
 
Settler agrarian societies develop interests in land, and the implications for the complexity 
of disputes are great. The relationship between land and its ownership, access, inheritance, 
exchange, valuation, sale and use all generate the necessity for rule-based dispute 
resolution.196 A similar issue is the level of complexity for pastoralists – with the need to 
resolve disputes involving the movement of groups of animals and people on a seasonal or 
annual basis across land that may be owned. Conflict can also arise from disputes 
concerning ownership of the flocks. These matters generate a whole echelon of 
requirements for rule-based (perhaps another and better phrase might be ‘norm based’) 
dispute resolution systems.  
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The nature of these dispute resolution systems is immensely varied, ranging from ‘umpire-
based’ mechanisms (such as ad hoc tribunals) through mediation by respected elders or kin, 
to tribal or clan gatherings. The anthropologist Bronislav Malinowski conducted a landmark 
study of society on the Trobriand Islands in the early twentieth century. He found that in 
any society, the preservation of the rights of others and the curbing of human inclinations, 
passions or instinctive drives may not necessarily be achieved through ‘courts and 
constables’.197 Malinowski was a pioneer in the field of the academic discipline 
‘Anthropology of Law’, and some of the findings in that field will be referred to throughout 
this thesis.  
 
For present purposes, at the very least in non-state systems it is probably right to say that 
the resolution of disputes is based on escalating violence, or at least coercion – as seen 
above, some societies eschew violence as counterproductive to the survival of the tribe or 
group. Sometimes the form of coercion may better be described as ‘custom’, ‘manners’ or 
something akin to what, in our own culture, might be described as ‘the done thing’. This is 
usually within a system of essential consensus concerning the application of that violence, 
custom or coercion – a system, as it were, of regulation. This is especially the case 
concerning more ‘developed’ societies, such as those that will be dealt with in this thesis.  
 
Such systems can extend as far as blood feuds, which – far from being a symptom of the 
kind of chaos described by Hobbes as ‘warre of every one against every one’ – are extremely 
closely regulated by ancient codes.198 Today such codes are still in use even in Europe, 
where in Albania the Kanun Lekë Dukagjini still to some extent governs the conduct of blood 
feud (gjakmarrja) in northern reaches of that country.199 In Afghanistan, as we shall see, the 
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Pashtunwali code is regarded as central to rule and order in those areas occupied by the 
Pashtun peoples. Similar codes still exist among other traditional peoples worldwide. These 
codes are tribal responses to the risks posited by those who adopt social contract 
constructs.  
 
A primary concern of such non-state systems where disputants may be acquainted with one 
another (or at the very least be acquainted with the other party’s family or tribe) and may 
do regular business, is to return the parties to a situation where they may be able to coexist. 
This almost invariably involves some form of compensation or, in cases of murder or assault, 
retribution. This in turn implies the necessity of restitution and settlement. In Western 
societies this form of justice is known as ‘restorative justice’, although the form it takes in 
the West is largely state organised.200 Consequently, the function of dispute resolution in 
those tribal societies that use such mechanisms is less a search to determine what 
happened, and more an effort to determine what might be done to repair the damage, 
whether such harm might be characterised in other societies as criminal or civil. Law, insofar 
as it can be seen to exist as an abstract (about which, see below), here clearly develops as a 
tool for the maintenance of necessary harmony. 
 
In larger and more complex societies where parties to disputes may not be acquainted with 
each other personally or have identifiable family links, states exist to control that force. ‘In 
many or most cases in populous state societies consisting of millions of citizens who are 
strangers to each other, the people involved [in disputes] had no prior relationship, don’t 
anticipate any future relationship and were brought together on a one-shot basis’ by the 
circumstances of the dispute.201 In such circumstances, there are clear risks to allowing 
unrestricted access to force by citizens, those risks having been delineated by Hobbes and 
others: ‘a prime concern of effective state government is to guarantee or at least improve 
public safety by preventing the state’s citizens from using force against each other’.202 In 
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essence, this is exactly what Hobbes and his successors in the social contract movement 
have claimed, in order to avoid the violent anarchy that might otherwise result. Ideas of 
‘social contract’ are clearly far easier to uphold in smaller societies, where the philosophical 
tool of that ‘contract’ is more readily derived from what actually takes place, than they are 
in larger, highly complex societies.  
 
The relevance of political theory is more apparent in insurgencies than relatively stable 
democracies. In the nineteenth century, questions of where sovereignty resided were of 
immediate importance, particularly with the debates preceding the outbreak of the US Civil 
War. The United States Civil War is arguably the paradigm of insurgencies.  
The question of whether the ‘people’s’ will existed in the form of the federal government 
and the constitution of the United States, or was (or might be) superseded by other forms of 
the expression of their will, was central to the casus belli. For example, the question of 
whether the ‘people’ (in the form of constitutional conventions or the federal government) 
were supreme was key to the issue of the legitimacy of the Confederacy. For instance, a 
judgment handed down by the Georgia Supreme Court stated that the secession 
conventions, by which secession was declared in all but one state (Tennessee, which 
declared independence), provided a way by which people act ‘in a capacity higher than and 
superior to any government, state or federal, theretofore created or adopted by them’.203  
 
 
An excursion into jurisprudence 
 
Here is not the place for a full discussion of the jurisprudential debates that have arisen 
from attempts to answer the question ‘from where derives the human impulse to law’ and 
‘justice’, or indeed the question of what ‘justice’ or ‘human rights’ are – if indeed they ‘are’ 
anything at all. These questions have been at the heart of debates in jurisprudence for 
centuries. The effect of courts upon insurgencies is not at heart a jurisprudential issue, 
although certainly legal philosophical questions impact on the conclusions that may be 
drawn. There is also a risk of being drawn into unproductive debates that, for present 
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purposes, are not helpful. As the scholar of jurisprudence William Twining put it, much of 
the discussion on legal pluralism and centralism, a key topic in this thesis, ‘has been 
bedevilled by an obsession with perennial jurisprudential problems surrounding the concept 
of law and legal pluralism’.204  
 
In smaller societies, as was mentioned above, it might well be argued that dispute 
resolution may be framed within the field of ‘social contract’ within the larger area of 
‘natural law’. But in larger and more complex systems of law, the natural law theorist, often 
influenced by social contract ideas, only provides one stream of thinking. Another legal 
philosophical flow is provided by the ‘positivists’, who take the alternative view that instead 
of there being any substance to notions of ‘social contract’, law is simply a result of human 
action and enactment. There is no morality necessary in law. ‘One cannot derive an ought 
from an is’, say the positivists;205 put in the most simple formulation, ‘because chaos might 
allegedly result from the absence of this or that law, there is no necessary implication that 
this or that law ought or should be enacted’. There is, in fact, nothing ‘self-evidently right’ or 
‘basic forms of good’206 inherent in any law: there is no ‘law’ existing as a separate abstract 
entity. Millions of pages have been written in an attempt to reconcile the two streams of 
legal philosophy. Some form of synthesis was arguably achieved by H.L.A. Hart, whose views 
are centred on the qualities necessary for working law as opposed to the supposed nature 
or origin of those laws themselves. There are some rules which are necessary to ensure 
survival, as we are not in ‘a suicide club’.207  
 
An interesting empirical anthropological perspective is provided by Margaret Mead:  
 
… the culturally regulated relationship among persons within a given environment is 
characterised by certain persistent regularities, due to the species – specific 
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characteristics of human beings ... the systematic observations of constancies among 
all known cultures make it highly probably that the kinds of cultural behaviour found 
in all of them have been an integral part of their survival system up to the present 
time.208  
 
She goes on to enumerate these as including murder, regulated family life and private 
property. In so doing she is coming close to a social contract/natural law perspective. It may 
well be that some forms of insurgent (or indeed counterinsurgent) justice may cast some 
light on the jurisprudential aspect of the sources of law and justice. Most insurgents and 
counterinsurgents are initially driven by imperatives of security and, as we will see, the need 
to establish control in a competitive environment. Some forms of insurgent justice are 
entirely different from the forms against which they compete: in both the main cases that 
this thesis examines, Ireland and Afghanistan, the legal systems adopted and developed by 
the insurgent groups are very different in form from those against which they compete.  
 
More advanced societies and the legitimate ‘monopoly of force’ 
 
The key difference between developed state systems and ‘less-developed’ non-state 
systems at what might be called a tribal level is that state systems claim what is often called 
‘the monopoly of force’. It is important to state that such a monopoly must have a high 
degree of acceptance as ‘legitimate’.  In non-state or tribal systems, it is common for the 
right to use force to be claimed by individuals or tribes. All men have the right to use force 
to assert their rights, albeit within parameters that are well understood by the society in 
which they live. In such societies, there is little or no delineation between what is described 
in state systems as ‘criminal’ or ‘civil’ law.  
 
Weber gives the key defining characteristic of a state as being precisely that it claims such a 
monopoly and refuses it to the state’s constituent parts. He identifies the practice of politics 
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as the means by which that monopoly is administered. Clearly, the particular practice of 
dispute resolution, the role of ‘courts’, is one of those means.209  
 
Weberian political ideas are deeply ingrained in Western thought. Those presumptions are 
not by any means present everywhere. A fine example of this can be seen in Pashtunwali – 
or for that matter in other similar quasi-legal or perhaps social codes, such as those referred 
to above. Indeed, the ‘Weberian paradigm’ of the ‘West’ may not (as will be seen below, 
particularly in Chapter 4) be relevant at all in those areas characterised as ‘ungoverned 
space’, where, almost by definition, the ‘state’ is either not present or else plays a decidedly 
limited role in day-to-day life. We turn now to those presumptions of Western policy that 
permeate all aspects of state-building.  
In his article ‘The three types of legitimate rule’, Weber was the first to divide authority into 
so-called ‘ideal types’ – archetypes, as it were, of political power – for the purpose of 
discussion and analysis.210 These three types were ‘charismatic, traditional and rational 
legal’. Charismatic rule is founded on the individual personal charisma, inspiring devotion in 
followers. Traditional rule is founded essentially on the legitimacy conferred by the antiquity 
or supposed antiquity of a given system. Rational legal is based upon systems of rules – rule 
of law, perhaps. All three of these so-called ‘pure types’ are essentially abstract notions, 
useful as tools of analysis rather than to provide specific definitions. It is surely the case that 
most forms of political rule have elements of all three types. Insurgent systems generally fall 
between the last two. There are cases where charismatic rule has formed the basis of 
insurgent government and dispute resolution; such examples were more prevalent in 
former centuries, but the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Central Africa may be considered 
to fall within that category.211 In this thesis we will be dealing largely with ‘traditional’ and 
‘rational legal’ forms of rule.  
 
Weber sees these three notions as essentially hierarchical, developing upwards from the 
personal or charismatic to the rational-legal political settlement exemplified, it might be 
                                                          
209
 Weber, Max; ‘Politics as a Vocation’ (1919) 
210
 Originally published in 1922 in the Preussischer Jahrbuch, 187, 1–2 
211
 ‘Kony exercised a form of charismatic leadership, accepted by his rank and file soldiers and with no active 
resistance from the population.’ Doom, Rudy, Valassenroot, Koen, ‘Kony’s message: A new Koine? The Lord’s 
Resistance Army in Northern Uganda’, African Affairs, 38 (1999), p22  
64 
 
said, in the modern Western secular democratic state. Within such secular state systems of 
dispute resolution there are two usually separate jurisdictions, characterised as ‘civil’ and 
‘criminal’. One arguable exception to this general rule is the system of Islamic law, the 
Sharia, which might be characterised as a system for the regulation of private justice, 
wherein the civil and criminal jurisdictions are not always clearly delineated.  
 
When we come to discuss the situation in Islamic countries – for example, Afghanistan – the 
role and methods of such law may become clearer, particularly in reference to the way in 
which the Taliban have been operating judicially. In ‘normal’ Weberian states, citizens of a 
state are discouraged from the application of private violence by the threat of state 
retribution. In return, citizens of that state are assured of the state’s efforts to ensure their 
own security. The state is ‘providing a mandatory alternative to do-it-yourself justice – all 
other goals are subordinate to that one’.212 In contrast to non-state systems in societies 
where there is some necessary degree of mutual acquaintance, the state is not primarily 
concerned with compensation in ‘criminal’ matters, as society can function without such. 
For example, in England and Wales the purposes of sentencing are fivefold: first, 
punishment; second, the reduction of crime through deterrence; third, the reform and 
rehabilitation of offenders; fourth, the protection of the public; and fifth, the making of 
reparation by offenders.213 
 
The ‘rule of law’, monopoly and insurgency 
 
States on the Western model aspire to the ‘rule of law’. Definitions of this term are 
common, but agreement on what precisely it denotes is less so. The commonly quoted 
United Nations definition states that rule of law may be defined as  
 
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, 
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measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before 
the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation 
of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.214  
 
Other authorities’ definitions are not significantly different. Notable among the qualities 
applied by most authorities is that of ‘supremacy of the law’. Clearly this strongly implies a 
single authority. Here sociology, as represented by Weber, and the law meet.  
 
Insurgents generally aspire to that  legitimate monopoly of force, in the same way as 
governments do. They see it as the key attribute of a successful state. As we shall see below, 
to a very great degree this goes hand in hand with ‘legitimacy’. Having said that, in pluralist 
systems (which is to say, in those with more than one form of judicial authority) there is 
little in the way of monopoly. Within standard rule-of-law models there is little room for 
alternative sources of legal authority. Chapter 4 will demonstrate that failure to appreciate 
that Weberian ‘monopolies’ are not essential to working governance has arguably produced 
a decade of wasted opportunity in Afghanistan. This is particularly unfortunate, as questions 
of how to accommodate legally pluralistic societies were deeply studied in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, and their positive (as well as their negative) legacies remain in 
many places today.  
 
The acquisition and retention of a monopoly of force accepted by its subjects as legitimate 
(or at the very least supremacy) and the potential attendant support and adherence form 
the initial purpose of insurgent struggle. In this, insurgents are engaged in a competition for 
control. Clausewitz saw war as a political act;215 in other words, it is an activity which 
extends beyond the arena of the application of physical force. The contemporary 
counterinsurgent ‘practitioner’ David Kilcullen rephrased classical Clausewitzian thinking 
thus: ‘the resilience of an armed group depends on the capabilities they can bring to bear 
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across the full spectrum of a competitive control system’.216 David Kennedy sums up what 
the role of law can be: ‘Law itself may also be an instrument of policy, on a continuum with 
war – different means to the same end.’217 Some insurgent groups have also realised this 
and have used that realisation to their great advantage. They will be examined in Chapter 2 





Legitimacy – the ‘main objective’ 
 
‘Law has become a mark of legitimacy and legitimacy has become the currency of power.’218 
 
As kinetic combat takes place in a physical environment, in which all participants fight, so 
law may be a common language in the virtual fight for ‘legitimacy’. Not all 
counterinsurgents understand that justice is where (as it were) the ‘rubber’ of governance 
meets the ‘road’ of the people. Counterinsurgents should be sure to treat it with the same 
regard with which some successful insurgents treat it. 
From a military perspective, treating the justice sector in a post-conflict or ‘state-building’ 
context as an often unwelcome ancillary is a serious error. While the form that dispute 
resolution mechanisms take may change, the nature of justice as a social good is similar 
across all cultures. Similarly, the relationship between justice and legitimacy is often taken 
for granted.  
To illustrate the point, I will, for a moment, come home. There may be some readers who 
have, at one time or another, found themselves in a British court. The fact of being in such a 
place has profound implications that extend beyond the fate of one’s personal liberty or 
driving licence. For a start, there is an implicit acceptance of the court’s authority. The 
presumption of legitimacy is so deep that it is almost never articulated. One could sit in 
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English courts for many years without hearing the phrase ‘I deny the right of this court to 
decide my case.’ There may be those who find court rulings misconceived or just plain 
wrong. Arguments are often made about jurisdiction, but few outside the small ‘insurgent’ 
community of this country deny the right of the court to make those rulings. Facing 
everyone in a UK court (except the judge or magistrate) is a large Royal Crest over the 
judge’s seat. For those who care to consider it, the implication is clear. Here resides 
authority based around common acceptance. There are no rivals to the courts here. Any 
proposed (or indeed existing) Sharia or Beth Din courts (dealing largely with family cases, 
with the consent of the litigants) will derive their authority, and more importantly the 
enforceability of their decisions, from United Kingdom law. When something goes wrong, 
whether this is government misfeasance or private crime, we rely on courts to sort it out. 
The ability and acceptance of the right to adjudicate in disputes is the ultimate expression of 
the right to rule – indeed of ‘legitimacy’. Once that sense is lost, as it was in early 1920s 
Ireland or early twenty-first century Afghanistan (both examined in later chapters), it is a 
slogging uphill struggle to get it back. Complex insurgencies are powered by injustice, 
corruption and a sense of illegitimacy. Contrary to received governmental wisdom, they are 
not generally driven by a desire to see free and fair elections. Most ordinary right-thinking 
people have the provenance of their government well down their list of priorities. What is 
important is the knowledge that if you have a dispute with your neighbour over land or with 
an individual over whether he stole your television set, it will be resolved fairly. Your 
livelihood may depend on that. In the absence of the provision of such a service, insurgents 
will happily and gratefully provide it themselves. Justice is a doubly dangerous weapon in 
the hands of an information-literate indigenous insurgent operation like the Taliban. 
‘Sometimes the best weapons are those which do not shoot’, as the US Counterinsurgency 
Manual puts it.219 Not only does the insurgent’s ability to adjudicate in disputes in an 
accepted and purportedly fair fashion reinforce his claims to legitimacy, but it bleeds that 
legitimacy away from the government. As one commentator has put it, the setting up of 
separate courts is the ultimate ‘non serviam’.220  
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What is legitimacy? 
 
Legitimacy is the bottom line of accepted counterinsurgency theory. The US Insurgencies 
and Countering Insurgencies Handbook (2014 edition of FM 3-24) declares legitimacy to be 
‘the main objective’ of counterinsurgents.221 No fewer than 61 paragraphs of that document 
mention ‘legitimacy’. It declares irregular warfare to be a ‘violent struggle among state and 
non-state actors for legitimacy’.222 This is therefore a competition for legitimacy, one aspect 
of what David Kilcullen calls ‘the theory of competitive control’.223 Unlike conventionally 
understood forms of war, insurgency/counterinsurgency is not a contest to control territory 
or to destroy an enemy’s ability and will to fight, but rather a competition between two 
opposing groups to be recognised by a particular population as its legitimate government. 
As he says elsewhere: ‘We can beat the Taliban in any military engagement, but we’re losing 
in Afghanistan not because we’re being outfought but because the Afghan government is 
being outgoverned.’224 This ‘binary’ approach has already been criticised in the introduction 
above. 
 
Thus, law has a dual use in counterinsurgency: both a tool for defeating criminal insurgents 
themselves (by imprisoning them) and a means for governments to build legitimacy.225 So 
what is legitimacy? And from where does it derive?  
 
Both the British and US doctrinal documents prescribe the usual nostrums for inculcating 
this elusive quality of legitimacy. The 2006 edition of FM 3-24 sets out six ‘possible 
indicators of legitimacy’, which are said to include the ability to provide security, selection of 
leaders in a manner perceived to be just and fair, a high level of political participation, a 
culturally acceptable level of corruption, a culturally acceptable level of social and economic 
development, and a high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.226  
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Nowhere in this list is the ability to solve disputes. None of those indicators are of much use 
if the ‘host population’ turns to the ‘insurgent’ to solve its problems. British and US 
counterinsurgency doctrine adopts the solution of ‘building courts and training lawyers’.227 
The British handbook, like its American counterpart (which in fairness gives a nod to 
informal justice mechanisms as interim arrangements),228 mandates military lawyers to 
undertake ‘rule of law activities’. These prescriptions are nothing more than afterthoughts, 
representing the notion that justice is an easy fix, brought into effect by the construction of 
courts and the training of lawyers and judges. This will be looked at in far more detail below. 
 
 
Legitimacy and ‘social capital’ 
 
Social theorists have looked at legitimacy as the product of the accumulation of social 
capital. That capital can take the form of such goods as roads, schools, water and electricity 
production and distribution. There is also the accumulation of rather less tangible ‘symbolic 
capital’: ‘Symbolic capital refers to those intangible accumulations that are rich with widely 
socially shared meanings that are often rooted in accumulations of physical capital but 
nevertheless distinct.’229  
 
For a state to be ‘legitimate’, the reservoir of ‘symbolic capital’ must remain above a certain 
threshold. In practical terms (as will be illustrated in Chapters 2 and 4), that reservoir will 
contain such elements as working courts, systems of enforcement of judgments and a 
certain minimum foundation in the relevant societies’ mores and customs. It is the job of 
the insurgent to drain that reservoir and refill it with his own capital.  
 
Hobbes’ classic formulation posited the necessity of what amounted to a ‘contract’ between 
the subject and the sovereign. It is this formulation that lies at the root of the stream of 
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political philosophy known as ‘social contract theory’. The idea of the state existing to 
restrict uncontrolled violence through the exercise of the monopoly use of its own violence 
is commonly accepted: ‘Every state is founded on force’, said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. That 
is indeed correct. If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the 
concept of ‘state’ would be eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be 
designated as ‘anarchy’, in the specific sense of this word. Of course, force is certainly not 
the normal or the only means of the state – nobody says that – but force is a means specific 
to the state.230 Mao Tse Tung phrased much the same thought differently: ‘Every communist 
must grasp the truth “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”... all things grow out 
of the barrel of a gun.’231 Such power may indeed grow from cold steel, but power itself and 
legitimacy are made of very different substances.  
 
A critique from legal anthropology 
 
The idea that societies must in some fashion be based on the threat of force is by no means 
accepted by legal anthropologists. Fernanda Pirie states that ‘behind the Hobbes model is 
the idea that human beings are by nature asocial and inclined to a state of conflict unless 
controlled and socialised by government’.232 She is supported in this by, among others, 
another leading anthropologist of law, Simon Roberts. He says that studies undermine ‘a 
long-standing assumption that order is only conceivable if there are strong men in positions 
of authority ready to tell others what to do ... It is not the fault of anthropologists if the 
lesson of these studies, clear as they are, have yet to be absorbed by some legal and 
political theorists’.233 Similarly, Malinowski, the pioneer of legal and social anthropology, 
was an early advocate of the idea that centralised government and laws are not necessary 
to the functioning of society.234 Indeed it can be argued that even in the West, most 
disputes are not in fact settled through state structures, but are resolved through 
negotiation. It is only when such negotiation fails that, usually as a last resort, the state 
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becomes involved. It can also be argued that some laws and codes have very little impact on 
how disputes are actually resolved. There are examples of societies where the law is 
separate from any normative function, serving rather as, at best, guidance or even ritual 
decoration.235 An example of this has been cited as the ‘law’ of the Old Testament of the 
bible which is accepted as ‘law’ by, for example, Christians, but not implemented, albeit for 
theological reasons.  
 
Jeffrey Rustand has spent two decades as a legal and justice reform advisor in many 
countries, and most recently has spent five years in Afghanistan. He describes the reality of 
Afghan regulatory life:  
 
Much of Afghan life is regulated by what we might call corrupt mechanisms. There 
are four kinds of ‘corruption’: simple greed, family connections, friends, networks of 
other kinds. This is their life, everything comes through these networks. It was, of 
course, the same in western countries for centuries. However our system has 
evolved to a state where all these types of, in our term, ‘corruption’ have been 
privatised, devolved to a state or eliminated. Afghans rely for protection on family 
and tribe; that’s what matters. The institutions are too ramshackle and weak. No one 
knows what they can get away with.236  
 
It may well be that this state of affairs is rather more the norm than many 
counterinsurgency practitioners (and certainly their literature) would care to admit. These 
matters will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
It is certainly the case that the Hobbesian stream of thinking has been adopted by 
counterinsurgency theorists, as it has by ‘rule of law’ development practitioners. The word 
‘paradigm’ is perhaps overused; but it entirely relevant and appropriate in this context. The 
paradigm of Western state-centralist ‘rule of law’ has dominated counterinsurgency 
discourse. The technical word for this approach is ‘centralism’, defined by John Griffiths as 
the approach  
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 … that law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of 
 all other law and administered by a single set of state institutions. To the extent that 
 other, lesser, normative orderings such as the Church, the family, the voluntary 
 association and the economic association exist they ought to be and in fact are 
 hierarchically subordinate to the law and institutions of the state.237  
It is, says Griffiths, ‘a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion’.238 As will be seen in Chapter 4, 
centralism treats customary systems, which are very commonly encountered in insurgency 
situations, as separate from the essential centrality of the state. Deborah Isser is right when 
she says that customary systems must be seen ‘not as an isolated phenomenon but as an 
undeniable component of the justice landscape’.239  
 
Perceptions of fairness and legitimacy 
 
A key element in the provision of security is the ability to apply (or threaten to apply) the 
dynamics of force, in the form of enforcement of social or political strictures. One central 
method of securing both physical and economic security is through a justice system ‘of 
which the population approves’.240 It is there that the justice system sits in a developed 
society. Rule of law promotes legitimacy in two ways: first, by restraining and defining the 
parameters of the state, thereby ensuring that a sense of justice is at least possible; and 
second, by providing a service. That service in turn affects and promotes the idea of a state, 
by reinforcing the state’s power. 
 
 At the heart of any counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign lies one basic requirement – 
 the population of the territory concerned should form the perception that the 
 government offers a better deal than do the insurgents. In this perception, security
 of the person and of property, and the establishment of the rule of law, are 
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 paramount considerations. It follows that whatever else the government may do, it 
 should start from that edict in the Hippocratic Oath which states: ‘do no harm’.241  
In his book Why People Obey the Law, Professor Tom Tyler talks about the key factor in 
legitimacy being the impression of procedural fairness.242 What, though, is fairness? Is what 
is fair to Afghans different from what is perceived as procedurally fair in colonial Ireland of 
the 18th and 19th centuries, for example? It is no good just relying on common sense; 
perhaps we must look into social contract? If exogenous COINs can provide procedural 
fairness, can they develop legitimacy? Surely, according to Tyler, the answer is yes. But were 
not the judges of the British courts in colonial Ireland perceived to be procedurally fair? 
Heather Laird, in her study of Irish subversive law, asserts that the dynamics that allowed 
the courts in England to gain an acceptable level of legitimacy in the key period of the late 
eighteenth century did not function in Ireland.243 She counterpoints the conclusions of E.P. 
Thompson, who took the view that in England there was at least the perception of the 
possibility of justice.244 Laird states that: ‘In contrast it could be difficult to pinpoint any 
attempt during the same period in Ireland to create the appearance of legal impartiality. 
The penal code that operated during the eighteenth century protected protestant interests 
and was, therefore, “evidently partial and unjust”, while “British law” was popularly 
interpreted as a foreign imposition that had displaced an earlier legal system.’245 Thus, the 
law acted as a driver of conflict. There was little in the way of perceptions of fairness. As will 
be seen, the perceptions of fair process are vital to notions of legitimacy. 
What is clear is that the writ of the ‘crown’ courts – those run by the British administration – 
in the sense of their accepted authority certainly did not run throughout the land. One 
‘resident magistrate’, a representative of the lowest level of judicial authority, was often 
incapable of recalling that ‘Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom with representatives in 
parliament and not a far flung colony’.246  
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In this respect, comparisons from Afghanistan and contemporary conflict and insurgency are 
available, if not necessarily particularly compelling. As a specific example, Helmand is 
regarded as a remote, semi-detached Afghan province, but an Afghan province nonetheless. 
Rather more compelling is the reality in Afghanistan that the possibility of justice in fact – as 
opposed to the often merely virtual world of government statements – barely exists. The 
formal courts in Helmand (as was the case in Ireland) are not trusted as independent 
arbiters of disputes, but all too often are seen as the tools of those who can best afford to 
bribe the judges. The issue would seem to be one of procedural fairness. What evidence is 
there that fairness, or the perceptions of fairness, found a basis for legitimacy?  
Obedience? 
Compared with social theoretical studies on domestic compliance, there has been little 
scholarship on the questions raised by insurgency concerning obedience to legal strictures 
and the link between legitimacy and insurgency. This is surprising, given COIN’s emphasis on 
legitimacy and the implicit stress placed upon it by insurgents. Clearly, any 
counterinsurgency campaign is ultimately concerned with applying measures to ensure that 
the ‘target population’ displays (and, to a lesser extent, feels) loyalty to the incumbent 
regime and veers away from the kind of armed insurrection characterised by the term 
‘insurgency’. As will be examined below, the failure of those incumbent systems to develop 
mechanisms for the resolution of embedded disputes is a trigger for insurgency. If a state 
has not developed adequate means to address deep-seated problems concerning the 
distribution or use of land, for example, it will clearly have difficulty in establishing a 
practical ability to govern.  
Ultimately, if a state cannot make a sufficiently sound offer of government, its subjects will 
not obey its laws and it will have lost the ability to govern. It will fail to gain ‘legitimacy’. In 
social contract terms, the state will have failed in its part of the bargain – to govern 
properly.  
What makes people obey the law? 
In answer to the question ‘why do we obey the law?’, social theory generally offers two 
general  positions, not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first has been characterised as the 
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‘instrumental’ perspective, also referred to as ‘social control’. This is concerned primarily 
with offering access to resources for compliance, or sanctions for failure to comply. 
Complementary to the ‘social control’ perspective has been the ‘public choice’ approach, 
which ‘suggests that people are intrinsically motivated to maximize their personal gain in 
their behavior towards the law’.247 Consequent to this approach, the view is taken that 
sanctions, as the necessary counterpoint to gain, provide the key impetus for compliance. 
Put very simply, the ‘social control’ approach posits that the key driver is a system of 
rewards and punishments. This might also be termed a ‘transactional’ approach. However, 
democratic societies cannot function in a purely instrumental fashion. While it is a 
mischaracterisation that the ‘social control’ model is Pavlovian, there is surely more to 
compliance than a simple and constant weighing up of rewards and costs: ‘it may not be 
effective enough to allow a complex democratic society to survive’.248  
There is a further problem with the social control approach: ‘Citizens have been found to 
obey the law when the probability of punishment for non-compliance is almost nil and to 
break laws in cases involving substantial risks.’249 At a mundane metropolitan level, what is 
it that makes people decide not to drink and drive, or indeed to pay taxes in an honest and 
full fashion?  
The second approach is known in general terms as the ‘normative approach’, which takes 
what might be regarded as a more nuanced view of the problem. Tom Tyler posits that the 
strongest motivation for obedience to the law is not externally imposed, but is, in fact, what 
he calls ‘internalised obligation’, a major component of this being ‘legitimacy’:  
From the perspective of the authorities in a political or a legal system, legitimacy is a 
far more stable base on which to rest compliance than personal or group morality, 
for the scope of legitimate authority is much more flexible. It rests on a conception 
of obligation to obey any commands an authority issues so long as that authority is 
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acting within appropriate limits. Leaders with legitimate authority have open-ended, 
discretionary authority within a particular range of behavior.250 
This is known as the ‘Tyler Rasinski Hypothesis’. Its conclusions were challenged in a 
subsequent study by Jeffrey Mondak, whose conclusions were that the influence of 
procedural propriety was ‘much less forceful’ than was suggested by Tyler and Rasinski.251 
However, that study was primarily concerned with the acceptance of high-level appeal-court 
decisions. 
The case Tyler makes is not that legitimacy displaces the social control approach, but rather 
that legitimacy is an important element in the exercise of authority. In 1984, alongside 
Kenneth Rasinski, he conducted an extensive empirical study, known now as the Chicago 
study,252 to determine what it is that motivates that ‘internal’ obedience. This study was 
extensive and comprehensive. Its conclusions were equally complex. However, one 
particular aspect was clear: ‘The way people assess procedural fairness is strongly linked to 
their judgements of whether the authority they are dealing with is motivated to be fair.’253 
Tyler concludes that:  
People obey the law because they believe that it is proper to do so, they react to 
their experiences by evaluating their justice or injustice and in evaluating the justice 
of their experiences they consider factors unrelated to outcome such as whether 
they have had a chance to state their case [or ‘distribution of control’ as he calls it in 
the study’s findings] and been treated with dignity and respect. On all these levels 
people’s normative values matter, influencing what they think and do ... Attitudes 
and behavior are influenced to an important degree by social values about what is 
right and proper.254 
This conclusion may seem to be in accordance with intuition, but what Tyler offers is 
empirical evidence that this is the case.  
                                                          
250
 ibid., p26 
251
 Mondak, Jeffrey, ‘Institutional legitimacy and procedural justice: re-examining the question of causality’, 
Law and Society Review, 27 (1993), p608 
252
 Fully reported in Tyler, Why People Obey the Law. See also Tyler, Tom R. and Rasinski, Kenneth, ‘Procedural 
justice, institutional legitimacy and the acceptance of unpopular US Supreme Court decisions: a question of 
causality’, Law and Society Review, 25:3 (1991), p 469 
253
 Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, p164 
254
 ibid., p178 
77 
 
The importance of procedural fairness and its perception may be clear in societies with 
structured legal regimes255. The same seems to be the case with respect to some ‘stateless’ 
systems of governance and dispute resolution. The xeer system in Somalia is based around 
submitting disputes to nominated respected representatives of tribal or ‘clan’ groups, 
individuals who are chosen for their impartiality and knowledge of tradition. A hearing is 
held, at which both sides present their ‘cases’, as it were. The nominated elders arrive at a 
decision and the parties are encouraged to accept it:  
Whether such a decision sticks depends upon whether both parties feel the 
judgement to be fair, on their eagerness to have the matter settled and the pressure 
which their respective kinsmen and associates can bring to bear upon them. Even if 
the decision is not accepted, its outcome will clearly provide an important bargaining 
counter in subsequent negotiations.256 
Implications for insurgents and counterinsurgents of considering a normative model 
The key point to be drawn from Tyler’s conclusions is that obedience is conditional upon 
legitimacy – as far as it goes, this is what the newer iterations of COIN suggest. But, he 
suggests, legitimacy is itself conditional on fair dealing by the authorities with the 
‘customers’ of the service provided. This in turn requires a deep awareness not only of the 
systems of dispute resolution, but of the way in which disputes are perceived and of who, if 
anyone, has the authority to resolve them. Clearly ‘fairness’ is to a great extent a moveable 
concept.  In a largely stateless society, such as in the Somali example, the concept of 
‘legitimacy’ may well be rather more individually or tribally based than institutionally or 
indeed be based upon notions of ‘honour’. Societies such as this are not rare outside the 
Western context, as will be seen in Chapter 4. 
The implications of this are extensive, if they can be applied to Afghanistan or elsewhere. It 
casts doubt on the ‘armed alms-giving’ and ‘institution-building aspects of 
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counterinsurgency as supports for legitimacy.257 The implication here is that, without what 
might be called ‘fair dealing’ (with the cultural caveat mentioned above), no amount of 
granting of physical goods (or indeed social goods) will work in what amounts to a system 
that either is or is perceived to be corrupt or for that matter outside applicable social mores.  
Justice may be a key factor in insurgencies. Because if a state is not able to dictate how 
disputes are resolved – a contemporary expression of ‘monopoly of force’ – it surely can 
have no claim to legitimacy. This does not necessarily imply that the state does the dispute 
resolution in the form of courts; it may mean the state devolving that responsibility to a 
non-state actor, or indeed the state having little, if any, practical role in basic dispute 
resolution at all. In Ethiopia, however, the reality of a multi-ethnic and deeply multi-cultural 
state is reflected in a constitution which allows extensive latitude to the various approaches 
to governance – in other words a deep and explicit legal pluralism.258 In some ways this 
fundamentally challenges the Hobbesian (or almost any) form of the ‘state monopoly on the 
use of force’ model. It is worth remembering that even in highly regulated societies such as 
the Western model, most dispute resolution on a day-to-day basis is done outside any 
formal context. It is only when that fails that the state, in the civil context, is invited by one 
or both parties to become involved.  
The important factor is only that, in cases where there are non-state options, the state is 
seen as the arbiter, whether in form or substance – as is the case, in fact, in pluralist 
constitutions such as Ethiopia’s and as will be seen below in chapter 4, in colonial ‘dual 
mandate’ systems. The fact that non-state actors (a vital distinction from anti-state actors) 
may be ‘doing’ justice in itself need by no means imply a reduction in legitimacy. On the 
contrary, it is simply an acceptance of reality and a state endorsement of that reality. 
Clearly, as we shall see when we look at the Afghan case (and others), when the state, in 
that case encouraged by foreign interveners, tries – however ineptly – to impose a system 
that is foreign to, and distrusted by, the great majority of citizens, the state sets itself 
against those citizens.  
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It is into situations like this that the insurgent, the subversive, will insinuate himself. He will 
seek to offer an alternative to the state-provided version. He will place great emphasis on 
making that version work. The more such an alternative works, the more it is embedded; set 
against a state version that clearly (or apparently) does not. 
Parallel systems in the West? 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, insurgent courts will be examined in the context of their role in 
‘shadow states’. In Chapter 4, the idea of legal pluralism will be addressed in the context of 
insurgency. However, neither ‘alternative’ judicial means of dispute resolution nor ideas of 
legal pluralism are confined to insurgent combat zones. Alternative systems of justice do not 
necessarily impact on the legitimacy of the state, even in the West.  
 
Even within modern democratic Western societies, there are occasions when questions or 
controversies arise which highlight and illustrate that link between the authority of courts 
and legitimacy. Even in highly developed Weberian societies such as the United Kingdom, 
the idea of legal pluralism is not entirely alien, and there have been occasions outside the 
forum of civil war when the concept of pluralism has been argued. Pluralism does not 
necessarily undermine concepts of legitimacy. Proponents of legal pluralism, usually arguing 
from a religious perspective, would not contend that acceptance of the legitimacy of one 
system, even within one state, implies the illegitimacy of all others within that state. It is 
not, as it were, a zero sum idea. Rather, they posit that legitimacy is not necessarily rooted 
in one stream of authority. Such ideas are controversial in Western societies. One such 
controversy arose when there were moves in the United Kingdom to allow some degree of 
jurisdiction, particularly in family matters, to religious courts – specifically the Sharia courts 
of the Islamic community and the Beth Din courts of the Jewish community. Particular 
comment was occasioned by a statement from the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, 
Nicholas Phillips: 
There is no reason why Shari’a principles, or any other religious code should not be 
the basis for mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution [with the 
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understanding] ... that any sanctions for a failure to comply with the agreed terms 
for mediation would be drawn from the laws of England and Wales.259 
It is fair to say that this statement and others by similarly prominent public figures, such as 
the Archbishop of Canterbury, have stressed arguments directed at promoting ‘custom and 
community’.260 Opponents have been clear that providing some limited legal authority for 
Sharia courts was the first step towards supplanting English law:  
 Their [supporters of Shari’a courts] ultimate goal is to supplant existing governments 
 with Islamic theocracies. Their tactics are evidenced worldwide and take the form 
 of terrorism, coercion, litigation, lobbying, and stifling free speech. Providing Shari’a 
 courts with the full force of British law is much more likely to be viewed by radicals 
 as opening the door to achieving their ultimate goals, rather than as a final 
 concession by the British government.261 
Further equally fundamental objections to allowing any jurisdiction at all to Sharia courts 
involved human rights, particularly the treatment of women in probate and divorce 
matters.262 Concerns such as these led to the introduction by Baroness Cox in 2012 of the 
Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill,263 the intention of which, among other 
provisions, was to ensure that Islamic courts in the UK complied fully with national law 
concerning equality,264 and that no claim of ‘the powers and duties of a court’ would be 
lawful.265 Concerns about parallel systems of justice are not confined, therefore, to the 
world of insurgencies and rebellions.  
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Section 4  
 
Lawfare: synthesising law and insurgency 
 
The term ‘lawfare’ itself seems first to have appeared in 2001, in an article by an American 
Air Force Judge Advocate, Charles Dunlap, in a working paper for a conference at Harvard 
University.266 In a later essay, written when the topic of ‘lawfare’ had well and truly entered 
common discourse,267 Dunlap took the view that law had become a ‘decisive element of 21st 
century conflict’. He went on to cite the way in which opponents of the US conduct of the 
war in Afghanistan had criticised the use, for example, of drones. Has law, asks Dunlap, 
become ‘a tool for the enemy’?268 In the UK, the issues often referred to in the US as 
‘lawfare’ have become part of the national discourse,269 as a result of several cases decided 
in UK courts arising out of events in Iraq and Afghanistan.270 This has been described as the 
‘juridification’ of (in this instance) the British armed forces.271  
In War and Law, David Kennedy observes that war, like other forms of discourse, is 
governed by rules. Indeed, it is regulated by law:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
raised, see Reiss, Maria, ‘The materialization of legal pluralism in Britain: Why Sharia Council decisions should 
be non-binding’, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 26 (2009) 
266
 Dunlap, Charles, ‘Law and military interventions: Preserving humanitarian values in 21st century conflicts’, 
Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, Carr Center for Human Rights Working Paper, 29 
November 2001, available at http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf  
267
 Dunlap, Charles, ‘Lawfare: A decisive element of 21
st
 century conflict’, Joint Forces Quarterly, 59 (2009), 




 ibid., p34  
269
 For example, Ledwidge, Frank, ‘Soldiers shouldn’t need to go to law for justice’, The Times, 20 June 2013, 
available (through paywall) at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article3795482.ece; see 
also Tugendhat, Tom and Croft, Laura, ‘The fog of law: an introduction to the legal erosion of British fighting 
power’ (Policy Exchange, 2013), available at 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/the%20fog%20of%20law.pdf 
270
 Particularly the case of Smith and Others v Ministry of Defence, judgment available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2012_0249_Judgment.pdf  
271
 For example, Heron, C.P., ‘The juridification of the British armed forces’ (Shrivenham Defence Research 
Paper, 2013 unpublished) 
82 
 
We know the corporate world can kill … law addresses these wrongs, parsing them 
out – permissible injuries or violations of the duty of care. We insure, we contract 
out, we buy property elsewhere, we zone the city to reduce or concentrate the 
threat – we sue, we negotiate, we demand regulation or prosecution or the death 
penalty. Somehow we thought war was different. But it turns out not to be.272 
The idea of law being used as a weapon is arguably as old as international law itself. 
Certainly in the twentieth century it was a common feature of the discourse of conflict; 
territorial claims were discussed in terms of legal right. Ideas of law and legitimacy were 
used during the Second World War to achieve political effect. For example, after the 
Warsaw Uprising of 1944, Churchill levered the international law on the treatment of 
prisoners of war to ensure the safety of the captured Polish Home Army fighters.  
At the grand strategic level, where debate on the legal aspects of war played a major role in 
the creation of narrative, no country could afford to be credibly accused (at least after the 
Second World War) of acting outside the law. However egregiously a country behaved, or 
indeed behaves, the language of law is used to justify that action. It hardly needs to be said, 
but it is a worthwhile observation that no country will ever admit to acting outside 
international law.  
As well as being used as a justification, law is also used instrumentally. Combined with a 
significant level of realpolitik, over the last decades it has been used to produce strategic 
effect. For example, the removal of Taiwan from its seat representing China at the United 
Nations has been seen as a component of a long-term political effort to deny Taiwan 
legitimacy.273 Law and war, particularly through the twentieth century, were intimately 
intertwined. Questions of law have always infused questions of ius in bello and ius ad 
bellum. As David Kennedy puts it: ‘Law and force flow into one another. We make war in the 
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shadow of law and law in the shadow of force. Law has infiltrated the decisions to make war 
and crept into the conduct of warfare.’274  
The setting up of the various ad hoc war crimes tribunals in the 1990s added another rather 
more obvious lawfare component to the conduct of warfare. The strategic effect of the 
indictment of Slobodan Milosevic by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) certainly contributed to the overall NATO political strategy of the 
marginalisation of Serbia.275 Serbian nationalists have always regarded the ICTY as a political 
tool in a continuing campaign against their country.276 In the current decade, ‘Laws 
ascendance as a means of warfare is tied to the ascendance of counterinsurgency as a form 
of warfare.’277 
‘Today, lawfare is used often as a label to criticize those who use international law and legal 
proceedings to make claims against the state, especially in areas related to national 
security.’278 This ‘label’ is often used by those who respond in the affirmative to Dunlap’s 
question ‘Has law become a tool for the enemy?’ The approach is epitomised by the 
‘Lawfare Project’, a New York-based blog, whose declared aim is ‘safeguarding against the 
abuse of law as a weapon of war’.279 Much of its content seems to be directed at criticising 
legal challenges to the Israeli state, and purported threats to democratic discourse in 
Europe and the US by Muslim organisations. In a blog entry to Small Wars Journal, scholar of 
counterinsurgency Shane Bilsborough takes as a ‘case study’ of the use of ‘lawfare’ the 
efforts by Palestinians to bring alleged abuses by Israeli forces to public attention during the 
first Palestinian intifada. No litigation resulted from these efforts, and the only legal element 
of this ‘lawfare’ seems to have been the assertion that the actions were illegal. Legal issues 
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were raised in the Palestinian media campaign only to ‘leverage international concern’.280 In 
other words, they were a rhetorical device rather than a legal mechanism.  
There is no question that awareness of the potential of the use of law as a weapon is 
growing. For example, China is said to maintain an entire department of the People’s 
Liberation Army specialising in the strategic use of law as a weapon,281 within the 
framework of the idea of the ‘three warfares’ (legal, media and psychological operations).282  
Among advocates of ‘lawfare’ as something new, there is an awareness of the fact that war 
is a political tool and that law is a component of political discourse. Certainly, as advocates 
of lawfare as something new and perhaps even threatening would acknowledge, there is 
political or even military effect of the kind of ‘lawfare’ they describe. The declaration in 
2013 of an Air Defence Identification Zone by China over key parts of the East China Sea 
(and China’s subsequent narrative positioning) has been cited as a recent example of 
strategic-level lawfare;283 indeed the use of lawfare as part of the political component of 
warfare is the central point. Yet there is nothing new or especially threatening about the use 
of law as a rhetorical instrument of policy, so long as it is fully realised that this is what is 
happening and appropriate countermeasures are adopted. 
Section 5 
Strategic lawfare and narrative 
The great conservative philosopher Joseph de Maistre, writing shortly after Waterloo, 
famously said that battles are won or lost in the imagination, not on the battlefield. This 
was, as James Whitman has said, ‘a bon mot not a scholarly argument’;284 nonetheless the 
importance of ‘narrative’ to warfare is as central now as it ever was. As may be clear from 
the foregoing, much of that ‘narrative’ is conducted on the terrain of the law.  
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As observed above, the relations between states are closely linked with international law. 
The controversies surrounding most (perhaps all) international conflicts are often 
communicated through the language of law. Borders are set by legal means, even though 
those borders may bear little relationship to areas occupied by peoples or tribes. On 
occasion, the controversies surrounding these controversial borders turn on the 
construction of a very few words or phrases. As David Kennedy says: 
 War takes place on a terrain that is intensely governed – not by unified global 
 institutions but by a dense network of rules and shared assumptions among the 
 world’s elites.285  
The implications of such rules and assumptions can be vast, especially for the physical 
terrains – literal ‘territories’. By way of illustration, the Durand Line, drawn in the late 1890s 
by a team of British surveyors, largely governs the border between what is now known as 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also applies to the virtual territory of discourse and argument – 
narrative.  
The effect of a consistent ‘narrative of justice’ and indeed notions of ‘fairness’ and 
‘legitimacy’ are amply displayed in the Irish struggle for independence, which was an 
insurgency which lasted centuries and which was, to a very great degree, powered by 
notions of legitimacy and justice.  
As David Betz says, ‘No narrative can survive, even in part, if it is based on a lie.’286 This is 
true, and it is equally true that the Taliban narrative (which will be looked at extensively 
below) is not based upon a ‘lie’, whereas the Afghan government’s ‘offer’ very largely is, in 
that its offer of a working, fair justice system is largely illusory, as will be argued in Chapter 
4. The idea that a ‘narrative’ backed by factual or perceptual truth is vital to the conduct of 
war is reinforced in Emile Simpson’s War from the Ground up. In writing about the 
contemporary Taliban’s approach to rhetoric, Simpson says that  
 … to base one’s entire strategy upon perception rather than on the reality that lies 
 beneath it is highly unstable. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, it is clear 
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 that narratives which depend massively on perception without a base in physical 
 reality are very dangerous.287 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt at all that what government officials often call ‘optics’ is 
important. In other words, what appears to be happening, as opposed to what might 
actually be happening. This is the province of ‘media operations’ or ‘psychological 
operations’ – categories now subsumed under the rubric ‘information operations’. 
Military doctrine is not blind to the necessity of maintaining a link between what is asserted 
by the counterinsurgent and what goes on in fact. It makes the link between honesty in 
narrative and legitimacy. ‘Counterinsurgents seeking to preserve legitimacy must stick to 
the truth and ensure that words are backed up by deeds.’288 From the perspective of justice 
and courts, any rhetoric of justice founded on a reality of corruption will fail to ground a 
legitimate state, as observed above.  
In his book on contemporary strategy, Hew Strachan refers to General Rupert Smith in 
seeing 
... contemporary warfare [as] a form of theatre played out by a small, separate group 
(i.e. a professional and not a conscript army) orchestrated by a team of unseen 
directors, stage managers and lighting engineers, but watched by many more. The 
people are the audience for war.289  
This applies at least as much when the activities played out are judicial in nature. Courts are 
one of those scenes in Smith’s theatre. For example, in Chapter 2, when we look at the 
insurgent tactic of ‘rupture’, it will be seen that the effect of that strategy depends entirely 
on there being an audience – not only in the courtroom itself, but in wider society, and 
particularly the media. Those scenes may be played out in the reports of legal cases (as will 
be seen when the activities of the courts in the Malaya insurgency are discussed in the next 
chapter).  
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Within the legal domain, however, no ‘play’ is more effective at establishing legitimacy than 
the establishment of insurgent courts, which provide the métier for Chapter 3.  
Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has briefly surveyed the concepts that will ground the remainder of this thesis. 
It has looked at the concept of legitimacy, at how it impacts on, and is impacted by, 
insurgency, and at the importance of challenges to that legitimacy. The role of law and 
courts in a working society has been addressed, as has the importance of perceptions of 
fairness in bolstering legitimacy in a state. The chapter has looked at the way military 
doctrine has defined the involvement of the ‘rule of law’ and therefore circumscribed the 
effectiveness of counterinsurgency itself by absorbing purely Western notions of state and 
governance. 
It seems clear that counterinsurgency theory has not addressed the extensive 
jurisprudential scholarship concerning legal pluralism. It has, or seems to have, assimilated 
uncritically Western notions of state centralism and ‘rule of law’. In that sense, it may well 
be set up, as currently constructed, to fail. One problem faced by counterinsurgent doctrine 
is that it is bound to notions of state centralism which are inapplicable to many of the 
societies within which they operate. Counterinsurgent doctrine and (as will be seen in 
Chapter 4) practice are wedded to notions of the ‘state’. In turn, these give rise to secondary 
obligations concerning such laudable aims as ‘rule of law’ and ‘human rights’, which, if 
applied, may conflict with the operational imperative to win an insurgency. It has been 
argued here that ‘the people’ are not passive objects but active agents.  
The objective of this chapter has been to contribute to answering the second research 
question about what the justice sector can tell us about the validity of population-centred 
counterinsurgency as a doctrine. It does seem as if it may well be too centred within its own 
society. This possibility will be tested further in Chapter 4. 
The chapter has also aimed to support the assertion that counterinsurgents need to 
understand the requirement of the necessity for a ‘judicial strategy’ (the third research 
question). This, in turn, requires an active awareness of international law concerning the 
status of insurgents, as there is the ever-present danger of domestic legislation, for 
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example, impacting on the legitimacy of an insurgent ‘state’, such as the self-proclaimed 
Islamic State.  
The use of courts, tribunals and dispute resolution mechanisms as a weapon both by 
insurgents and counterinsurgents is an aspect of what has become known as lawfare, and 
this chapter has defined where lawfare may sit within counterinsurgency. In turn, these 
matters inevitably feed into a vital narrative. The next chapter will look at how 
counterinsurgents have used their own courts in insurgencies, and how those courts have 



















CHAPTER 2  
Using Counterinsurgent Courts 
‘No country which relies on the law of the land to regulate the lives of its citizens can afford 
to see that law flouted by its own government, even in an insurgency situation. In other 




In his War and Law, David Kennedy describes war as a ‘legal institution’.291 By that he means 
that the conduct of war and war itself take place in a legal environment: ‘Law itself may also 
be an instrument of policy, on a continuum with war – different means to the same end.’292 
The conduct of war, he points out, is heavily regulated, and law is a constant influence on 
participants in warfare. This is true, and it is that insight which informs this thesis: the idea 
that law itself and the practice thereof may play a part analogous to armed force and 
complementary thereto – in other words, as another weapon in the arsenal of the 
combatants. It is this idea that forms the core of the concept of ‘lawfare’ and which lies at 
the heart of this thesis. This chapter looks at how counterinsurgent warfare has been 
conducted through the medium of courts.  
A full awareness of this field of activity and its importance requires an appreciation that a 
strategy needs to be formulated as to the approach to be taken by the counterinsurgent to 
justice, preferably prior to a full commitment being made to the campaign. As will be seen 
in this chapter, choices have to be made as to whether courts are to be used as a simple 
weapon, or as a tool to try to entrench ‘rule of law’ and therefore legitimacy. There will be 
costs involved in either approach.  
Section 1 looks at the dilemmas facing counterinsurgents in terms of how the law and courts 
are used against insurgents. It is framed by what has been called here ‘Kitson’s dilemma’, 
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which might be summarised by the question ‘Should the law and courts be mere adjuncts to 
state power, or should there be adherence to the “rule of law”?’ The section centres on a 
case study of how the British conducted the legal arm of their campaigns of the 1950s.  
Section 2 looks at the courts of ‘incumbents’,293 and at what tactics have been (or could be) 
used by insurgents to undermine the efforts of incumbent or counterinsurgent forces. Such 
techniques include ‘rupture strategy’, where the legitimacy of a given court – or its right to 
decide – is challenged. Also discussed is ‘disruptive litigation’, where the decisions of courts 
can be used either deliberately (‘hostile disruptive litigation’) or collaterally (‘non-hostile 
disruptive litigation’).  
 




In a seminal essay on lawfare and counterinsurgency, Thomas Nachbar questions whether 
the law, or mechanisms of justice, can be used firmly by counterinsurgents to promote 
legitimacy, or whether it will necessarily be perceived as unfair and will thereby undermine 
legitimacy.  
 
 Perhaps the most meaningful indicators of the legitimacy of any state are the rules 
 (and even more importantly the degree to which the state follows them) that govern 
 its exertion of force, especially exertion of force against its own citizens. By 
 announcing and demonstrating their commitment to these rules, counterinsurgents 
 can enhance the government’s legitimacy and weaken the insurgents.294  
 
This question is echoed by an earlier practitioner of counterinsurgency. In his Low Intensity 
Operations, a work (written during a sabbatical from military service at Oxford University in 
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1970)295 that synthesised his experiences into what amounted to a doctrinal treatise, 
General Frank Kitson looks at the dilemmas presented by the use of justice as a weapon. He 
advises that: 
 … the military leadership should present to the supreme council a number of issues 
 of joint military-civilian  co-operation on which firm policy rulings should be taken 
 before  operations against those practising subversion can start. An excellent 
 example  concerns the way in which the law should work. Broadly there are two 
 possible  alternatives, the first one being that the law should be used as just 
 another weapon  in the government’s arsenal and in this case it becomes little 
 more than a  propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the 
 public. For this to  happen efficiently the activities of the legal services have to be 
 tied into the war as  discreetly as possible ... the alternative is that the law should 
 remain impartial and  administer the laws of the country without any direction from 
 the government.296 
For governments concerned with the conduct of operations within a legal framework, this is 
an exceedingly difficult balance to strike. As will be seen below, Kitson’s dilemma was 
extremely familiar to those closely involved in counterinsurgency operations in the 1950s.297 
In The British Way in Counterinsurgency 1945–1967, David French quotes the assistant 
secretary at the Colonial Office with responsibility for Palestine in 1946: 
 The plain truth to which we firmly shut our eyes is that in this emergency Regulation 
 Detention Business we are taking a leaf out of the Nazi book, following the familiar 
 error that the end justifies the means (especially when the means serve current 
 expediency). We are out to suppress terrorism and because we can find no better 
 means we order measures which are intrinsically wrong, and which since their 
 consequence is evident to the whole world, let us in for a lot of justifiable and 
 unanswerable criticism.298  
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This line of argument is perennial, especially in times of stress or perceived stress. There is a 
long line of legal decisions dealing with this issue. The most famous of these judgments was 
delivered by Lord Atkins in 1941, in the case of Liversidge v Anderson, with the often-quoted 
lines:  
 In England amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They may be changed, 
 but they speak the same language in war as in peace. It has always been one of the 
 pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for which we are now fighting, that 
 the judges ... stand between the subject and any attempted encroachments on his 
 liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is justified in law.299 
What is rather less well known is that Lord Atkins was in the minority in the case concerned; 
the majority judgment of the court went against him. More recently, Israeli Supreme Court 
judge Haim Cohen summarised a similar point for Israel: 
 What distinguishes the war of the State from the war of its enemies is that the State 
 fights while upholding the law, whereas its enemies fight while violating the law. The 
 moral strength and objective justness of the Government’s war depend entirely on 
 upholding the laws of the State: by conceding this strength and this justness, the 
 Government serves the purposes of the enemy. Moral weapons are no less 
 important than any other weapon, and perhaps more important. There is no weapon 
 more moral than the rule of law. Everyone who ought to know should be aware that 
 the rule of law in Israel will never succumb to the state’s enemies.300 
As an instructive example of the tensions inherent in the dilemmas facing a fully engaged 
counterinsurgent state, we turn now to the approach taken by the British in the ‘high 
period’ of counterinsurgency, during the withdrawal from Empire. 
The ‘classic period’ of counterinsurgency 
This global withdrawal, with its many ‘small wars’, rarely involved the imposition of martial 
law (By ‘martial law’ is meant rule by military authorities.) The sources of the British 
approach to legislation in insurgency may be found in the idea that while ‘British domestic 
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law did not recognise a state of siege, British Colonial Law did’.301 Rather than institute 
states of martial law, the British colonial powers, and indeed (as will be seen) eventually the 
domestic government in Northern Ireland, developed a system of ‘emergency powers’.  
David French, in his study of post-Second World War British counterinsurgency, has looked 
closely at the legal framework behind Malaya, and indeed Kenya and Cyprus. He identifies a 
‘pyramid of committees’ as the chosen mechanism.302 He points out that the legal basis 
upon which most of the actions described above were taken was the Emergency Powers 
Order in Council 1939, which granted colonial officials very wide latitude of action. 
Although, between the wars, the British had relied upon what amounted to martial law,303 
during the 1930s, partly as a result of events in Palestine, there was an extended shift 
towards moving judicial authority closer to civilian control in the form of so-called 
‘emergency regulations’. This culminated in the Emergency Powers Act 1945,304 which itself 
evolved out of a long line of Orders in Council that largely dealt with the insurgencies in 
Palestine in the 1930s.305 The situation was later summarised by Governor General of 
Malaya Sir Henry Gurney:  
 In Palestine ... the Emergency Regulations were continually being added to and 
 tightened up, so that at the end it might almost have been said that the whole book 
 of regulations could have been expressed in a simple provision empowering the High 
 Commissioner to take any action he wished.306 
While delegating all power to the discretion of the High Commissioner may have been in the 
strictest sense ‘lawful’, it can hardly – at least by today’s standards – be described as in 
accordance with the rule of law.  
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The Emergency Powers Act 1945 itself derived from a 1939 Order in Council,307 which 
provided for a colonial governor to enact measures that might well be regarded as arbitrary 
and oppressive. In cases of ‘public emergency’: 
 The Governor may make such Regulations as appear to him to be necessary or 
 expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of the territory, the 
 maintenance of public order and the suppression of mutiny, rebellion and riot, and 
 for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community.308 
There then follows a list of actions that may have to be considered, including detention and 
expulsion of suspects,309 sequestration of property,310 summary suspension or indeed 
application of any law,311 and the trial and punishment of offenders.312 Such powers could 
be delegated to any person by the governor of the colony, and such powers as were 
declared in force were not to be restrained by pre-existing legislation.313  
Rather than ‘rule of law’, this may be described as an example of arbitrary rule, and the 
point was appreciated at the time. There was considerable discomfort expressed about 
these provisions. For example, it was suggested that the existence of the original enabling 
1939 Order in Council should be kept secret.314 Indeed, the fact that the enabling 
instrument (which is passed by the Privy Council and does not require parliamentary 
approval or even scrutiny) was an Order in Council rather than a statute in 1939 says 
something about such unease.315 This discomfiture clearly subsisted after the war, when the 
provisions were placed on a statutory basis. In a 1950 note by Arthur Creech Jones, the 
colonial secretary, clear reluctance is expressed about the propriety of introducing 
‘emergency powers’: 
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 I must emphasize the necessity of adhering as far as possible at which an emergency 
 has to be declared, to the normal principles of English Law by which the rights and 
 liberties of the individuals are maintained.316  
In using these provisions, versions of which were brought into force in all Britain’s 
counterinsurgency operations of the 1950s, it could easily be argued that any semblance to 
the ‘rule of law’ was thereby removed. 
One of the founding documents of the idea of British counterinsurgency is Defeating 
Communist Insurgency by the former minister of defence of the Malay Federation during 
the ‘Emergency’ there.317 In one of his often-quoted precepts of counterinsurgency, 
Thompson comments that ‘The government must function in accordance with law’, a point 
that touches on the central question within this thesis.318 Thompson’s views concerning the 
importance of adherence to the law and the consequences of failure to do so are very clear:  
 If the government does not adhere to the law then it loses respect and fails to fulfil 
 its contractual obligation to the people as a government. This leads to the situation 
 in which officers and officials cease to be responsible for their actions, with the 
 result that, instead of an insurgency, there is to all intents and purposes a civil war 
 within the country in which neither side can claim to be the government. In such 
 circumstances there is so little difference between the two sides that the people 
 have no reason for choosing to support the government.319  
This is a message which is at least as relevant today as it was in the 1950s. After his time as 
minister of defence in Malaya, Thompson spent some years in Vietnam as an advisor to the 
United States. He recalls: 
 I remember saying to General Khanh, then Prime Minister to Vietnam, that when I 
 heard of a case of a peasant suing the government for a buffalo killed by the army 
 during operations and being paid compensation, we would be winning the war.320  
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Thompson is less insistent on the necessity for security forces to be accountable for their 
actions, but the point is made.321 To what extent, though, was there real ‘adherence to law’ 
in the ‘high period’ of British counterinsurgency, which took place against the grand 
strategic background of withdrawal from an Empire of over 487 million people?322 This 
period – and particularly the Malaya case – is chosen not primarily because it has provided 
something of a founding myth of contemporary counterinsurgent thinking,323 but because 
the sources are relatively good and the historical background well known.  
Rule of law in the Malayan Emergency 
‘We had got the fundamentals right. Maintain the administration, maintain the civil courts 
and adopt a strategy that would eventually defeat them ... we would have no military 
tribunals.’324 
The ‘Malayan Emergency’, as it is still called, lasted from 1948, when the Malayan People’s 
Liberation Army (MPLA)325 began its insurgent campaign, until 1960, when it surrendered. It 
is often seen as a paradigm of counterinsurgent tactics; at the same time, others see it as a 
triumph of oppressive colonial techniques.326 Such matters are largely beyond the remit of 
the current thesis. What is not in doubt is that it was a successful campaign at all levels, in 
that the insurgency was defeated and the initial strategic objectives achieved.  
As the incidence of insurgent actions grew, an Emergency was declared in Malaya in 1948, 
and the Essential (Special Emergency) Regulations of 1948 were enacted (under the 
authority of a 1945 Act) by Governor Sir Edward Gent, conferring on the High Commissioner 
power to make his own regulations. These triggered the Federation of Malaya Emergency 
Regulations Ordinance 1948 and subsequent amendments.327 It was under these that the 
security forces operated, and it was pursuant to them that those suspected of insurgent 
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activities were tried. A key instrument of these provisions was administrative detention, the 
power to arrest and detain without trial.328 By the end of 1948, there were certainly over 
1,000 such detainees, and at least one author claims that there were several times that 
number.329 By 1952, there were over 5,000.330 When Gent was killed in an accident, he was 
replaced by Sir Henry Gurney, who arrived from Palestine, where he had been chief 
secretary to the government there.  
Gurney rejected martial law, although the provisions that were adopted were similar in 
nature, including sequestration, control of movement, dispersal of assemblies, the 
designation of restricted areas, and the photographing of the entire population over the age 
of 12.331 An offence of ‘consorting’ was introduced, the relevant law stating: ‘Any person 
who consorts with any other person whom he knows or has cause to believe to be a person 
who intends or is about to act or who has acted in a manner prejudicial to the public safety 
or the maintenance of public order’ thereby commits an offence.332 Another tool available 
to the authorities was deportation,333 sometimes following detention. By the end of 1948, 
3,148 families had been deported to China. The figures are disputed, but the total figure 
deported over the course of the Emergency was certainly in excess of 14,000, with many 
more leaving under pressure, although not technically deported.334 Once the communist 
government was securely installed in China at the end of the Civil War, deportation to China 
ceased, although other countries were used. The mass ‘resettlement’ programme under the 
Briggs Plan moved 650,000 people. 
The regulations also permitted the use of detention as a mass punishment for communities 
suspected of colluding with the insurgents.335 For example, when an official was murdered 
at a village called Permatang Tinggi in August 1952, ‘General Templer personally told the 
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villagers that they would be detained if the murderer was not detained within 4 days. When 
no information was forthcoming all 64 villagers were detained and the village was 
destroyed.’336 Other forms of collective punishment permitted included confinement of 
inhabitants of particular villages, closure of shops or schools, and reduction of the rice 
ration.337 The powers to authorise collective punishment and mass detention were ended in 
September 1953, with Templer being evidently less keen on their imposition than his 
predecessor.338  
On 31 December 1955, by which time the back of the insurgency had been broken, these 
regulations lapsed and were replaced by the Preservation of Security Ordinances. Anyone 
convicted under these could apply to the Court of Appeal.339  
The drafting and passing of laws and ordinances are one matter. Of equal – or indeed 
greater – importance was how those regulations were implemented. To what extent was 
‘rule of law’ implemented in Malaya, as mandated by the strategic approach selected? 
One way of assessing this is to examine the key primary texts on cases brought to appeal – 
the contemporary law reports. The Malayan colonial courts (and indeed courts in today’s 
Malaysia) followed procedure almost identical to that of English courts. During the colonial 
period, all appellate judges were English. In theory, and as seen below, occasionally in 
practice, courts of the Malay Federation were subject to appeal to the Privy Council in 
London, the final court of appeal for the colonies, composed of senior judges of the House 
of Lords. It is clear from the available judgments that the professional standards prevalent at 
the time in terms of the quality of legal analysis were maintained.  
The judicial role 
Some 55 cases heard between 1948 and 1960 and reported in the Malayan law reports340 or 
in the Malaya Law Journal are concerned with the Emergency Regulations. All of them are 
cases brought on appeal, usually from the trial courts on points of law. In most of them, the 
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issues before the court related to the admissibility of various forms of evidence or the 
adequacy of the judge’s summing up to the ‘assessors’ (cases under Emergency Regulation 
were tried by assessors, not juries). Some concerned questions put by trial judges on certain 
matters, to provide clarification. For example, in one case the judge asked the Court of 
Appeal whether he was obliged to impose penal servitude and whipping.341 Another case 
involved consideration of whether rayon was a restricted article and could be removed from 
a ‘restricted area’.342 No fewer than 25 of the 55 reported ‘security cases’ resulted in 
judgments favourable to the appellant. A flavour of the cases may be obtained from the 
selection below. 
Public Prosecutor v Chan and Others: Weapons were found in a fisherman’s hut and all 
inside the hut were charged. The court decided that the prosecution had to prove 
knowledge of the presence of firearms, and the appeal was allowed, so the men could go 
free.343  
Leong v Public Prosecutor: A police officer was used as an interpreter when a confession was 
taken from the accused. The defence challenged the confession as inadmissible. The same 
policeman also gave evidence in the subsequent trial in relation to the material of the 
offence, which was possession of a firearm. This ‘offended against the elementary ideas of 
justice and therefore no reliance could be placed upon the accuracy of that statement [the 
confession]’.344  
Sambasivam v The Public Prosecutor: This case concerned a man sentenced to death under 
the Emergency Regulations for possession of a weapon. The appeal concerned whether 
there had been a procedural error in the appeals procedure.345 The appeal was allowed and 
the sentence was quashed. By way of comment, this was the kind of case that was decided 
on what might be termed a ‘legal technicality’. It concerned the admission of a statement 
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made by the defendant in relation to one charge, of which the appellant was acquitted in 
order to prove another.346  
Si Ah Fatt v Public Prosecutor: The appellant had been found in the company of a man who 
was in possession of a Mauser pistol. He was initially convicted and sentenced to five years 
in prison.347 His appeal was allowed and the sentence quashed, as the prosecution needed 
to prove that the appellant knew that his companion had the weapon.348  
Soo, Lai and Chan v Public Prosecutor: The appellants were convicted of consorting with 
‘bandits’349 and sentenced to five years’ ‘rigorous imprisonment’. The appeal turned on the 
construction of the word ‘consorting’. The appeal was partially allowed and a sentence of 
two years was substituted.350  
Public Prosecutor v Peong: Sixteen men were playing cards in a home not their own. The 
case turned on whether the curfew imposed under regulation 7, which stated that people 
had to ‘remain within doors’ meant that a person needed to be in his own home. The court 
decided that it simply meant inside, and the appeal was allowed.351  
Ngee v Public Prosecutor: The Malayan Court of Appeal decided that a right of appeal 
against sentence existed even where the only sentence available was death – in this case, 
for possession of a hand grenade and six rounds of ammunition. The sentence was 
confirmed, although the right to appeal was upheld.352  
Periannan and Others v Public Prosecutor: Another curfew case, in which a fine was reduced 
from $75 to $30. The main issue here was whether magistrates had the authority to try 
cases under the Emergency Regulations. They did.353  
There is little or no sense in these cases of a judiciary in thrall to the executive. On the 
contrary, there are very many decisions which would have disconcerted the security forces. 
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One of the more interesting took place in 1952, during the most intense phase of the 
Emergency. Two police officers, one British and the other Malay, arrested a man whom they 
suspected of involvement with ‘bandits’. They took him aside, on his evidence, and 
threatened and hit him. He was prodded with a pistol and a shot was fired near his head. A 
confession was obtained. The ‘bandit’ was acquitted on the basis that he had been forced 
into a confession, complained, and eventually the two officers were convicted of assault. 
The British officer was given a month’s imprisonment with hard labour, and his subordinate 
seven days. The Malayan officer was told that it was his duty ‘to say that this was a thing we 
cannot do. The only way to make the law known is to enforce it’.354 David French, in other 
areas highly critical of British colonial practices, is clear on this: ‘Securing a conviction even 
of an insurgent caught under arms was far from straightforward. The security forces had to 
follow proper procedures.’355 He seems to have been right. 
Furthermore, the briefest of looks at both the journal and the law reports shows that in 
Malaya during the time of the Emergency, normal legal life proceeded much as it would 
have done otherwise. Over 98 per cent of judgments356 concern other matters, of the kind 
any volume of contemporary law reports would. Road traffic cases, sales of land, landlord 
and tenant, ordinary crimes, contract and tort cases. More cases were reported on appeal 
concerning gambling than ‘Emergency Legislation’.357 This is significant. There is the sense, 
when reading these digests, cases and articles, that legal and business life proceeded 
reasonably normally. One reason for this may have been that the fighting was taking place 
mostly outside the cities, where of course most of the commerce was going on. However, it 
is also clear that litigants, many of whom (judging by their names) were Chinese, were 
confident that not only might they get a hearing and judgment, but that such a judgment 
might be enforced.  
The same was, or appears to have been, true in Cyprus. Cyprus, like Malaya and Kenya, has 
a fully common law system of justice. This implies that when disputes – whether criminal or 
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civil – are appealed, the reasoning and results are reported. An examination of the relevant 
law reports in Cyprus for the period 1948–60 reveals a picture of apparent legal 
normality.358 From the perspective of jurisprudence, life seems to have continued very much 
as it had done before and has done since. Very few cases which went to the Cyprus Court of 
Appeal and were reported in the law reports concerned the Emergency. Indeed, there 
appears to have been only one that related directly to insurgent military action. This was a 
case relating to an alleged member of EOKA, the Cypriot nationalist insurgent group, 
Ekaterina Soteriou, who went by the nom de guerre ‘Nina’.359 Her sentence for possession of 
explosives was reduced from twelve years to nine, on the basis that ‘Nina’ may have been 
married (there was no direct evidence of this, and ‘Nina’ did not appear to assert this) and 
therefore ‘may have acted under the influence of her husband’.360  
 
Legal rhetoric?  
To a very great extent, however, the picture that may be formed of an executive restrained, 
in the context of the security situation, by an apparently largely impartial judiciary may be a 
false one. Simpson points out in his authoritative article on the European Convention on 
Human Rights in British colonial law that: 
 The protection of individual rights rested largely on such discipline and self-control 
 as the security forces were able to maintain. The power of individuals to challenge 
 them was minimal.361  
In theory, under regulation 20, a detainee could appeal to an advisory committee. The 
identity of the members of this committee was secret. Simpson quotes the complaints of a 
lawyer  and member of the Malayan Legislative Council R. Ramani:  
 He, [the detainee] is supposed to state the grounds of his objection without 
 knowing a word about why he has been detained; and then what happens? This 
 notice goes to the Advisory Committee and then the Advisory Committee writes to 
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 him in another printed form. They don’t even then, tell him the grounds of his 
 detention. They tell him his application will be heard on such and such a date ... and 
 then go on to say sapiently these words ‘the grounds for making a detention order 
 against you was that you were suspected of having recently acted or – mark these 
 words – of being likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or good 
 order’.362  
This is more reminiscent of Kafka than the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords. Checks 
on the actions of the security forces seem in practice to have been rare.  
The secretary of state for defence of the Malay Federation for much of the time of the 
Emergency was Sir Robert Thompson.  His book Defeating Communist Insurgency has 
proved influential in much subsequent thought on counterinsurgency, with its focus on civil 
measures. Thompson acknowledges that ‘some very tough laws were enacted in Malaya’.363 
There was a clear awareness in the community at large that ‘administrative detention’ 
(internment) was ‘necessary for the defence of the state’; however, there was an equal 
awareness that the state needed to be reined in, or be seen to be reined in, if those powers 
were used excessively – and indeed concerns were expressed in the press that ‘in a small 
number of cases, the procedure by which a detainee has been given the opportunity of 
objecting to the order of detention is unsatisfactory’.364 Incidentally, it is instructive as to 
the culture predominating in Malaya at the time that matters like this are discussed in much 
the same way as they are today. Information was widely and freely available to the political 
nation through what appears to have been a free and vibrant press.365 There was clearly 
also a consciousness among the judiciary that the rule of law, as understood by them, was 
under some strain and that there was a need to be seen to act in accordance with it. When 
Mr Justice Mathew was sworn in as the Federation of Malaya’s new chief justice in January 
1952, the attorney general in his public welcome speech said ‘not only does it fall to yourself 
and your colleagues to administer in this time of emergency laws of some severity, but it 
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falls to you to administer them with absolute justice, but with a ready humanity in 
accordance with the highest traditions of British justice’.366 To some extent this was 
rhetorical flourish. However, it is clear that there was some unease at that time as to the 
derogations being made from traditional values of human rights.367  
It is clear that in traditional British counterinsurgency doctrine there is a clear link between 
the idea of legitimacy and the ‘hearts and minds’ narrative – a term now largely defunct,368 
but certainly a key part of the narrative in Malaya at the time, notwithstanding the fact that 
it may have been honoured sometimes more in the telling than in the doing.369  
It could be argued that, from the perspective of the suspect, what the British called the 
regime under which one was interned – martial law or otherwise – was of little relevance. 
Rather more important was the fact that one’s internment was not subject to independent 
review or de facto accountability (traditionally called ‘habeas corpus’) and was based upon 
an administrative decision rather than a decision in a court. It is clear that the degree to 
which a detainee had access to judicial review of detention, was in fact rather limited. At 
least there was a semblance of judicial process, perhaps even sufficient to pass the 
threshold of ‘legitimacy’. This was certainly the case in the political nation, insofar as the 
narrative related by the contemporary law reports (and indeed the press) tended to support 
the idea that the security forces were indeed accountable within the law. This is part of 
what General Rupert Smith calls part of the ‘theatre’ which, he says, is constituted by 
contemporary military operations (see Chapter 1). 
As argued in Chapter 1, ‘optics’ are important, and in Malaya at least some attention was 
given to appearances, to that legal ‘theatre’. This was certainly not the case elsewhere.  
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Rule of law during the Kenya Emergency 
‘There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and with guerrilla actions 
for government forces to act outside the law.’370 
In Kenya there was no political strategy such as there had been in Malaya, nor any realistic 
appreciation that the end of colonial rule was a matter of years rather than of decades. As 
Elkins points out, ‘the timing for Britain’s future decolonisation of Kenya was vague at 
best’.371 This had an opposite effect to the one that the presence of a political strategy had 
in Malaya, with its intimations of political legitimacy.  
The counterinsurgency operations in the British colony of Kenya ran almost exactly 
concurrently with the campaign in Malaya. In Kenya, a combination of conflict over land and 
tribal rivalry had given rise to an organisation called ‘Mau Mau’, which was dominated by 
the Kikuyu tribal group. The Mau Mau conducted a campaign against British colonial 
security forces from 1948 to 1960.372  
While some measures were adapted from Malaya, thanks to the occasional transfer of 
colonial security officials, there was very little systemic consistency between the two 
theatres.  
The case of the Kapenguria Six – Jomo Kenyatta and five other Kenyan nationalist leaders, 
allegedly for involvement in Mau Mau activities – set the tone, although even in its manifest 
derogations from any standards of fair trial accepted then or now, it was far better than 
what was to come later. In order to placate anti-colonial feelings in the UK, a trial was 
ordered by Governor Evelyn Baring, despite the powers he had to order administrative 
detention.373 Nonetheless, this was not to be a fair trial. Obstacles were placed in the way of 
a highly skilled defence, and the judge was ‘biased and vindictive’.374 Witnesses were 
suborned and bribed, and there was constant contact between the judge, who had been 
awarded a vast pension when he took the case (essentially a bribe),375 and the governor. 
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The atmosphere was not assisted by the infamous murder of the settler family of Roger, 
Esme and Michael Ruck by Mau Mau activists while the trial was proceeding. Kenyatta and 
his fellow accused were convicted of managing a proscribed group and sentenced to seven 
years’ hard labour.  
Emergency assize courts were set up,376 and the kind of processes rejected by Briggs in 
Malaya as ‘largely the result of panic and emotion’377 – namely the introduction of summary 
trials followed by execution – were adopted in Kenya.  
One settler wrote to a newspaper in Kenya at the time: ‘It is stark nonsense to treat these 
rebels as legitimate belligerents and to apply to them the subtleties and intricacies of British 
law.’378 David French makes the point that, whereas in normal times in Kenya, about half of 
all death sentences were commuted, during the Mau Mau Emergency of the 1,468 death 
sentences, 1,048 were carried out.379 The proceedings were little more than show trials: 
‘due process was suspended, the defense had little if any access to the evidence in the case 
and the defendants themselves were often tried en masse and identified for the court not 
by name but by large numbers hanging around their necks’.380 The number of executions in 
Malaya was 226 – still a large number, and higher, for example, than the official number (as 
opposed to extrajudicial killings) carried out in Algeria by the French authorities. One reason 
for the far smaller number of executions in Malaya was that prisoners were regarded as 
better sources of intelligence than corpses – more a question of pragmatism than any 
attachment to the value of human life.  
David Anderson has written the leading work on the operation of courts in Kenya during the 
Kenyan Emergency. His findings, which have provided much of the material for recent 
leading court cases,381 might be summarised as follows: 
 The war against Mau Mau was fought not just by the military or by the police, but 
 by the civil administration in a pervasive campaign that sought to strip the rebels and 
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 their sympathisers of every possible human right, while at the same time 
 maintaining the appearance of accountability, transparency and justice. Nowhere 
 was this more apparent than the Mau Mau trials.382  
Law reports in Kenya 1948–60 
As in Malaya, the sense in the contemporary law reports is of a comfortable legal system 
carrying on very much as usual. For example, only three cases in the reports for the years 
1953-56 explicitly deal with matters concerned with the ‘Emergency’.  These dealt with the 
evidence needed to corroborate a charge of membership of an ‘illegal society’ (Mau 
Mau),383 the requirement for precision in charging,384 and the ever-common (in normal 
circumstances) problem of identification.385 All of these were reported in 1953. The years 
1954–56 see no cases reported at all concerning the Emergency.  
There was not a universal sense of complacency concerning the way the law was being 
used. Anderson quotes one judge speaking of the system of ‘screening’: 
 Such methods are the negation of the rule of law which it is the duty of courts to 
 uphold and where instances come before the courts of allegations that prisoners 
 have been subjected to unlawful criminal violence, it is the duty of such courts to 
 insist on the fullest inquiry with a view to their verification or refutation.386  
In another case referred to by Anderson, the Appeal Court Judges Worley, Jenkinson and 
Briggs ‘seized the opportunity offered to mount a savage attack upon the security forces in 
general and the police in particular’.387 The judges in this case, which involved the highly 
emotive (within the white settler community) murder of two settlers, took the view that  
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 the implications of this case are indeed grave, suggesting as they do that the police 
 force in Kenya is tending to become a law unto itself. The courts will fail in their duty 
 if they ignore or pretend not to see the danger when it is apparent on the evidence 
 before them.388 
Nonetheless, very few such cases came effectively to appeal. For that to have happened, 
there needed to be lawyers willing (and indeed present) to conduct them. Few such lawyers 
were available, and what now might be called ‘access to justice’ was poor at best. In any 
event, Anderson asserts that the recommendations in a report by a senior judge following 
judgments in cases such as this (the ‘Holmes Report’) were suppressed by Baring and the 
executive.389  
Strategy, narrative and legal legacies 
There were very great differences between the two campaigns. In Malaya, there was a clear 
strategy that evolved from well-defined political directives. At the outset of his time in 
Malaya, the High Commissioner General Gerald Templer made it abundantly clear that he 
required guidance from government, specifically Winston Churchill (the prime minister of 
the day), as to exactly what the strategic objective was: ‘ I am not at all clear as to what [HM 
Government] is aiming at from the political point of view ... I must have a clear policy to 
work on.’390 
Templer received a detailed and clear reply in the terms he had requested, outlining the 
policy of the government for the development of a Malay nation, with full citizenship, 
‘partnership’ and democracy for all its races.391 This required the defeat of communist 
‘terrorism’ and a ‘worthy and continuing British involvement in the life of the country’. This 
constitutes what would now be called a ‘desired end-state’. The commitment to 
independence bled any form of legitimacy from the Malayan Races Liberation Army, beyond 
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its appeal to those of a Marxist inclination. At an early stage in the campaign there was a 
strong insistence that ‘the civil courts functioned ... although we were of course at the time 
introducing all the emergency regulations and so on, most of which were very tough ... all 
crimes would go through the civil courts.’392 
The framework within which these courts operated is of crucial importance, as it marks the 
difference between what were essentially formally ‘civil’ courts and courts that in fact 
operated as arms of the security forces. This is of far more than conceptual or theoretical 
importance, as it plays into legitimacy.  
 ‘Legal’ is not necessarily congruent with ‘legitimate’, and indeed the criticism was made at 
the time (and has been made since) that by rendering oppressive and essentially 
unconstitutional actions legal, the British were ‘taking a leaf out of the Nazi book’, as David 
French suggests.393 As drafted (although, in fairness, not always as executed in practice), the 
Order in Council amounted to the licensing of arbitrary and summary rule by a governor in a 
colony. This was ‘rule of law’ only in its most narrow and confined sense.  
The fact that, as David French points out, the British very much tended towards security and 
away from basic human rights is painful for those, such as Thompson, who stress the need 
for counterinsurgency to remain within legal boundaries. The truth is that there is no doubt 
whatsoever that had the methods employed by the British in Malaya or Kenya been 
employed in Europe at any point over the past 60 years, they would be characterised as 
deeply oppressive (at the very least), howsoever backed up by ‘legislative’ provisions. 
Indeed, in more recent years the ‘enormous resettlement programme’ in Malaya would be 
labelled simply ‘ethnic cleansing’, as would the activities authorised under emergency 
powers in Kenya.  
As French asks, ‘if it is legal, was it also legitimate?’394 This distinction between legal and 
legitimate is a trope that plays out in many (or perhaps even most) insurgencies. Despite the 
relatively liberal approach in Malaya (relative to Kenya), the fact remains that the use of 
‘emergency powers’ amounted to a gap between the British rhetoric (of remaining under 
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the ‘rule of law’) and the reality, which was far more than, as Strachan has put it, ‘the firm 
smack of government’.395 In terms of rule of law, it is instructive that the UK entered what 
are termed ‘reservations’ to relevant human rights instruments, specifically the Geneva 
Convention article 68, forbidding the execution of civilians by military courts. Indeed the 
1949 Geneva Conventions were not ratified by the UK until 1957.396  
Recognition of, and obedience to, law – the nearest approximation to the practical 
demonstration of loyalty (as we saw from the writings of Tyler in Chapter 2) – derives at 
least in part from the willingness of those people subject to a law to see that law and its 
enforcement as legitimate, rather than from their fear of what the law might do to them if 
they transgress. Enforced compliance is always possible, as several oppressive regimes have 
shown, even in insurgencies.397 But this is not legitimacy, and is arguably, in any event, not 
sustainable.  
The various wars fought by the British against different resisting peoples have left a legacy, 
often of bitterness. This has certainly been the case in Kenya, where legal actions are still 
being taken by hundreds of Kenyans – very publicly and to the continuing embarrassment of 
the British government, which has spent a great deal of time and money trying to suppress 
the records of misdoings.398 Only one such case has been brought in Malaya, concerning the 
alleged massacre of rubber plantation workers by a unit of the British Army at Batang Kali in 
1948.399 The Batang Kali incident has carried forward to the twenty-first century, and at the 
time of writing shows no sign of going away.400  
In neither Malaya nor Kenya were the insurgencies the British faced sufficiently developed, 
and nor were those insurgencies allowed to develop sufficiently to put into operation their 
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own competing systems of justice to challenge for legitimacy. In neither place did the British 
courts face any competition as working dispute resolution systems acting within a political 
sphere. There were no MPLA courts acting as accepted arbiters of civil or criminal disputes, 
or at least there is no record of such courts. The same applies in Kenya. In both cases, the 
military campaign was against guerrillas who enjoyed no outside support, had little training 
and found themselves challenged by comparatively well-developed military systems and 
very hard pressed. In neither theatre was there space for an alternative or shadow 
government to grow and establish an alternative source of legitimacy. In Malaya, the 
foundations laid by the British colonial administration have provided the basis for Malaysian 
legal approaches: ‘In many ways, the 1948–60 Emergency set the pattern not only for the 
conduct of future Emergencies but even in some respects for what became regular laws.’401 
This was as true in Palestine and its successor state, Israel, as it was in Malaya.402 
The ‘Diplock Courts’ 
The insurgencies of the 1950s were part of a general retreat from Empire for all European 
colonial powers, including Britain. Far closer to home, another conflict, more ancient in 
character, had flared up again, with a civil rights movement in Northern Ireland being co-
opted by insurgent groups, as a result of a combination of opportunism by those groups and 
serious misjudgements on the part of the British government.  
By 1972, the political and military situation in Northern Ireland had deteriorated to such an 
extent that direct control from London was imposed on Northern Ireland. Previously, the 
province had been governed by a government in Belfast that the predominantly Catholic 
minority Nationalist community regarded as sectarian. One of the first tasks of the new 
government was to reassess the effectiveness of the courts system. The highly controversial 
system of ‘internment’ had been introduced to offset the difficulties caused by gaining 
credible witness testimony. Accordingly, a commission headed by a leading judge, William 
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Diplock, concluded that for certain ‘scheduled offences’ (connected with terrorism) the right 
to jury trial would be abolished.403 Diplock summarised the risks as follows:  
The main obstacle to dealing effectively with terrorist crime in the regular courts of 
justice is intimidation by terrorist organisations of those persons who would be able 
to give evidence for the prosecution if they dared.404 
Due to the clear risks of intimidation of jury members within a highly charged political and 
military environment,405 it was ‘therefore necessary to consider whether any changes can 
be made in criminal procedure which, while not conflicting with the requirements of a 
judicial process, would enable at least some cases at present dealt with by detention to be 
heard in courts of law’.406 Certain ‘scheduled offences should be [tried] by a Judge of the 
High Court, or a County Court Judge, sitting alone with no jury, with the usual rights of 
appeal’.407  
Criticism of the new courts began as soon as the first announcement of the conclusions of 
the Diplock Commission.408 To some extent, the establishment of the courts played into the 
hands of the insurgent Irish Republican Army (IRA), and this was almost inevitable.. The 
human rights implications of having state-appointed judges as deciders of fact were clear, 
and human rights organisations were equally clear in their condemnation.409  
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Though it is not at all clear what alternatives the British (or indeed Lord Diplock) had to 
establishing such courts, short of internment, from the strategic perspective the courts 
played well in the context of the IRA’s ‘Long War’ strategy.410 This aimed at making the 
province ungovernable except by what the IRA called ‘Colonial Military Rule’. Clearly the 
way was open for the IRA and its supporters, highly capable strategic communications 
operators, to make the claim that the Diplock Courts were essentially a quasi-colonial 
imposition; in so doing, of course, they denied the legitimacy of the Diplock Courts. To that 
extent, the IRA operated the ‘rupture strategy’ initially advocated by Jacques Verges in 
Algeria (examined in more detail below). In due course, the courts became a key stake in 
negotiations to end the conflict, and they were abolished in July 2007.411 
In some ways, the Diplock Courts were ‘cousins’ of the courts of the various British 
counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1950s. They decided cases under what amounted to 
emergency regulations, although they themselves were not emergency tribunals as such 
(still less military tribunals). Arms of the state in one sense, they were to some extent 
instruments for ‘the disposal of unwanted members of the public’, as Kitson would have it 
(see above). In one sense, that is the function of all criminal courts. The issue here is not one 
of function, but rather one of fairness.  
There is no doubt that the courts played an essential role in providing some oversight for 
the activities of the security forces (as did the courts in Malaya), since there were very many 
acquittals. Criticisms of the Diplock Courts equate lack of a jury to lack of fairness. But it is 
worth observing that most legal systems in the world function without juries, and often in a 
way that is accepted as ‘fair’ by many of those subject to their jurisdiction. There is evidence 
that in effect, if not in form, the Diplock Courts were essentially a hybrid of the adversarial 
(in that there were prosecution and defence lawyers playing highly active roles in the 
proceedings) and the inquisitorial (where the judge takes the leading role – the so-called 
‘civil’ or ‘continental’ system).412 As in those civil systems, judges took a very active part in 
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proceedings. It is also fair to say that there are few allegations from independent critics to 
be found of bias on the part of judges in such trials.  
Whether or not the Diplock Courts did in fact offer due process and fair trials is of secondary 
importance. The problem they created was not necessarily that they were unfair, but that 
they were perceived to be unfair. As we saw in Chapter 1, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that it is the perception of fairness that supports legitimacy, and that perception is 
itself fed by, and in turn feeds, a wider narrative. 
 
Section 2 
Litigation lawfare in incumbent courts 
Rupture strategy 
We turn now to how those acting against the interests of the ‘incumbent’ might use courts 
to their advantage. In situations of insurgency, insurgents before courts often challenge the 
very right of their accusers to try them. The most famous incident of this kind took place in 
1649. The English Civil War was over, and the leader of one of the parties to that war 
(fought to a very great extent over the issue of the source of legitimacy – Parliament or 
King),  King Charles I, was indicted and tried for the crime of High Treason. He answered the 
indictment as follows: 
 Now I would know by what authority, I mean lawful, there are many unlawful 
 authorities in the world, thieves and robbers by the highways, but I would know by 
 what authority I was brought from thence, and carried from place to place, and I 
 know not what: and when I know by what lawful authority I shall answer [the 
 charge].413  
At this point, of course, the former head of state was no longer in a position of active 
authority, but he claimed such authority. He was, it could be said, at the point of his trial 
himself an insurgent.  
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The well-known French lawyer Jacques Verges called this the ‘rupture defence’: he adopted 
the denial – the defensive – and then, he might claim, took it a step further by adding an 
‘offensive’ element: 
 ... so that when the judge says ‘You’re French’, the prisoner says ‘I’m Algerian’; the 
 judge says ‘You’re in a criminal conspiracy’, the prisoner says ‘I’m in the resistance’; 
 the judge says ‘You committed murder’, he says ‘I executed a traitor’. From then on 
 no dialogue is possible.414  
Verges developed this form of ‘lawfare’ in Algeria in the late 1950s, when he earned a 
reputation for uncompromising criminal defence of men and women suspected of 
involvement in attacks on French interests, including terrorist attacks. He encapsulated his 
approach in his book De La Stratégie Judiciaire.415 A curiously under-referenced book, at 
least in English-language discourse, it sets out a way in which insurgents use courts against 
the established order. Verges himself, who died in 2013, was a radical lawyer, well known 
(and indeed famous in France) for his support of causes highly unpopular in the West, such 
as Palestinian guerrillas and the Khmer Rouge, as well as Nazis indicted in France for war 
crimes committed in the Second World War.  
De La Stratégie Judiciaire is a review, with historical and modern examples of techniques 
that can be used in court by insurgents. The author writes that: ‘In terms of political (legal) 
defence, there are always two methods. The compliant strategy (Dreyfus, Challe) or the 
“rupture strategy” (Socrates, Jesus). The first endeavour to save their lives; the second to 
win their cause. The novelty of today is that they can also save their lives.’416 The idea was 
based on the astute observation that ‘by nature, the prosecution is conservative’.417 
Irish insurgents combined both approaches when it suited them. ‘When the defendants 
were brought before the court, they refused to recognise it, stating that they were soldiers 
of the Irish Republic and denied the right of a foreign tribunal to try them.’418 As was 
discussed above, they then took to the offensive in the very courts whose jurisdiction they 
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denied. The same approach was taken by IRA prisoners in the ‘troubles’ of the late 
twentieth century. At least one judge at that time took the view that Mr Justice McGonigal, 
a judge in the Diplock Courts, ‘would show grudging respect for those IRA men who refused 
to recognise his court, regarding them as behaving like proper soldiers’.419 
Skilfully done, it makes the courtroom part of the battlefield. Verges’ first major case 
illustrates this. In his classic Bouhired trial, Verges turned attention away from the facts of 
the case and instead towards the legitimacy of the court and, by extension, the legitimacy of 
the state. Djamila Bouhired was accused of planting a bomb in a cafe in the European 
quarter of Algiers in 1956 which killed 11 civilians (an event depicted in the film Battle of 
Algiers). In 1957, she had been captured and allegedly tortured; in July 1957 she went to 
trial for murder. She was defended by Jacques Verges. The usual defence strategy in such a 
case might be to attempt to undermine the prosecution case by challenging the integrity of 
the evidence, the intelligence upon which it was based or the conclusions of the forensic 
experts. If there was a confession, that too might be challenged (in Bouhired’s case there 
was no confession). Alternatively, it might be open – in the event that the prosecution’s 
evidence was overwhelming – to negotiate a favourable guilty plea. Again, in Bouhired’s 
case, a conservative defence approach might be to agree a plea of guilty on the basis that 
the death penalty would not be imposed. Verges would have called this the defense de 
connivance – a collaboration defence. He took the view that Bouhired’s trial should not be a 
‘play for sympathy as left-wing lawyers advised … from the murderous fools who judged 
us’.420 
Verges took a different approach. He attacked not the evidence, or indeed the police or 
security forces; he attacked the court itself. He refused to acknowledge that the bombing of 
the cafe was a criminal offence and accused the court of being complicit in the army’s  
corvée de bois (woodcutting – here a euphemism for torture) tactics. Jacques Derrida called 
this a ‘radical contestation of the given order of the law, of judicial authority and ultimately 
of the legitimate authority of the state that summons his clients to appear before the 
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law’.421 Verges took the view that another role rupture strategy plays is to highlight the 
arbitrary nature of the relationship between accused and accuser.422  
This strategy, in purely immediate legal terms, is unlikely to work, in the sense that a judge 
is unlikely to find in favour of the insurgent. Indeed, in the case of Djamila Bouhired, the 
result – from the narrow perspective of the trial itself – was conviction and a death 
sentence. The sentence was never carried out and Bouhired was eventually to marry Verges 
and become a senior member of the government of independent Algeria. From the 
perspective of the insurgent campaign in Algeria, the trial of Bouhired was little less than a 
triumph: Verges had succeeded on the international stage in changing the narrative from 
the French story of a savage terrorist attack into his version of an illegitimate state engaged 
in the oppression of a legitimate struggle. The fact that he had done this through the 
medium of a trial is testament more to his courage than his originality. 
Other perhaps more nuanced critics have suggested not only that Verges and the ‘rupture 
strategy’ was not original,423 but also that it amounted to nothing more than a ‘rehashing of 
the “tu quoque” argument advanced by the defendants at Nuremburg and that it was very 
much a tactic of its time in terms of the effect it had’.424 They say that Verges was employing 
a tactic advocated by, among others, Lenin, who said that Bolsheviks accused before courts 
should ‘defend their cause not their freedom ... [and] address the masses over the heads of 
the judges’.425 As contemporary journalist Ted Morgan, who had been present in Algiers 
throughout the war, points out, it was not only the ‘masses’ to whom Verges was appealing; 
his target was also the elite of metropolitan France.426 Certainly the Bouhired trial was very 
much ‘of its time’, set as it was in the context of a ‘war of liberation’ in an age of ‘wars of 
liberation’. With its use in the Bouhired trial, Jacques Verges made the term ‘rupture 
strategy’ part of legal vocabulary, even if only in a fairly rarefied area of practice. Verges was 
content, as well he might be, to acknowledge that he was not the first to use this tactic.427 
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As he himself said, it was a strategy used by Jesus and Socrates. The denial of the court’s 
right to sit in judgment is only part of the strategy, however. Without a public hearing, there 
is simply no point in using ‘rupture strategy’. The essence of the strategy is intimately 
connected with ensuring that the ‘message’ of the cause is reinforced, while simultaneously 
undermining the legitimacy of the state. As such, it is as much a strategic communications 
tool as it is a legal one. Indeed, on purely legal grounds, the technique, as pointed out 
above, rarely succeeds, save on its own terms.  
The Irish Nationalists of the War of Independence (1919–21) were the masters of a 
multifaceted judicial strategy. Apart from their use of courts to undermine crown legitimacy, 
they instinctively understood Verges’ point that choosing ‘rupture’ opens the possibility of 
‘turning the tables, even if you lose’.428 When it suited their purposes, the Nationalists were 
more than content to use the Crown Courts for their own purposes. If matters went against 
them, this could be presented as an example of corrupt justice; if the court decided in their 
favour, the case could be presented as vindication of the case that had been brought, and 
thus presented as a victory. 
While the default position for those IRA volunteers before Crown Courts was to deny the 
authority of the court to try them, a draft general order of IRA command stated that ‘open 
permission is granted to all members of the army charged before enemy courts on charges 
involving the penalty of death to enter into a formal defence if they so desire’. However, 
permission was not extended to ‘men taken in open warfare’  for whom a legal defence 
might be evidentially difficult, as to do so would involve the pointless expenditure of legal 
fees ‘much needed for other matters’.429  
The courts were also used for civil cases against the crown in the event that property was 
destroyed or damaged in the course of raids or action by crown forces. These would be 
made under the Criminal Injuries (Ireland) Act 1919. Indeed, awards were made by Crown 
Courts in favour of next of kin of persons killed. Senior Republican figures were perfectly 
prepared to bring such actions. Judgments in favour of such litigants were used in 
propaganda efforts.430 This in turn assisted in efforts to ensure that the message of the 
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rebellion was sustained and extended, particularly in the US, as well as at home. Every effort 
was made to hobble crown forces through crown (UK state) courts. Using coroners’ inquests 
into those killed by British forces was a particularly effective tactic. The first, and arguably 
most celebrated, case concerned the inquest into the death of Thomas Ashe, who died after 
a failed attempt to force-feed him on a hunger strike in 1917. The jury’s verdict condemning 
the government’s treatment of Ashe and censuring the British authorities was nothing less 
than a propaganda triumph.431 It was the first of many such coroners’ verdicts that went 
against the crown. These courtroom victories were given great prominence in Nationalist 
media, with stress being placed on the argument that the verdicts reflected all the worse on 
the British by virtue of the fact that the juries were ‘selected and summoned by the police’. 
Obviously adverse verdicts were either not reported or were presented as instances of bias. 
In one case, an attempt was made in the Crown Court to stop police raids on Sinn Fein’s 
pamphlet printing house. Although the case was eventually lost, ‘we had got our objective in 
the breathing space created and our literature was made available’.432 
The link between these cases (and many like them) and the media was critical. The 
Nationalists were fortunate to have the remarkable Erskine Childers as the Irish Parliament 
(Dail) director of propaganda, with the declared aim of ensuring that ‘the matter of 
Propaganda abroad would be on a much wider scale’.433 Childers also edited the Irish 
Bulletin, distributed in England, Ireland and the United States. The Bulletin regularly 
reported courtroom victories and criticised defeats as examples of ‘corrupt British justice’, 
echoing avant la lettre Verges’ view that even in losing, the tables could be turned. Childers 
and his team ensured that the message of the Nationalist courts’ fairness was carried 
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nationally and internationally, with foreign journalists being granted access to the 
underground tribunals by the propaganda department of Sinn Fein.434  
Rupture in its traditional form, as espoused by Verges, is still used by lawyers. The legitimacy 
of the very existence of military commissions to try Al Qaeda and other terrorist suspects 
was a particular issue throughout the decade-long saga after they were instituted by 
President George W. Bush in November 2001. In the first major account of the US Military 
Commission procedures, The Terror Courts, Jess Bravin relates that in the chaotic 
arraignment hearing for the alleged 9/11 conspirator Khaled Sheikh Mohammed in May of 
2012, the defendant’s lawyer, David Nevin, struck at the core of the controversies by 
challenging the right to exist of the court before which he was appearing. He ‘questioned 
whether by wearing a judicial robe [the Commission’s military judge] Pohl had prejudged 
one of the central issues “the legitimacy of the structure of the court itself,” something that 
had never come up in any case in Nevin’s career’.435 Nor, one expects, in the careers of the 
other American lawyers or judicial officials in the room. 
In some contemporary judicial discourse, the idea of rupture has undergone something of a 
small renaissance. The idea of ‘immanent critique’ has arisen, where, rather than the 
submissions of a party, judicial activism has resulted in insurgent ideas having real effect in 
the form of court judgments. For example, in one judgment of the Indian Supreme Court 
which arose out of the Naxalite insurgency in India, the court stated that ‘what we have 
witnessed in the instant proceedings have been repeated assertions of inevitability of 
muscular and violent statecraft’.436 This judgment concerned the activities of a particular 
group of counterinsurgent paramilitaries, the so-called Salwa Judum, composed of ‘Special 
Police Officers’ (SPOs), which amounted to groups of armed tribal youth. These were 
conscripted into the service of the counterinsurgent state government.  
An action had been brought by three claimants alleging widespread violation of human 
rights by the state authorities. In its judgment, the Supreme Court drew on academic works 
critical of globalisation and essentially took an approach remarkably in line with much of the 
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theoretical framework advocated by counsel for the claimants. As a commentator on this 
case put it, ‘the court thus positions the rights to equality and dignity in opposition to 
capitalist development imperatives ...’437  
The case Indian academic Brenna Bhandar makes concerning the significance of this case is 
compelling, in that it shows the continuing potential of political shifts originating in judicial 
authority. As she says ‘a strategy of rupture might involve an exposure of the contradictions 
that inhere in colonial capitalist legal orders that eviscerate the potentiality that rights hold 
to enable individuals to live lives free of fear violence and exploitation ... through the act of 
judgement’.438 One is tempted to state that the ‘might’ in that characterisation is the key 
modifier. She is undoubtedly right, though, when she says that ‘it is clear that an 
independent judiciary does have the power to disturb the monopoly of violence exercised 
by the government and to transcend this disturbed framework by offering a radically 
different interpretation of security and freedom’.439 By way of comment, courts in a free 
society have the potential to achieve even more than this. The question as to what social, 
psychological or political forces ensure that this potential is rarely (if ever) exercised lies 
beyond the remit of this thesis. While Bhandar argues that this is an example of ‘rupture’, a 
case could well be made that it was an instance of ‘disruptive litigation’ (see below).  
 
‘Rupture’ and the narrative 
The rupture strategy, as described and practised by Verges and essentially epitomised by 
the Irish judicial strategy, may have had effect in both Algeria and Ireland. However, the 
strategy is of little use in the absence of two key factors. If an accused person in, for 
example, an Iranian or Russian state court is accused of ‘terrorism’, little effect will be had if 
he denies the authority of the court to try him and attempts to subvert that court. The 
response of those authorities may simply be to close the courts to public access and deny 
the accused any form of publicity. Further, the decision of the court in such societies may 
have little in common with notions of ‘fair trial’: the trial is likely simply to be more in the 
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nature of a production line than an examination of the factual and legal issues surrounding 
the accused’s alleged crime. There needs to be an element of basic notions of ‘rule of law’, 
as well as judicial professionalism. In other words, in order to work, the ‘target’ court needs 
to operate in an environment approximating to Western notions of ‘rule of law’. In both 
Ireland and Algeria, this was to a very great degree the case – at least to the extent that the 
rhetoric of the law was complied with to some extent. In order to have purchase, notions of 
‘using the courts against themselves’ must have a degree of credibility. In such 
circumstances, courts’ claims to professionalism and compliance with legal norms should 
have some basis in fact, or at least perceived fact. It may be worth mentioning at this point 
that even martial law courts in democratic countries may display such characteristics. As 
Foxton points out in his Sinn Fein and the Crown Courts, there was a sense of ‘punctilious 
legalism’ alongside brute force in the British approach in Ireland.440 One leading defence 
lawyer for IRA volunteers, Tim Healy, had a high regard even for the courts martial officers 
in Ireland, who could sometimes be reasonably fair: ‘As a rule courts composed of officers of 
the British Army make a fine tribunal.’441 Few would consider attempting the rupture 
strategy in a closed court presided over by judges employed only to process convictions, or 
indeed a Court Martial composed of military officers in an operational zone.  
Secondly, rupture strategy requires the voice of rupture to be heard by an audience outside 
the courtroom. This requires a degree of media access and freedom. Indeed it is at such 
media that rupture strategy is aimed. Once again, to refer to Rupert Smith’s characterisation 
of contemporary war being a form of theatre, a theatre needs an audience, and with the 
‘rupture’ strategy that audience has to be in the form of media. Ted Morgan, the American 
journalist reporting from Algiers at the time of the Bouhired trial, wrote that Verges, the 
defence lawyer, ‘had little concern for the truth’: he was ‘playing to that part of public 
opinion in France that had turned against the war’.442 This was certainly true, but that was 
exactly the point. ‘Truth’ was secondary at best: Verges purpose was to advance a cause, 
and playing to the ‘home front’ was one way of doing so. And that depended on having an 
audience which was supplied by the international media. In today’s terms, his actions would 
be considered to be an effective information operation.  
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As well as being tools of government and insurgency, courts may also be platforms for 
political declarations. Castro’s speech ‘La historia me absolverá’443 was made in open 
court.444 It is still a key text in Cuban society today. Similarly, all of Verges’ classic trials took 
place with full media presence. Rupture, and indeed a wider judicial strategy, is and must be 
part of a strategic communications narrative, and for it to have a place in such a narrative, 
there has to be a means of propagation. Such a narrative will, in its essence, act as a foil to 
the counterinsurgent narrative of adherence to human rights, due process, etc.  
Rupture is a complement to the development of insurgent courts, which will be looked at in 
the next chapter. As insurgent courts undermine the legitimacy of state courts in the 
domestic realm, while promoting their own legitimacy, rupture attacks that legitimacy from 
within the courtrooms of the state. Cogently and professionally conducted, and in the right 
context, it can play a key part in insurgent judicial strategy. As will be further stressed in 
Chapter 3, the Irish Nationalist strategy amply demonstrated in 1919–21 the potential of an 
insurgent judicial strategy. 
 
Disruptive litigation  
If lawfare is the means by which ‘law is used as a means of achieving military objectives’,445 
‘disruptive litigation’, like ‘rupture’, is a weapon within that realm of warfare. It might be 
defined as ‘the use of court decisions to influence the conduct of strategy or operations in 
war or conflict’. There are two clear categories into which such litigation (defined here as 
the conduct of court proceedings) might fall. The first is hostile disruptive litigation; the 
second is non-hostile disruptive litigation.446 The difference lies rather more in the intent of 
the litigant or claimant (the persons bringing the case). ‘Hostile disruptive litigation’ has the 
intended effect of disrupting counterinsurgent operations. Its non-hostile counterpart may 
have the effect of doing so, but the intent is not present. The latter, as will be seen, has 
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been common over the last decade, particularly in the context of the conduct of the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In his essay on Chinese lawfare as part of the ‘three warfares’ idea referred to in Chapter 1, 
Dean Zheng outlines some scenarios whereby a Chinese legal campaign using US courts, 
which he calls ‘offensive lawfare’, could work: 
 The most obvious such measure would be the filing of a variety of legal motions in 
 American courts aimed at delaying any American intervention. These motions could 
 be filed in response to a host of issues, ranging from the War Powers Act to the right 
 to mobilize various American resources. More subtle actions could include legal 
 action related to environmental or labor law – areas that, while not directly related 
 to foreign policy and national security, could still have an impact on US military 
 operations.447  
Zheng’s predictions in the context of international conflict, with respect to lawfare, have yet 
to be fulfilled. In a conversation with me, however, Zheng went further: 
 Imagine in the case of a US Navy carrier group approaching Taiwan during a crisis. 
 What better way of disrupting its command structure than, say, removing the 
 admiral by means of false criminal or civil accusations, generated by Chinese agents 
 in the US? Images of child abuse, for example, planted in his personal computer. At 
 the very least the enemy could hope for his peace of mind disturbed. Even 
 better, he might be summoned back to the US. Either way, the operational efficacy 
 of the admiral could be seriously damaged at minimal cost.448  
Clearly the scope of such potential operations is almost unlimited, provided the resources 
and will are present. However, within the context of insurgent warfare, there is evidence 
that the kind of hostile disruptive litigation to which Zheng has drawn attention has in fact 
been used. In a paper presented to the Fort Leavenworth School of Advanced Military 
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Studies in 2010, Juan Padilla, a Colombian officer, wrote about a well-known case that is 
ongoing in Colombia itself.449  
The case derived from a famous incident in the conflict between the Colombian government 
and various insurgent groups and drug cartels in the 1980s. In 1985, a group from ‘M-19’, an 
offshoot of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) group, raided the Palace of 
Justice in the capital of Bogota and took 300 people hostage. An attempted rescue mission 
by Colombian security forces resulted in 90 deaths. The commander of the operation was 
one Colonel Plazas Vega. In 1986, the Supreme Court investigated the incident and 
determined that the actions of the security forces and of Colonel Plazas were within proper 
bounds, and that culpability lay with M-19. In 1992, convictions were obtained against the 
M-19 leaders of the operation, although all avoided prison terms. Some subsequently 
entered politics. Some 25 years after the incident, Colonel Plazas had retired and been 
appointed by President Uribe as director of the Narcotic Enforcement Office. Padilla says 
that he achieved great success in that role.  
In 2005, proceedings concerning the raid were reopened and Colonel Plazas, who was by 
now running for Congress, was detained. Pending resolution, he remained in detention and 
was no longer eligible for political office. Padilla’s case is that, by means of politically 
inspired litigation, Plazas had been removed from the fight against narcotics and insurgency 
in a democratic country. Whatever the merits of the case, which was very complex and 
controversial,450 Padilla’s case is that an effective fighter against insurgency and terrorism 
had been removed through legal means.  
Clearly there is a line to be drawn between cases of supposed ‘hostile disruptive litigation’ 
and the more common allegations and litigation of abuses by security forces of the kind 
extensively dealt with in the aftermath of the ‘Bloody Sunday’ events.451 Equally clearly, the 
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real motives of claimants in cases of hostile disruptive litigation may only become clear 
years or even decades later; for if they were clear at the time, it is unlikely that courts would 
entertain claims. It is vital, generally, that such motives are concealed. There are occasions 
when there is no such attempt. For example, credible media reports assert that Hamas has 
made attempts to secure British lawyers to ensure the arrest of Israeli military and political 
leaders should they ever visit the United Kingdom.452 In all such cases, the effect of such 
actions is twofold. First, a successful case brought might remove inconvenient or effective 
leaders from the enemy incumbent’s order of battle. Second, whether or not the legal 
action is won, there is significant narrative and strategic communications value in simply the 
fact of having brought the case. By engaging British lawyers in the manner alleged, Hamas 
succeeded in raising the profile – and possibly the credibility – of their cause.  
Non-hostile disruptive litigation as the enemy’s strategic partner?  
It is difficult in many cases to disentangle the motives of litigants from the arguments in the 
cases themselves, or indeed from the effects those cases might produce. The leading human 
rights case of Ireland v UK arose out of the use by British forces in Northern Ireland of 
techniques of interrogation against suspects that, it was alleged, amounted to torture.453 As 
well as reaching back to the early days of the Northern Ireland campaign, the consequences 
of this judgment and the facts that gave rise to it remain contemporarily relevant, not only 
in the development of British policy on interrogation –which it directly continues to affect – 
but in the framing of the narrative relating to British counterinsurgency in the contemporary 
context.  
As an example of ‘lawfare’ – conflict in the domain of law but impacting directly on the 
conduct of operations, the legitimacy of those operations and, further, the legitimacy of the 
counterinsurgent cause – no case has had more impact. It set the tone for discourse on 
British counterinsurgency specifically. It also provided much of the background to the even 
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more critical discourse surrounding UK and US activities during the Iraq and Afghan wars of 
the early twenty-first century. However, the litigant in the case was the Republic of Ireland, 
not a combatant. Nor was it particularly sympathetic to the political aims of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) whose alleged members were the internees subject to the 
torture and ill-treatment that was the subject of the case. Was this ‘litigation warfare’? Was 
it disruptive litigation? In one sense, of course, it was. The intent was surely to stop the ill-
treatment of detainees that the Republic of Ireland claimed as citizens. However, the intent 
was not to impede the aims of the United Kingdom’s security forces, let alone advance 
those of the IRA. 
Similarly – and moving to a far more recent conflict – few would suggest that Maya Evans, 
the British peace activist whose cases will be discussed below, had any sympathy for the 
Taliban, who might well (had they been asked) have approved of her actions as much as 
some elements in the British armed forces fighting the Taliban would have regarded them 
as providing ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’. Whatever the motives for such litigation, it is 
the incumbent or counterinsurgent who is on the defensive. No state entity will bring cases 
in the United Kingdom against, for example, the Taliban for actions in Afghanistan. And even 
were they minded to do so, the chances of any judgment being enforced would be nil.454  
From the conceptual perspective, such actions tend to erode incumbent legitimacy. Writing 
on Stephen Neff’s landmark Justice in Blue and Gray on the use of law in the United States 
Civil War, one reviewer stated:  
 Law becomes a strategic partner – a lubricating oil smoothing accomplishment of 
 national security objectives – when it produces a perception that military operations 
 are, or even that the war itself, is legitimate and therefore righteous and 
 supportable. Law becomes the enemy’s strategic partner, however – that is, creates 
 friction in the other direction — when it produces the opposite result. This is so 
 because law in war operates on, against and within all three aspects of what 
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 Clausewitz once called the ‘paradoxical trinity’ of which war is composed: the 
 people, the commander and his army, and the government.455  
On occasion, the ‘friction’ produced that might benefit the ‘enemy’ may be initiated (or 
indeed created) by parties not directly involved in the conflict. Typically, over the last 
decade, such people have often been anti-war activists or human rights campaigners. 
Certainly in the Iraq and Afghan cases in the UK, referred to above, this has been the case. 
The view taken by some US observers is that within the context of the ‘war on terror’ – ‘in 
grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign’456 – these actors have had some 
success.  
‘During the past decade the United States and its citizens have been subjected to numerous 
legal actions in European and domestic courts that appear to be aimed at negatively 
impacting the United States’ ability to fight Islamic extremists.’457 There may be some 
confusion, to put it mildly, between the effect and the intention. The effect of litigation 
aimed, for example, at curbing bomb attacks (be they ‘drones’ or other delivery systems) by 
US military assets, including ‘special forces’, may well be to ‘negatively impact’ the vast 
capabilities of the US military machine. In very many – indeed most – cases, the intention is 
rather to act to enforce what proponents might argue were, until the last decade, well-
accepted tenets of the law of the use of force. While some may characterise such an 
approach as ‘abuse’,458 others would see it as the exercise of litigation to entirely 
appropriate legal ends. For example, when Italy indicted CIA officers for kidnapping, 
allegedly for the purposes of rendition, was this a legitimate action by a state in support of 
its security and legal integrity, or an attack on the US capability to fight ‘terror’?459 While the 
result might be to blunt the discretion of US military commanders – in that case affecting 
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their discretion to kidnap nationals of another state from the streets of a third (and allied) 
country without reference to that state – that is not the intent.  
By the same token, is the use of the Alien Tort Claims Act a restriction on the discretion of 
other countries to use torture? The Alien Tort Claims Act has been used to sue for ‘victims of 
Palestinian terrorist organizations’ in Israel.460 
Non-hostile disruptive litigation and the US home front 2001–14 
Clearly even ‘exogenous’ counterinsurgency campaigns are not confined to the borders 
wherein the military interventions take place. There is a long history of counterinsurgencies 
being fought – and arguably won – in the countries of the intervening states themselves. 
Vietnamese General Giap said in an interview that ‘the [Vietnam] War was fought on many 
fronts ... the most important one was American public opinion’.461 Rather more recently, in 
his memoirs, the former UK Chief of the General Staff, the professional head of the British 
Army, said: ‘Losing popular support at home is one guaranteed way to lose a 
counterinsurgency campaign, as the Americans discovered to their cost in Vietnam.’462 The 
‘home front’ has, over the counterinsurgencies of the early twenty-first century, been a vital 
part of the campaigns.  
Clearly this has involved many layers of discourse, argument and narrative, ranging from the 
polemic to the academic. From the legal perspective in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the courts have provided a forum for some of the controversies 
surrounding the wars to be played out. In the United States, the matters litigated (and 
which have entered or influenced public discourse on the ‘war on terror’) have largely 
concerned questions surrounding detention and interrogation, and the extent to which 
American courts have jurisdiction over such matters. There has been particularly intense 
litigation over the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, many of them Taliban or other insurgents. 
The cases brought in the so-called ‘military commissions’ were frequently seriously hobbled 
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by the use of torture and mistreatment.463 This has had an effect on the narrative of the 
wars, with allegations made in court providing excellent copy for the media in the context of 
portraying the campaigns in an often negative light.  
A series of legal cases concerning both the Iraq campaigns of 2003–11 (for the British) and 
the Afghan campaign of 2001–14 casts light on the approaches taken, or not taken, to the 
use of courts – and to some extent on the way in which the stark choices portrayed by Frank 
Kitson have been approached. They further highlight the importance of having a legal 
strategy. Incidentally, the international and domestic human rights implications of 
attempting to ensure at the very least a sound courts framework in the various theatres of 
operation have also been elucidated.  
General Michael Dunlavey (Commanding Officer Joint Task Force 170 Guantanamo Bay until 
November 2002) conflates the cases ostensibly brought to enforce constitutional liberties 
with the activities of ‘terrorists’: 
 I know where you are coming from, but when it comes down to it, when it is about 
 protecting rights, we have to come up and develop a way to deal with terrorists who 
 use the legal system against us. 464  
He was referring here to the Hamdan stream of cases in the US Supreme Court,465 which 
imposed serious restrictions on the jurisdiction of the ‘military commissions’ set up to try 
alleged Al Qaeda operators in the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, which has been 
described as a ‘legal black hole’.466   
Another perspective is, of course, that if the United States and its allies complied with 
international law, their problems might be somewhat lessened. Critics see the US as the 
leading proponent of lawfare, and that lawfare cuts two ways. Rather than the US being the 
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‘victim’ of lawfare, it is a leading practitioner. One Pakistani scholar, Ahmed Dawood, puts it 
thus:  
Military prowess is not enough in this age; and the United States knows it. America’s 
‘other army’ – its less visible but equally potent cadre of skillful [sic] lawyers (in 
government and even in private practice) – dutifully got busy crafting appropriate 
international law narratives for the War on Terror. They realized that winning the 
battle for defining ‘legality’ on the world stage was critical. Until you build the 
capacity to counter the dominant narrative and promote competing interpretations 
of what is ‘legal’ in international law, you will continue to be outwitted in 
international affairs not just on the battlefield.467  
Dawood identifies here the link between law and narrative. Such narratives do not operate 
only on the international level. Insurgencies are at least as concerned to capture and 
dominate domestic narratives of ‘legitimacy’ using, among other tools, the law and courts.  
Charles Dunlap states that the revelation of the torture at Abu Ghraib was the ‘US Military’s 
most serious setback since 9/11’,468 a thought echoed by David Kennedy, who said it was ‘a 
military defeat’.469 Kennedy may well be right, but the setback was not legal – except insofar 
as the activities forming the basis of the setback happened to be illegal (torture being a 
crime in the United States). The very few criminal prosecutions brought as a result of these 
crimes attracted far less attention than the iconic photographs of the abuse at the prison. 
The setback was presentational. 
Non-hostile disruptive litigation in the UK: the Iraq and Afghan cases 
The treatment of detainees in Iraq by UK forces has been controversial from the outset of 
the Iraq War itself in 2003. The death in custody of Baha Mousa in 2003470 catalysed a series 
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of investigations, trials and inquiries which, at the time of writing in mid-2014, continue.471 
In terms of litigation and its feedback into operations, two cases dominated the discourse. 
The first was that of Mazin Al Skeini and others who were shot dead by a British patrol in 
Basra in August 2003. The other was that of Hilal Al Jeddah, a prisoner who sued the British 
government, alleging mistreatment at the hands of UK soldiers during his detention for over 
three years in a UK military detention facility in Basra.472  
A further matter concerned Hamid Al-Sweady. This was a rather different kind of case, 
wherein it was alleged that prisoners taken by British soldiers after a battle were tortured, 
killed and their bodies mutilated. It became the subject of an inquiry.473 The Al Skeini and Al 
Jeddah cases established that the British authorities were responsible legally, under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act, for those killed or 
detained. Neither the detail of the judgments nor the legal reasoning behind them is 
immediately relevant for present purposes. These judgments had military and political 
effect, in that first they altered the parameters within which military operations take place, 
and second, to some degree they shifted the debate from the political purpose of the 
missions to the manner in which they were conducted, with intense press focus on the 
behaviour of UK forces.  
A similar effect can be observed from another stream of cases, brought in the civil courts of 
England and Wales by Maya Evans,474 ‘a peace campaigner opposed to the presence of UK 
and US armed forces in Afghanistan’.475 These concerned the allegation that the transfer by 
UK forces of detainees captured in combat to the Afghan authorities for trial was unlawful, 
as the detainees were thereby exposed to torture, ill-treatment and unfair trials. It was 
decided in these cases that the safeguards introduced by the British were adequate, 
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although barely so. A further case was brought in 2012 by Serdar Mohammed, a detainee 
captured by British forces and transferred to the Afghan authorities, who allegedly tortured 
him.476 This case was brought on much the same grounds, and the information provided 
indicated that the safeguards were most certainly not adequate.477  
In all of these cases, much effort was made by the British authorities to make sure that the 
matters being litigated were brought under provisions which would ensure that the 
proceedings were secret. In one of these cases it was stated that: ‘The importance of the 
case lies not only in its subject matter but in its implications for security in Afghanistan and 
the effectiveness of UK [counterinsurgency] operations there.’478 We do not discuss further 
here the extent to which the judgments (which, it is fair to say, largely favoured the 
accounts given by the UK authorities) were informed more by a desire to ensure the 
continued ‘effectiveness of UK operations’ than by a willingness to cease handing over 
detainees to a regime with a highly questionable human rights record (and specifically to 
the Afghan Intelligence Service, the NDS).479 However, what is clear is that, once again, the 
effectiveness of operations was perceived to be at stake. Much effort was expended by UK 
personnel in Afghanistan as a result of these cases,480 and it is apparent that there was a 
real concern to ensure compliance with relevant legal strictures as a result of these cases. 
Clearly these cases are not to be confused with the category identified as ‘hostile disruptive 
litigation’ of the kind described above, envisaged by Dean Zheng and indeed carried out by 
Colombian insurgents and others. The litigants in such cases fully understand that their role 
is as often unwilling participants in the conflict, not as active supporters of one side or the 
other – and certainly not as combatants. However, in bringing actions in the forum of 
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courts, they know that ‘the audience are not just the people in the war zone, nor even the 
population of all the belligerent states, but the court of world opinion’.481  
As such, they instinctively comprehend that perceptions are at least as important as the 
outcome of the cases they pursue. In his study of contemporary strategy, The Direction of 
War, Professor Hew Strachan writes: 
The newness of the challenge posed by non-state actors in war to our understanding 
or strategy is far less the fact that they do not belong to states than the fact that 
they have displayed a better understanding of the trinity of strategy.  Like Maoist 
guerillas, at least in Maoist theory they recognize that the people must be 
participants even if only passive and secondary ones not neutral onlookers.482  
As stated above, the litigants, of course, are not themselves insurgents. Nor do they 
necessarily adopt the views or objectives of the insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
Nonetheless, as one solicitor involved in the Maya Evans cases acknowledged: ‘There is a 
political purpose behind this litigation. What gets us up in the morning is the prospect of 
making change … I had a concern about the military not operating under law. It’s all about 
government operating under law.’483 While the objectives of those involved in such cases 
may not be to impact on the operational effectiveness of UK or allied forces on the ground 
in the operational zones of Iraq or Afghanistan, the result is that there is effect.  
It should have come as no surprise to the British government that detention in Iraq and 
Afghanistan became a ‘live issue’. Yet it is clear that even in 2012, when the Evans litigation 
was brought before the courts, no policy or strategy was in place. As pointed out above, 
David Kennedy observed of the scandal of torture and abuse of prisoners at the US-run Abu 
Ghraib prison near Baghdad that ‘the whole episode was clearly a military defeat’.484 Surely 
the same argument can be made of the British experience, albeit at a far reduced level of 
global impact. 
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‘Legal feedback’: disruptive litigation and the effect on operations 
A ‘targeting meeting’ is a regular occurrence in modern warfare. It is usually composed of 
representatives of all those involved in the planning and execution of missions to destroy, 
kill or capture enemy ‘assets’, be they human or otherwise. Such meetings will generally 
include the ‘kinetic element’ of warfare – those who will actually conduct the mission; there 
will be intelligence officers to brief the meeting on what is known about the target; there 
may well be a ‘psyops’ (psychological operations) officer to look at the media or ‘info ops’ 
(information operations) potential that may be inherent in the mission. There may be a 
civilian representative to analyse the political impact, if any, of destroying or killing the 
target. At all such meetings, however, in the twenty-first century the one certain presence 
will be the lawyer, who will be trained and qualified in the ‘operational law’ referred to 
above: in other words, the application of the laws of war (ius in bello) to the operation itself.  
A NATO military intelligence officer gave me his account of one such ‘targeting meeting’ in 
Afghanistan. The purpose of the meeting was to assess certain individuals for ‘kill or 
capture’ raids. When the agenda reached a particular individual, the ‘psyops’ officer said 
that, rather than killing or capturing him, another way of dealing with the ‘target’ might be 
to put about rumours concerning his sexual proclivities. At this point the legal advisor stated 
that this might contravene the local law on slander, or indeed the law of the 
country/countries whose officers were present and who would carry out the mission. The 
commander of the unit tasked with ‘kill or capture’ replied: ‘Alright, can we kill him?’ The 
legal advisor is said to have stated that there was no reason why he could not be killed. The 
officer did not tell me what was actually decided.485 
That the law influences the day-to-day conduct of counterinsurgency operations is nothing 
new. What is relatively new is the effect of the potential for litigation and the use of courts 
in the home countries of counterinsurgents who are exogenous or foreign to the country in 
which they are operating. This litigation has had a feedback effect on the conduct of 
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operations in such places as Iraq or Afghanistan.486 Over the last decade, this has been 
particularly evident in the field of the treatment of prisoners and interrogation.487 This has 
been a major issue for counterinsurgents endogenous to the insurgencies (i.e. not foreign, 
such as those in Northern Ireland or, arguably, the French in Algeria).  
There is no doubt that there was a ‘feedback effect’ from the Maya Evans stream of cases 
for UK forces and operations in Helmand. Such feedback had an effect not only on military 
operations, as Naina Patel a British civilian ‘justice advisor’ in Helmand explained: 
 … the resources devoted to anti-terrorism prosecutions on the civilian side, a key 
 part of the detainee pipeline, did suggest that this was in part prompted by judicial 
 challenges at home. It seemed to me that such resources ought to have been 
 deployed far earlier with a far more strategic look at the detainee pipeline at that 
 stage.488   
Patel’s comments in some ways bring the issues right back to the beginning: the need to 
make certain strategic decisions at an early stage in the conflict with respect to legal issues 
that are highly likely to arise.  
Chapter conclusion 
Frank Kitson’s experience gave him a fine insight into the practicalities of fighting insurgents 
from the military perspective. His insight into the choice facing those deciding on legal 
policy was, it might be argued, simplistic. While his understanding of the detail of legal 
approaches was binary, it was not his role to deal with the detail of legal policy. His real 
insight – important from the perspective of this thesis – was the understanding that the 
counterinsurgent needs a legal strategy, which in turn needs to dovetail with the political 
and military strategy. He understood that war is multidimensional and that one of those 
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dimensions is the field of law. Like other dimensions, it needs close planning and 
preparation.  
As seen above, Kitson proposed two formulations: the first might be characterised as ‘law as 
a weapon’; the second a ‘rule of law’ approach. If the counterinsurgents choose Kitson’s 
second formulation as their legal strategy, they lay themselves open to several tactics which 
are, in those circumstances, always available to aware insurgents. A fair judiciary can always 
be used against itself. As was seen earlier in this chapter, this can take the form of ‘rupture 
strategy’, such as that espoused by Jacques Verges. This technique essentially involves a 
combination of the denial of the authority of a court with the use of the forum such a court 
supplies to undermine the legitimacy of the court and disseminate the message of the 
accused insurgents.  
However, a relatively free legal system characterised by a genuine ‘rule of law’ approach to 
litigation also lays itself open to lawfare approaches from another flank – the international 
legal system (and indeed, by extension, its domestic system, particularly if, as in the case of 
the UK, an international legal regime has been incorporated into domestic legislation).489 
Indeed, even those who select or tend towards Kitsons’s first policy – that of using the law 
simply as a weapon – may find that there are opportunities presented by an assertive 
international human rights court, or indeed fair domestic tribunals, such as those generally 
to be found in the United Kingdom. This in turn can affect a state’s narrative, and the results 
of such cases can and do have operational effect, as seen in the Iraq and Afghan streams of 
cases above.  
From the perspective of the research questions, the key point is that lawfare is a vital 
element in the conduct of insurgencies, as it is in the conduct of all military operations. Both 
at the level of narrative and operations, ‘lawfare’ is an important factor and needs to be 
understood in terms of being linked with a coherent strategy, and indeed subject to a 
coherent strategy. As pointed out in the introduction, the realm of law, both domestic and 
international, is simply another forum in which a given conflict might take place. It is itself a 
field of conflict. This has profound implications for the conduct of warfare. The Kenya cases 
demonstrate that actions of military or law enforcement assets which transgress acceptable 
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legal limits may, in due course, carry the conduct of the psychological or media operations 
of an insurgency far into the future when those actions are litigated. The consequences of 
failing properly to appreciate the importance of this may have longer-lasting consequences 
than the military or even the political elements of the conflict, to both of which, of course, 
the legal dimension is closely related.  
Is there a common doctrine in the theatres (Malaya, Kenya, Northern Ireland and the ‘War 
on Terror’) looked at in this chapter? One obvious common thread, and indeed a common 
element of legacy legislation, was emergency legislation – the installation of laws which are 
essentially to be used, as Kitson put it, as weapons. There were different outcomes in each 
theatre. In Malaya, the veneer of legality was just sufficient to maintain legitimacy both in 
the United Kingdom and in Malaya. Furthermore, it seems clear by looking at the law 
reports and the press of the time that there was a degree of judicial oversight sufficient to 
maintain at the very least a credible veneer of ‘rule of law’. This did not happen by accident. 
Uniquely among the theatres looked at here, Malaya had a coherent and consistent strategy 
and purpose, established early in the campaign.  
In Kenya, there was none of the strategic coherence of Malaya. Again, the results were 
apparent in the legal field. It is clear from recent work done by Elkins and Anderson – and in 
pursuance of successful litigation in the UK courts – that there was concern about the 
legitimacy of the activities, including judicial oversight, at the time. This was reflected, as we 
saw above, even in the UK parliament. The key issue here is that the lack of proper judicial 
oversight of administrative action, the extent of its compliance with the egregious activities 
of the security forces, played heavily into the degree to which the British efforts were seen, 
even at the time, as legitimate. In fact – as well as to a large extent in public perception – 
the judiciary was an arm of the security apparatus. In Kenya, the courts were used, in 
Kitson’s formula, as a weapon. From the available evidence, the same was true of Cyprus, 
with very little in the way of judicial oversight of the administrative and security apparatus.  
The campaigns looked at here were not exogenous in the sense that they were outside 
‘interventions’. However, the only strictly ‘endogenous’ campaign was Northern Ireland – 
itself a part of the United Kingdom. While it may be that the introduction of the ‘Diplock 
Courts’ was to some extent inevitable, given the degree of jury intimidation, it is clear that 
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the legitimacy of the state was undermined by the way in which emergency legislation cut 
into well-entrenched ideas of ‘rule of law’. Courts were seen by the ‘target community’ – 
the Nationalist Catholic community of Northern Ireland – not as independent safeguards of 
their rights, but as the arm of the state. This was clearly the case in all of the theatres here, 
with the possible exception of Malaya. That is not to say that the courts in Malaya were not 
arms of the state, or that the courts in Northern Ireland were supine. Neither of these 
assertions is correct. In fact, despite perceptions, it can readily be argued that the Diplock 
Courts were not simply an inert arm of the executive, but a function of a democratic 
judiciary; the best that could be done in the circumstances. However, that was not the 
perception; and in counterinsurgency, as current doctrine has it, perception is all.  
The Colombian army officer quoted above, Juan Padilla, starkly states the case for increased 
awareness of future lawfare: 
 Democracies must understand holistic lawfare as a growing approach for 
 contemporary confrontation in order to creatively improve their own mechanisms to 
 counter it. After all, lawfare is going to be increasingly used by adversaries as it is 
 becoming an essential feature of twenty-first century conflicts to the point that 
 perhaps in Clausewitzian terms, it can best be described as a ‘continuation of war 
 with legal means’.490  
In none of the campaigns discussed here was there an effective competing ‘shadow state’ – 
or, to borrow David Kilcullen’s term, any real attempt at ‘competitive control’ in the domain 
of justice or lawfare. With the exception of some local attempts at local law enforcement (to 
be addressed below) by the Provisional IRA, there was no attempt at organised insurgent 
courts. Was this absence reflective of a lack of awareness on the part of insurgents of the 
opportunity presented by such ‘competitive control’? Or was it a lack of capability imposed 
by the effectiveness of British security forces in these campaigns. Elements of both factors 
applied. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, setting up a rival system of justice, however ramshackle, 
can be effective and requires operational and strategic consideration. To some extent this 
depends on a degree of territorial control, which was largely denied to insurgents in the 
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campaigns discussed here. This denied them the opportunity to take advantage of the use 
of courts. However, regardless of the military strength (or lack of it) on the part of 
insurgents, opportunities exist for insurgents to fight in the legal domain beyond courts. This 
chapter has examined the challenges, opportunities and problems faced by 
counterinsurgents in the context of lawfare, and some commensurate opportunities for 
insurgents. The next chapter will look both at the opportunities presented to insurgents by 





Insurgent Courts and Lawfare 
‘The authority to resolve disputes can necessarily be exercised by only one body (pursuant to 
the state’s ‘monopoly on the use of force’ that is the first element of the ‘rule of law’) – 
imagine the systemic breakdown that would result from two competing bodies claiming the 
power to resolve disputes.’491 
Ultimately insurgents are in the business of attempting to ‘offer a better deal’492 to their 
‘target’ populations. As will be seen, whether that is conceptually framed as ‘competitive 
control’493 or ‘shadow government’, a key element of any offer is the ability to provide 
dispute resolution mechanisms and ‘justice’. This chapter seeks to show that it is this that is 
at the heart of insurgent strategy in the field of ‘competitive control’. In Shakespeare’s play 
Henry VI Part 2, which itself concerns a revolt, a rebel character ‘Dick’, a butcher, suggests 
that in order to cement a rebel’s (Cade) envisaged role as king there is a requirement: ‘The 
first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.’494 The evidence would seem to suggest that the 
first thing that many insurgents do is precisely the opposite: they bring courts straight into 
the heart of the new aspirant government.  
 
This chapter centres on insurgent justice and the provision thereof. In the quotation that 
leads this chapter, Thomas Nachbar, a leading commentator on lawfare, suggests that two 
competing bodies claiming dispute resolution powers cannot exist in the same place. On the 
face of it, this seems to be fair. However, in Chapter 1 several examples were given of such 
‘competing’ authorities in the United Kingdom, without notable civic disturbance. Where 
there is conflict, however, such competing authorities can have very great strategic effect.  
We turn now to look at shadow states or ‘competitive control’, as David Kilcullen calls it, 
particularly in the legal ‘landscape’ that David Kennedy speaks of.495 The chapter will then 
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proceed to examine some instances where ‘justice’ – or the lack of acceptable, fair dispute 
resolution systems – contributes to the causes of insurgency. Land is a particularly 
important theme. The chapter proceeds in Section 2 to examine how some insurgents have 
used courts and with what results. Section 3 will proceed to examine the legality of 




Insurgents, legitimacy and law 
If, as current counterinsurgency theory embodied in the US Army and Marines 
Counterinsurgency Manual has it, ‘Legitimacy is the Main Objective’,496 and ‘without the 
host nation achieving legitimacy, COIN cannot succeed’,497 the mechanisms used for dispute 
resolution – and particularly courts – are surely an important aspect of counterinsurgency. 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that successful insurgents instinctively realise the 
importance of this aspect of social and political life. 
Insurgents recognise justice as a key centre of gravity of their effort. As this chapter will seek 
to demonstrate, successful insurgents have often been aware of this. If ‘the population is 
the prize’, it is won partly by providing ‘justice’ – and being seen to do so – in an acceptable 
fashion. In so doing, the insurgent establishes and entrenches his own ‘legitimacy’, while 
undermining that of the state he opposes. As dynamic and reactive actors, successful 
insurgents see courts and dispute resolution as an opportunity to take the initiative in a key 
area of conflict. If, as Yale Professor of International and Comparative Law James Q. 
Whitman has put it, ‘Kingdoms are won and lost in the realms of law and legitimacy’,498 
successful insurgents instinctively understand this. 
As in any legitimate state, there is a requirement for executive (and to some extent 
legislative) functions. What is indispensable is the judicial branch – that element of 
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government deputed to resolve disputes and grievances. When the insurgent can provide 
the means to settle grievances fairly (or to be perceived to do so), he is a long way down the 
road to replacing the most central of governmental functions.499  
It is an axiom that, as the French theorist David Galula put it, ‘a revolutionary war is 20% 
military action to 80% political’.500 Galula strongly implies that this proportion should also 
apply to counter-revolutionary war. In other words, the effort of the counterinsurgent 
should comprise at least 80% political action. Going far further back into strategic history, 
Clausewitz articulated the surely obvious but hitherto unexpressed truth that war is a 
political act: ‘We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political 
instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means. What 
remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means.’501 If we accept that 
rebellions and insurgencies are ‘war’, as surely we must, the political element itself 
comprises a plethora of interwoven elements, one of which is ‘justice’ and its various 
manifestations. 
The narrative of a viable government, ‘revolutionary rehearsals of the exercise of the power 
they hope to wield one day on a larger scale’,502 as Jon Lee Anderson puts it, is vital 
internally. There is a growing appreciation that the legitimacy of insurgent courts may have 
international support, insofar as they may have some juridical or legal status. This is 
examined later in the chapter.  
 
Shadow states and competitive control 
 
It has been suggested that shadow states, insurgent regimes, require an element of 
territorial control to succeed.503 This is not so, as both the Irish and Afghan insurgencies 
have shown. Territory can be useful, or it can simply act as a focus for incumbent state 
action. The competition takes place on the functional level, rather than the special. 
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Legitimacy, however, is not dependent on it. However, while the possession and control of 
land may have a function, an absolute sine qua non is the ability to ensure that the 
insurgent government’s strictures are obeyed and that its rule is enforced. This is not 
necessarily dependent on the exclusive possession of the land. 
Taking ideas of shadow states only slightly further is the ‘theory of competitive control’, 
advanced in Kilcullen’s Out of the Mountains, although it draws heavily on Bernard Fall’s 
COIN ideas from the 1960s and Kalyvas’s ideas advanced chiefly in The Logic of Violence in 
Civil War. Central to this stream of ideas is the proposal that ‘support follows strength’:  
 Simply put, the idea is that populations respond to a predictable, ordered normative 
 system that tells them exactly what they need to do and not do in order to be 
 safe.504  
The contemporary insurgent example Kilcullen uses of this kind of control is the Taliban in 
today’s Afghanistan, which we shall go on to examine in detail later in this chapter.  
Kilcullen’s assertion is that insurgents can take part in this effort by ‘sucking the population 
in’ to a framework of ‘illicit social control sometimes referred to in classical 
counterinsurgency theory as “parallel hierarchy” or “guerrilla government”’.505 He compares 
insurgents to organised criminals: ‘Insurgents in this respect behave much like gangsters’, in 
that they provide regulatory and mediation services where the state fails to do so 
adequately. In this way, the assertion goes, insurgents are essentially racketeers. The case 
made is that the key to control is the use of force to establish that control – surely no 
innovation.  
Drawing further on analogies in the organised crime world, he takes examples from Serbian 
militias in Bosnia and the organised crime groups of the mafia forcing supposedly subject 
populations to commit atrocities or crimes, thereby making them complicit in the militia 
activities. He does concede that ‘this is at the coercive end of the spectrum of incentives’,506 
and he is surely right about that. The argument is made that the key to achieving dominance 
over the population is coercive force.  
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To some extent Kilcullen’s perspective is that of the counterinsurgent, for whom insurgents 
are, at root, transgressors. There is an admittedly unspoken presumption that legitimacy lies 
with the ‘government’. Unfortunately, in many insurgencies governmental systems of 
control are rather more virtual than real. As we will see, whereas the physical 
accoutrements of such instruments may exist in the shape of uniformed police, courts or 
council offices, the reality for the subject population is all too often that these have little or 
no effect on their lives, and certainly are in no way capable of exercising meaningful control. 
It is here that insurgents who may not otherwise be able to compete with state forces on 
the battlefield can develop an effective advantage.  
In Afghanistan, what was happening was that, as conventional military forces ‘cleared’ areas 
which were to be filled by ‘governance, the kind of governance that filled the ‘cleared’ space 
was rather worse in terms of what it could offer than the admittedly ramshackle Taliban 
equivalent. ‘If your strategy is to extend the reach of a government that is corrupt, abusive, 
ineffective and alienates the people, then the better you execute that strategy, the worse 
things were going to get.’507  
Thomas Nachbar says this in a piece entitled ‘COIN, lawfare and the rule of law’:  
  As a competition for legitimacy, an insurgency/counterinsurgency calls upon both 
 sides to provide services to the people in a way that will foster legitimacy. Thus, both 
 the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban seek to provide security in some 
 form, and the party that does the better job of providing the form of security the 
 people demand will gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people and thereby move 
 toward their goal of winning the conflict.508  
Nachbar’s argument is made in the context of the debate over ‘lawfare’,509 arguably the 
central definitional element of this thesis.  
For counterinsurgent theorists and practitioners, the unpalatable truth is that ‘Parallel 
structures undermine official statutes in the first place then displace them’,510 where they 
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can establish – by force or otherwise – sufficient legitimacy and capability, for example in 
enforcing decisions of governments and courts. Once it is established, it is very difficult to 
displace, because ‘the creation of a counterstate solidifies the insurgency’s support among 
the population and it is the final step on its path to power’.511  
Justice and drivers of insurgency 
There is an extensive literature on the causes of insurgency. There are clearly economic 
imperatives. First, some degree of financial support is necessary. In a 2006 essay on the 
economic causes of insurgency, Paul Collier stressed the importance of the ability of 
insurgencies to finance themselves. Collier sees insurgencies and the civil wars that ensue as 
being essentially reliant on having the resources to conduct them: 
 
 The Michigan Militia, which briefly threatened to menace peace in the USA, was 
 unable to grow beyond a handful of part-time volunteers, whereas the FARC in 
 Colombia has grown to employ around 12,000 people. The factors which account for 
 this difference between failure and success are to be found not in the ‘causes’ which 
 these two rebel organizations claimed to espouse, but in their radically different 
 opportunities to raise revenue. The FARC earns around $700m per year from drugs 
 and kidnapping, whereas the Michigan Militia was probably broke.512 
It may well be argued that the lack of funding has not inhibited the Afghan Taliban, with a 
nugatory budget from (at the very least) holding off a multinational coalition of over 
100,000 soldiers with a virtually unlimited budget. It has been estimated that in one 
province of Helmand, the Taliban spent in the region of £14 million, compared to 
expenditure by the UK alone of in excess of £25 billion.513 Collier goes on to compare 
insurgents with organised criminals: ‘Economists who have studied rebellions tend to think 
                                                          
511
 Sitaraman, Counterinsurgent’s Constitution, p10  
512
 Collier, Paul, ‘Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy’, Oxford Research Paper 
(2006), available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/EconomicCausesofCivilConflict-
ImplicationsforPolicy.pdf  
513
 Ledwidge, Frank, Investment in Blood (Yale University Press, 2013), p123 
147 
 
of them not as the ultimate protest movements, but as the ultimate manifestation of 
organized crime.’514  
As touched on above, David Kilcullen tends to agree. He conflates the Taliban and a 
Jamaican drugs gang centred in the Tivoli Gardens area of Kingston, and applies the term 
‘racketeering’ to both of them. In so doing, it might be argued, he subverts the definition of 
‘insurgency’, which by definition must have a component that aims to subvert and replace 
the existing polity. He frames this analysis in his ‘theory of competitive control’, which is 
difficult to disaggregate from ideas of ‘shadow states’.515 There may be some validity in this. 
However, whether a mature insurgency such as the Taliban or the Cuban Revolution can be 
framed as ‘racketeering’ surely depends on perspective. A counterinsurgent may well elect 
to see an insurgency in terms of organised crime on a number of levels, not least in that 
armed resistance to existing government is a criminal act in all polities. Insurgents and their 
supporters, however, tend not to see themselves in the same way as, for example, a 
‘soldier’ of the ‘Shower Posse’ in Tivoli Gardens a criminal gang in Kingston Jamaica dealt 
with in some detail by Kilkullen, might see himself.  
As Kilcullen himself points out, terminology is important.516 In this thesis, we are concerned 
not with ‘non-state armed actors’ – an impossibly wide term, embracing everyone from a 
bank robber to Al Qaeda and everything in between. Historically, it would also, again 
depending on perspective, embrace the army of the Confederate States of America, 
Washington’s Revolutionary Army and England’s Civil War New Model Army, as much as Al 
Capone’s Chicago ‘family’. Here we are concerned with armed groups that aim to subvert 
and replace existing government. It is at that level that legitimacy becomes an active issue, 
and where the element of justice as expressed in courts becomes a real issue.  
David Kilcullen, in his 2009 Accidental Guerrilla, presented a further perspective on what 
might be considered the sources of insurgency. Kilcullen is a retired officer of the Australian 
army, with combat experience in East Timor. He developed further extensive experience of 
contemporary insurgency from the perspective of foreign forces intervening in Islamic 
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countries. He serves as an advisor to the US military – and General David Petraeus 
specifically – on ‘counterinsurgency’. He served as an advisor on the drafting of the US 
Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual. His perspectives have, to a great degree, 
informed US, and consequently NATO, theory on COIN. He has been a prolific writer on this 
topic, producing two books in the period 2009–10 alone.517  
 
In Accidental Guerrilla, he discusses the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in some detail. He 
claims: ‘I have shown how most of the adversaries Westerns powers have been fighting 
since 9/11 are in fact “accidental guerrillas”: people who fight us not because they hate the 
West and seek our overthrow but because we have invaded their space to deal with a small 
extremist element that has manipulated and exploited local grievances to gain power in 
their societies. They fight us not because they seek our destruction but because they believe 
we seek theirs.’518 To sceptics of the whole idea of COIN, this is a statement of the limpidly 
obvious. Indeed it is surely hardly a new idea that our ‘insurgent’ is their ‘resistance fighter’. 
This is, of course, in essence the motive of defence. Not surprisingly, Carter and Clark found 
that ‘The affront of having non-Muslim forces on Afghan soil is much-cited by insurgents in 
person and in their propaganda (and is a significant concern for ordinary Afghans).’519 
 
Then there are the psychological elements, the motivation arising from contingent 
circumstances. Stathis Kalyvas sees unsettled periods generating ‘simultaneously a need for 
strategic non-ideological action and an ideological explication of those actions’.520 In other 
words, if an insurgent is going to risk his life fighting a government, there needs to be an 
identifiable purpose to it. Kalyvas goes on to explain that the motivation existing at the time 
of the decision may well be reshaped in retrospect. He gives the example of a rebel whose 
family has been killed by the army who ‘wholeheartedly commits to the rebel cause in order 
to avenge her family (and also because she has nothing to lose). After the end of the war 
she may reconstruct her initial motivation and claim, and may come to believe that she 
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joined the rebels out of ideological commitment.’521 The motivations for violent action may 
be difficult – or even impossible – to identify. 
Some researchers have viewed the motives through the eyes of the satisfaction of basic 
human needs defined in Maslow’s hierarchy: that it is unmet psychological needs that drive 
insurgency, rather than political objectives.522 It is not at all clear that this is a helpful 
approach, and is perhaps tautological, since all needs are, at root, psychological, in that they 
are all motivators. Political objectives, of course, may well – if achieved – fulfil some of 
those ‘unmet needs’.  
With respect to ‘unmet needs’ – whether defined as ‘psychological’, ‘political’, or both – one 
factor which seems to define insurgents (at the very least in terms of narrative) is 
‘unfairness’ or injustice. When such unfairness as perpetrated (or apparently perpetrated) 
by governments acts deprive people of key assets, insurgency is an option.  
Justice and injustice  
 
Guevara looked at the stages of a guerrilla war.523 The example of the Cuban war was, of 
course, arguably the leading example of the classic Marxist style of insurgency, if not 
necessarily a Marxist insurgency. After the first stage of its beginnings and its initial contacts 
with the enemy, the next stage of development followed when a base area was selected 
and basic elements of settled life began. In the case of Cuba, they were a show factory, a 
cigar and cigarette factory, a printing press and other factories necessary for the 
maintenance of basic existence: ‘The guerrilla band now has an organisation, a new 
structure. It is the head of a large movement with all the characteristics of a small 
government. A court is established for the administration of justice.’524 
Guevara attached great importance to the development and enforcement of revolutionary 
laws, particularly, as we saw above, those pertaining to land reform, which is mentioned 
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time and again in this work.525 ‘The council, or central department of justice, revolutionary 
laws and administration is one of the vital features of a guerrilla army fully constituted and 
with territory of its own. The council should be under the charge of an individual who knows 
the laws of the country; if he understands the necessities of the zone from the juridical 
point of view, this is better yet.’ The guerrillas ‘issued a penal code, a civil code, rules for 
supplying the peasantry and rules of agrarian reform’.526 The council was essentially the 
ruling authority for the guerrilla organisation. It is striking that the judicial element and 
attendant necessary expertise is so explicitly stated. Cuba, of course, is a clear example of 
that deficit discussed briefly above. The Cuban state, in fact, despite its protestations of 
democracy, was an almost pure plutocracy. No legitimacy was to be derived from it in the 
minds of the Cuban people.  
Whatever the style of insurgency – whether it is a ‘new’ war or a classic ‘Maoist’ insurgency 
(already something of an outdated concept) – there can be little doubt that the element of 
justice is a very important component.  
The journalist and author David Loyn has said that for the people of Afghanistan, justice is 
the single most important issue.527 ‘Lack of justice is a key driver of the disillusionment felt 
by many Afghans across the country ... There is relatively little detailed research on 
individual motivations to join the insurgency, but grievances related to injustice are 
repeatedly mentioned in interviews and the literature.’528 In her extensive study of such 
motivations, ‘Testing hypotheses on radicalisation in Afghanistan: Why do men join the 
Taliban and Hisb-i Islami?’, Sarah Ladbury sees the problem from two related angles.529  
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She presents two related hypotheses. The first is that ‘the perception of the government as 
corrupt and partisan’ has meant that people have looked elsewhere for guidance and 
decision making. She finds this hypothesis proved: 
 
Government corruption and partisanship at provincial and district level was 
consistently cited as a major reason for supporting the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami in all 
field study areas and particularly in Kandahar. However, whilst many appreciate the 
moral form of governance shown by the ‘good’ Taliban, this it is not a unconditional 
[sic] endorsement for the Taliban movement as a whole due to the numerous 
categories of ‘bad’ Taliban.530 
 
The second, rather more specific, hypothesis is that not only does the government fail to 
provide the social good of justice, so that people look elsewhere for it, but that such 
‘services’ as the government does provide are so corrupt and partisan that people are 
driven not only to opposition, but to what she calls ‘extremism’. Again, this hypothesis is 
supported by the research that she has undertaken: 
 
The evidence strongly supports this hypothesis, with one proviso: it is necessary to 
add: ‘the failure of the state and Coalition forces to provide security’. Most 
respondents were unclear about what international forces are doing in Afghanistan. 
They do not believe it is to bring security, defeat the Taliban, support democracy or 
bring development, as they experience none of these. They argue the British are 
here for revenge and the Americans to pursue regional objectives. Although the 
Taliban don’t deliver security (they attract fire by foreign forces and this endangers 
local populations) they deliver justice. They are seen to do this reasonably well and 
attract support as a result.531  
 
It must certainly be clear from the foregoing that ‘justice’ (or the lack of it) has been a key 
driver of the Afghan insurgency. The question of ‘injustice’ continues to appear in discourse 
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concerning insurgency.532 Clearly it is important to understand that ‘injustice’ is a subjective 
quality. However, as Tyler points out, and as discussed in Chapter 1, the perception of 
justice or injustice is rather more quantifiable.  
Land as a catalyst for insurgent courts 
In the communist, or peasant, insurgencies which dominated the counterinsurgent theorist 
David Galula’s thinking, the root cause, co-opted deceitfully, says Galula, by communist 
insurgents such as Castro and Mao, was land reform.533 Whether deceitful or not, the 
question of land is central to the causes and resolution of particularly rural insurgency. Land 
reform is explicitly stated by Guevara to be a primary cause of insurgency: ‘a few peasants, 
dispossessed of their land’, says Guevara are ideal for forming the nucleus of a guerrilla 
band.534 While the struggle is ongoing, a priority is to formulate agrarian policy. 
Furthermore, upon the success of the fight, he identifies land reform as one of the first 
elements to be resolved by successful fighting insurgents.535  
Land is always an intensely complex issue, even in developed and relatively peaceful states. 
It is the ultimate resource upon which all others depend, and consequently is bound up with 
legal or quasi-legal regulation of resources, ranging from rights to minerals and water to 
rights of access and pasture. It is often the ultimate stake across the spectrum of conflict – 
from tribal or clan disputes over land or water ownership, to inter-state territorial war.  
In his People’s War, People’s Army, the commander of the North Vietnamese forces during 
both the war against the French (ending in 1952) and the war against the United States and 
its client South Vietnam, Vo Nguyen Giap is clear as to the importance of land as a driving 
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issue in the strategy of the wars he fought.536 ‘The Vietnamese People’s War of Liberation 
was a just war aiming to win back the independence and unity of the country, to bring land 
to our peasants and to guarantee them the right to it and to defend the achievements of the 
August revolution.’537 As a statement of strategy and intention, that is clear and 
unambiguous. He goes on to be even clearer about the importance of land: ‘The problem of 
land is of decisive importance.’538 Giap’s views are echoed by Eric Bergerud:  
In a traditional agrarian society, even one like Vietnam where much was changing 
quickly, the individual’s relationship to the land is central to economic and social 
existence. Just as land is fundamental in determining wealth and status, it was 
fundamental in defining political position. Indeed more than anything else it was  the 
land issue that brought Diem [the South Vietnamese leader initially strongly 
supported by the US] to ruin.539 
What has land and land reform to do with justice? For some this may be an unnecessary 
question. The question here is not so much land policy itself, let alone the nature of the land 
or its ownership. The key issue is the ability for disputes (in this case over the crucial 
question of land) to be resolved in a manner that is considered appropriate. This is usually 
done with the use of law and the courts. For insurgents, the question is what courts make 
those decisions, and are the decisions concerning the apportionment of land considered to 
be rightly decided by the subject of those decisions? In other words, are they conducted in a 
‘fair’ manner, the term rightly adopted by Tyler, as discussed in Chapter 1, and in a manner 
consistent with relevant and acceptable cultures and traditions? Failing to address these 
issues may cause structural problems which persist for decades or longer. In his study of the 
British invasion and occupation of Iraq in the early twentieth century, Toby Dodge makes 
clear the importance of land to the Iraqi polity: ‘No policy debate was more important for 
the making of the Iraqi state than that over the system of land tenure and revenue.’ He sees 
the British failure to address this matter, despite their realisation that it was the ‘most 
important issue to be dealt with once the state’s ancient systems had been put in place’ 
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with ‘the imposition of a land tenure system that was conceptually incoherent for the state’ 
as a major cause of problems that arguably subsist as a root cause of conflict – and indeed 
insurgency – in Iraq to this day.540  
Similarly, the British failure to deal properly with the serious issues of land tenure and 
ownership, to the extent that Western notions of ownership were appropriate, was a very 
great contributory cause in the Mau Mau rebellion in 1950s Kenya. The war was fought, 
more than for any other reason, against land appropriations. For a people whose very 
identity and life was wrapped up around land, what was perceived as the theft of land 
struck deep. One Mau Mau fighter said this: 
[We were] told that we were fighting for our land, the land of the Kikuyu, which had 
been taken by the white people who had taken it for themselves. They could do 
whatever they wanted with the land. A white man could come and declare land for 
miles as his, without having to ask for anyone’s permission or buy it from us ... we 
could see that we were being oppressed, because when something that belonged to 
you had been taken by someone else, and then you are treated like slaves on the 
land that once was yours, you’re bound to feel angry about it, aren’t you?541 
For the settler community in Kenya, the land problem had been resolved once and for all by 
the Carter Commission, which found that the Kikuyu population, who were the main victims 
of land appropriation by white settlers, had plenty of land upon which to settle. In fact, this 
was ‘a preposterous suggestion’.542 The Commission’s report, which ‘provides a remarkable 
insight into native mentality’, purported to examine all ‘native claims’.543 Clearly, however, it 
was more focused on an examination not of the validity of claims, but of the needs of Kikuyu 
tribesmen who had been displaced onto reserves. There is much focus in the report on 
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recommendations for better land use.544 The central issues of the validity of the policy as a 
whole were not addressed. 
There was a very mature and highly developed jurisprudence in British East Africa, and 
Kenya in particular. The Journal of African Law for the period contains extensive law reports 
and articles on matters of succession, tax, contractual disputes and ordinary crime.545 There 
is no discussion – and nor are there any law reports – of matters affecting the really central 
areas of dispute in Kenya at the time. No articles appear on land tenure in Kenya, and nor 
are there any reports dealing with land disputes. It is worth mentioning at this point also 
that there is no discussion of any of the obvious legal questions arising out of the legally 
fraught areas of administrative detention, with the implications of habeas corpus disputes, 
at the very least. Nor are there any evident law reports dealing with cases of any kind 
brought between Africans and settlers on appeal: this would indicate either that such cases 
were simply not brought, or that everyone was content with the results, a highly unlikely 
situation. Indeed, the first article published in the Journal of African Law dealing exclusively 
with courts in Kenya appears in 1961. That article concerns only the law and practice of the 
‘African Courts’ in the country. Customary courts of first instance were very common in 
most African countries under British colonial rule – a facet of the ‘Dual Mandate’ approach 
taken by many colonial powers, which will be looked at in the next chapter.546 In any event, 
by definition their jurisdiction did not apply to Europeans, who would have been the 
defendants in any action for the recovery of land.  
The issue of land was arguably the key driver of the entire Mau Mau rebellion. As Caroline 
Elkins put it, ‘Feeding the detainees’ anger was the perennial issue of land.’ She goes on to 
quote a British official: 
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 The principal underlying idea of all detainees [in the rehabilitation camps] is still 
 that their fathers’ land was stolen by ‘government’ and that no compensation has 
 ever been paid.547 
The official suggests the production of a booklet to inform aggrieved Kikuyu about the Land 
Commission report (the ‘Carter Report’) and its conclusions. This was unlikely to suffice. The 
absence of any adequate means of dispute resolution for land issues – or any means 
considered fair by the aggrieved population – was therefore key to providing a cause for the 
insurgent groups fighting the British in Kenya, over and above any notion of independence 
or other political drivers.  
Land is at heart a legal issue, and as a driver of insurgency – and therefore as a potential 
weapon against insurgents – it has been largely ignored. Insurgent legal means, however, 
can provide them with an opportunity to exploit this lacuna in counterinsurgent strategy. As 
we will see, the question of land ownership was very much the driving issue in Ireland, the 
locus of arguably the most successful of all anti-colonial insurgencies. In Afghanistan, the 
question of who owns the land and how that ownership is altered is an issue under-
prioritised by counterinsurgents, in favour of more apparently immediate concerns, such as 
state punishment of crime. Nowhere was the insurgent tactic of co-opting land as both a 
casus belli and a vehicle for extending their influence in an effective vacuum of legitimate 
state resolution of land issues more evident than in the Ireland of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century.  
Early twentieth-century Ireland 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the movement for independence shifted from what passed 
as the battlefield to the more low-key arena of agricultural unrest. The struggle for land 
reform began to take on a nationally recognised form at the same time. It was in this arena 
that most physical resistance occurred. Landlordism and rent had become a key driver of 
resistance.  
Prior to the extension of de iure English rule throughout the island of Ireland, with its 
attendant common law courts, most of Ireland had fallen under the jurisdiction of what 
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were called the Brehon laws. The extent to which use of the Brehon laws continued de facto 
in the form of custom, even until the late nineteenth century, is a matter of debate. If it did 
continue, it would have been very much at the level of informal usage, rather than through 
the establishment of what became known in other contexts as ‘shadow courts’.548 Certainly 
they operated as a useful instrument for advocacy of a strong Irish national legal tradition. 
Equally certainly, the extent to which they did operate practically acted ‘to undermine the 
operations of official law’.549  
During the later decades of the nineteenth century, the struggle for wholesale land reform 
took the form of so-called ‘land wars’, involving cattle rustling. One form of passive 
resistance became known as the ‘unwritten law’ and did, in due course, develop into 
something like a shadow legal system in the form of the Land League Courts. This grew out 
of the ‘Irish National Land League’, a formal movement founded in 1879 with the aim of 
returning land owned and controlled by largely absentee landlords to those who actually 
worked it. This organisation united many disparate groups agitating for reform under one 
banner. It was not at heart a violent organisation. Its president was the doyen of the 
Nationalist movement at the time, Charles Stewart Parnell; organised or subversive violence 
could not be tolerated at a time when it was thought highly likely that ‘home rule’ would be 
awarded. The role of the Land League, composed as it was of committees supported by its 
own courts – the ‘Land League Courts’ – was central not only to the process of agitation for 
reform, but also to governance itself. There were well-regarded commentators who 
seriously considered the Land League to ‘have established a polity capable of replacing the 
colonial state and [to have been] accepted by many as the legitimate political authority, the 
source rather than the breaker of law’.550 This was seen by many to have the attributes of 
what, in today’s terms, would be known as legitimacy. In other words, in all but name it was 
a highly effective, insurgent shadow state.  
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Arthur Griffith, founder of Sinn Fein, wrote a pamphlet ostensibly about the Hungarian 
struggle for independence ‘The Resurrection of Hungary’,551 but with strong parallels with 
the Irish situation.552 In it, he advocated passive resistance and non-compliance with British 
state institutions and refers to so-called ‘arbitration courts’ envisaged by the great Irish 
politician Daniel O’Connell. When such courts were, in due course, established and 
operating, particularly in the period between the Easter Rising of 1916 and the beginning of 
the Irish War of Independence in 1919, the ‘punctilious legalism’553 of the British combined 
with a pragmatic approach to form the view that arbitration courts were essentially legal 
within British law, as will be seen below. The view was taken that they were simply an 
extension of accepted forms of what was, at the time, known as ‘party autonomy’ or private 
arrangements along the lines of what would today be called mediation.  
That notwithstanding, the courts acted, as Griffith had intended, to subvert and supplant 
the established courts. They were the forerunners of the far more subversive and effective 
Republican Courts, and they grew out of the need to ensure that disputes over land were 




The Asia Foundation annual Survey of the Afghan People provides a very useful insight into 
attitudes towards all aspects of life in Afghanistan. In 2011, it found that around 21 per cent 
of disputes which had been taken outside the community involved land: ‘Disputes over land 
have regularly been the most common reason for communities to seek dispute 
resolution.’554 
                                                          
551
 Griffith, Arthur, ‘The resurrection of Hungary’ (1904), available at 
https://ia600204.us.archive.org/2/items/resurrectionofhu00grifiala/resurrectionofhu00grifiala.pdf  
552
 In this context, the Hungarian rebels of 1848 had set up ‘arbitration courts’ to compete with the Austro-
Hungarian ‘state’ courts  
553
 Foxton, Sinn Fein and Crown Courts, p193 
554




It also seems clear that land disputes are a direct driver of recourse to ‘insurgency’ in 
southern Afghanistan, as well as a vital driver of conflict. There are good quantitative data 
from Afghanistan,555 derived from disaggregated survey data,556 which amply sustain these 
assertions. There is certainly no lack of highly informed discourse on the issues of land 
tenure in Afghanistan and the problems it causes.557 
Traditionally, conflicts in the Pashtun lands have been over zar, zan and zameen (land, gold 
and women):  
In the politically fragile rural Afghan landscape, conflict over land and water 
resources has become a driver of instability ... continuing land conflict not only 
threatens efforts to alleviate poverty and rehabilitate the rural economy, but also 
undermines the Afghan state’s efforts to stabilise insecure districts … [It] is a 
symptom of the weakness of rule of law and a driver of political instability, civil 
unrest and corruption so further eroding citizens’ incentives to act within the law.558  
The countermeasures available to combat the proliferation of land disputes are the same in 
any culture and revolve around the accurate maintenance of acceptable, impartial records 
with suitable and accepted systems of dispute resolution, be they courts or other 
community-based solutions. This is a vast subject in itself, worthy of thesis after thesis. 
However, it is enough for the moment to state that awareness of the central importance of 
this question to the Afghan economy, and indeed Afghan politics, has come lamentably late 
to the nations involved in the counterinsurgency there. Whether this is due to what we will 
call in Chapter 4 ‘the problem of knowledge’ – essentially ignorance of local conditions – or 
damaging overemphasis on ‘security’ issues, such as what in the West we call ‘crime’ (or 
indeed elements of both) is not clear.  
                                                          
555
 Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2013: A survey of the Afghan People, available at 
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/2013AfghanSurvey.pdf  
556
 Raw data acquired on author’s request from Asia Foundation, February 2014  
557
 See the extensive list of reports by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit at 
http://www.areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=495&ContentId=7&ParentId=7, for example: 
Deschamps, Colin and Roe, Alan, ‘Land conflict in Afghanistan: Building capacity to address vulnerability’, 2009, 
available at http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/918E-Land%20Conflict-IP-web.pdf;  
Wily, Liz, ‘Land governance at the crossroads’, October 2012, available at 
http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1212E%20Land%20Reform%20I%20BP%20Oct%202012.pdf  
558
 Mason, Rule of Law in Afghanistan, p205 
160 
 
In late 2012, I was sent an essay produced for private distribution by Paul Davis, a former 
‘stabilisation officer’ in southern Helmand.559 The paper is an attack on current ideas about 
‘stabilisation’. It argues that they are little more than self-delusion, especially in an Afghan 
context. Davis wrote extensively about the endemic corruption in the Afghan government 
and security forces. He says this about the issue of land:  
The longer I have been here the more fundamental this issue has appeared. It is a 
crucial, enduring conflict driver and source of instability and yet it remains 
unresolved, untouched and parked as being too difficult.560  
He goes on to outline the history of Helmand over the previous five decades. It is a history in 
which land and land use, as with every other rural community, is absolutely central. As in 
Kenya and rural Ireland, the way in which the land is used and held forms a deep, central 
cause of conflict. In my own period as a justice advisor for the British mission in the recent 
Helmand campaign, the land issue cropped up again and again, from the problem of 
refugees taking land that had been allocated to the government in the late 1980s, to 
constant (often violent) disputes over the ownership of commercial or agricultural property. 
From the macro to the micro, land was central. This was important throughout Afghanistan, 
but in Helmand, with its important agricultural resources and potential, the land issue had 
become absolutely crucial. 
Taraki decree number 8 of 1978 (‘Law number 8’ as it is very commonly known) was 
introduced by a communist government as a measure to regulate the holding of land and 
was intended to give land to families that had previously been landless sharecroppers.561 
The reform was arbitrary and poorly thought out. One militia leader told a former military 
officer and cultural advisor, Michael Martin, that ‘the mother of problems we have now is 
the land redistributions [at that time]’.562 These land conflicts overlaid those from the 
1950s, feeding the tribal and group rivalry. The details of these land conflicts are long and 
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involved.563 For present purposes, it may suffice to summarise them as involving extensive 
land theft by certain tribal and narcotics interests – some with stronger links to the 
government than others. Several cases of such land theft or extortion by government 
officials against landowners were outlined to me during my time in Helmand as justice 
advisor in that province.564 All of them involved violence of greater or lesser degree of 
intensity. Entire quarters of the capital Lashkar Gah were appropriated from owners who 
had fled the country and reallocated to others with connections.  
 
Very frequently in conflicts examined in this thesis and elsewhere, land and the 
controversies attached to the laws regulating its ownership have been key drivers of the 
insurgencies. In Helmand, it has been apparent to many observers that Law number 8 has 
been a festering source of conflict for the three decades since it was promulgated in 
1978.565 There is evidence of a lack of awareness of the profound, fundamental importance 
of land to insurgencies in predominantly rural cultures.  
Michael Martin details how Law number 8 has continued to drive conflict in Helmand right 
up to the present day, interfering as it has with deeply entrenched social systems. This was 
not an obscure issue on which a few scholars should have been free to discuss matters and 
pass judgment; it was directly relevant to a very great proportion of landholders in 
Helmand. Indeed it was a matter of common conversation. When I asked a Helmandi official 
in 2007 what particular legal problems might be a cause of conflict in Lashkar Gah, the 
official replied that the dispossession in the 1980s of an entire community of refugees who 
were now returning from Pakistan and living in an already inhabited area of the town was 
causing problems that the Taliban were exploiting.566  
 
Yet there was never any move on the part of the Western powers to initiate reform on any 
scale of this crucial provision. As Paul Davis, quoted above, said, it was ‘parked as too 
difficult’. While at root there was a deeper problem at play in the Western, and particularly 
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the British involvement in Helmand – a lack of understanding of all the conflict dynamics – 
this was certainly an area where progress could have been made, or at least attempted. To 
have done so would have demonstrated an awareness of the necessity to look at the 
conflict though legal eyes, as well as military. This awareness was largely absent. By way of 
anecdotal evidence, when I asked who owned the land on which the UK Provincial 
Reconstruction Team had been billeted, no-one in the large camp seemed to know. In 
another case, the journalist Ann Jones reported that US forces had built a suspension bridge 
across a river in the East of Afghanistan at a cost of a million dollars. They had not secured 
any land rights, and so no roads led to the bridge, which remained unused.567  
 
The existing problems involving the key issue of land in Afghanistan were exacerbated by 
recent government actions. The Government of Afghanistan ‘claims to own 86% of the land 
of Afghanistan and appears to be intent on asserting its claim to as much land as 
possible’.568 Clearly this is seriously contested by those who owned the land previously. 
Current formal governmental procedures for settling land disputes are regarded as complex, 
corrupt and lengthy. In contrast, with its own laws and procedures, the Taliban offers ‘1) 
Protection from GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] laws and 
procedures and 2) predictability.’569 
 
Is the case being outlined here that land disputes are a driver of insurgency? To a certain 
extent, yes. However, this is especially the case when mechanisms for the resolution of 
disputes over land are absent or ineffective. The argument being made here is that a lack of 
fair dispute resolution, specifically over land, can (as Guevara and Galula both assert, though 
from very different positions, as insurgent and counterinsurgent, respectively) be a major 
factor in laying the ground for insurgency. The roots of insurgency are complex and of 
course go well beyond disputes over land or notions of justice, important as these may be. It 
is clear that the lack of adequate means of resolving land disputes in Kenya contributed 
greatly to the causes of revolt there in the 1950s. In Ireland, land was, if not the dominant 
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issue, then certainly a major issue, and the development of the ‘arbitration courts’, which 
themselves grew out of the Land League Courts laid the foundations for the far more 
strategically effective Dail Courts, which in turn (as will be seen) provided a major asset for 
the insurgents of the Irish War of Independence.  
Acting to resolve such problems, in terms of both passing laws and, more importantly, 
implementing them, provides a major support for insurgent legitimacy. When the Taliban 
was in power from 1996 to 2001, it passed and implemented a series of land laws which 
‘benefited Pashtun tribals and remain popular and valid ... they are a key part of the 
Taliban’s programme’.570 At least of equal importance is the notion that judgments reached 
by Taliban judges will be enforced. For having an accepted legal code is one thing, but the 
utility of any legal system rests on the ability of those administering it to enforce its 
decisions. In the Ireland of the early twentieth century and Afghanistan today – and indeed 
in other working societies – formal dispute resolution is achieved through the institution of 
courts. In the early twentieth century, Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Fein, said:  
I say to my countrymen as the Nation571 said to them in 1843, ‘you have it in your 
power to resume popular courts and to fix laws and it is your duty to do so ... it is the 
duty of every Irishman to himself, to his family, to his neighbour, his boundless duty 
to his country to carry every dispute to the arbitrators and obey the decision’.572  
Griffith pointed out correctly that such courts were in fact ‘legal and their decisions have all 
the binding force of law when the litigants sign an agreement to abide by them’.573 
Passing laws is one thing; adjudicating those laws in courts is another. Equally important, 
however, is the ability to enforce the judgments that such courts hand down. In all the cases 
mentioned above, from Mao’s China to contemporary Afghanistan, a key element and 
measure of shadow governmental control is the ability to settle land disputes and ensure 
that those settlements last and do not provide a medium for further internal conflict.    
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The purpose of this section was to show the potential of one aspect of civic life – the central 
one of land – to provide not only a cause for insurgents, but also a vehicle for them to act as 
agents of dispute resolution – whether in a Western setting, albeit agrarian, such as Ireland 
in the early twentieth century, or a tribal setting, such as contemporary Afghanistan. How 




Insurgent courts  
We now turn to look at some historical examples of insurgent or revolutionary courts. These 
examples are arranged in ascending order of organisation and complexity. Even in the less 
well-developed examples, none of them might be described (except by their enemies) as 
simply ‘kangaroo courts’. All had some level of sophistication, dependent not only on 
personnel, but also (to an extent) on the security situation they faced. Clearly, the more 
secure a group was in its territory, the more entrenched and developed a system of shadow 
government might be, with its crucial component of courts both as agents of security and as 
dispute resolution fora.  
As was pointed out above, in his classic work Guerrillas Jon Lee Anderson took the view that 
rebels use courts as ‘revolutionary rehearsals of the exercise of the power they hope to 
wield one day on a larger scale’.574 He visits several revolutionary movements: the 
Mujahedin of 1980s Afghanistan, the Karen National Liberation Movement, the Polisario 
Front of Western Sahara, the Occupied Palestinian Territory of Gaza and the Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) of El Salvador.575 With the exception of the Polisario 
Front (see below) all these movements were involved in an active contest for territory (and 
people) with the larger and more powerful conventional forces of states which were, if not 
necessarily strong, then at least as militarily capable as the insurgents. In other words, none 
of them occupied territory of their own securely for any length of time.  
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In addition, as Sandesh Sivakumaran points out, the Algerian insurgents of the FLN in the 
Algerian War of Independence ran courts,576 as did those of Biafra. In today’s insurgent 
world, the Marxist Naxalites of India, the Free Aceh Movement,577 the Sierra Leonean 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Kosovo Liberation Army,578 the National Liberation 
Army (ELN) and FARC of Colombia, and the South Sudanese Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) (prior to winning independence)579 have run courts of greater or lesser 
sophistication.  
The FMLN of El Salvador provides a sound example of why such courts are set up. As 
Anderson points out,  
… it was necessary to impose order and discipline so that everyone, the guerrillas 
and civilians knew where the new boundaries lay. The FMLN moved swiftly 
implementing a strict system of justice ... mostly the system has worked and in 
marked contrast to the government forces the FMLN’s combatants have earned a 
reputation for being well-disciplined.580 
Anderson stresses that ‘the administration of justice is a crucial aspect of [the FMLN’s] 
revolutionary programme'. In other words, to some degree the nature of the justice 
imposed contributes to the strategic narrative of the movement. The case of the FMLN 
provides an instructive illustration of how justice was used to support a wider narrative. 
The FMLN was essentially a classic South/Central American Marxist ‘liberation’ movement. 
It was formed in 1980 and fought throughout that decade, prior to a ceasefire and re-
emergence as a political movement in 1991. Throughout its existence, the narrative of 
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discipline and compliance with international law was a constant theme. In a book published 
by the movement in 1988, internal discipline was stressed both nationally and 
internationally.581 For example, when two wounded and captured US servicemen (the 
United States was heavily involved militarily in the Salvadoran Civil War on the side of the 
military government) were killed by an FMLN fighter, the FMLN declared that they ‘admitted 
to what happened and said that those responsible have been charged with committing a 
war crime by violating the FMLN’s Code of Conduct and the Geneva Conventions’.582 A trial 
was convened that was open to international observers, who were not happy that the 
standards of fair trials had actually been met – for example, access to the identities of 
advocates and jurors.583 
Speaking more generally about insurgencies, Kalyvas has pointed out that:  
 [P]olitical actors face three distinct population sets: populations under their full 
 control; populations they must share with their rival; and populations completely 
 outside their control. These three situations constitute two general types of 
 sovereignty: segmented and fragmented. Sovereignty is segmented when two or 
 more political actors exercise full sovereignty over distinct parts of the territory of 
 the state. It is fragmented when two political actors (or more) exercise limited 
 sovereignty over the same part of the territory of the state.584  
Among current insurgencies, segmented sovereignty might be epitomised by the Western 
Sahara Polisario Front or the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in mid-2014; fragmented 
sovereignty by the Taliban in Afghanistan.  
We turn now to look at some examples of currently operating insurgent courts, before 
embarking on a more detailed examination of two key instances where the operation of 
courts has had a profound strategic effect: the Republican Courts of the Irish War of 
Independence and the contemporary Afghan Taliban. The section ends with a brief look at 
the Islamic State and insurgent courts in the current Syrian Civil War. 
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In North Africa, the conflict over the area South of Morocco and now known as Western 
Sahara began in 1975 with the withdrawal of Spain, which handed the territory over to 
Morocco. A resistance movement was formed by the indigenous Sahrawi people and 
became known as the Frente Polisario. In due course, military pressure from the Moroccan 
armed forces drove the Frente Polisario from the physical territory of Western Sahara. Since 
1991, when a ceasefire was negotiated with Morocco, most of Western Sahara has been 
under Moroccan control, although with a UN presence.585 The Sahrawi Republic exists as a 
virtual entity now in Eastern Algeria.  
 
The Sahrawi Republic, run by the successors to the Frente Polisario is, to all intents and 
purposes, a state with all the formal accoutrements, including a well-developed court 
system, with first instance, appeal courts and a supreme court. Like other states in exile, it 
considers itself to be the legitimate government of the entire territory of what is now 
Western Sahara. Its court system is, at least formally, well developed and comparable in 
structure to any other state system in the region.586 
 
Philippines: Communist Party of the Philippines and New People’s Army  
 
The communists of the New People’s Army (NPA) have been fighting in the Philippines since 
the heyday of Marxist ‘people’s movements’ in the late 1960s. The foundation documents 
speak clearly of the need for courts to found the new state advocated by the movement. 
Such courts exist from the lowest municipal level to the higher political levels.  
 
Arbitration courts exist at the barrio or local level. The Communist Party of the Philippines 
(CPP) has set up some local-level arbitration courts: 
 Based on our experience, arbitration has become an effective means of uniting the 
 people for the revolution. This is because the people see that it is possible to obtain 
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 justice even while we are still advancing our struggle ... handled by the organs of 
 political power under the guidance of the Party and its representatives. Serious 
 criminal cases that need longer processing and preparations are referred to the 
 people’s court.587  
The guiding principle is asserted to be ‘social justice’, and even in the rather dated Marxist 
terms of the article quoted above, it is clear that the arbitration courts are competing (or 
are said to be competing) with the Philippines state courts on the basis that justice is cheap 
and quick.  
Extensive reference in the documents of the CPP/NDA is made to cases brought in ‘people’s 
courts’ against alleged criminals, some of whom had been acquitted for such matters as 
corruption in what the New Democratic Party of the Philippines (NFDP) calls the 
‘reactionary’ state courts.588  
The system prescribed by the ‘Guide for Establishing the People’s Democratic Government’ 
posits three levels of courts – at the provincial, district and barrio levels.589 A panel of three 
judges sits on minor cases, while a panel of nine judges handle major and complex cases, 
particularly those involving the death penalty.  
While the operation of these courts has been extensive, and the CPP/NPA claims due 
process in its documents, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions 
– the highly regarded Philip Alston – has strongly criticised them: 
 It is apparent that the CPP/NPA/NDF does impose punishments for both ordinary 
 and counterrevolutionary crimes in areas of the country that it controls. But NDF 
 representatives were unable to provide me with any concrete details on the 
 operation of the people’s court system. This suggests that little or no judicial process 
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 is involved ... In other words, it seeks to add a veneer of legality to what would 
 better be termed vigilantism or murder.590  
Nepal: Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist  
 
Courts are also an indicator of the extent to which government might be failing. Nepal was 
the venue for one of the most successful Maoist revolutionary movements of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Beginning its armed struggle in 1996, in due 
course the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) took power locally in many areas of 
Nepal, eventually being permitted, following a ceasefire in 2006, to take part in elections. 
Indeed in 2008 it won a majority and took power.591 
 
As in the Philippines (and indeed elsewhere in the Maoist and wider revolutionary world), 
courts were developed nationally. As elsewhere, they were used as tools of control, 
indicators of power and a means of undermining government legitimacy. They were part of 
the wider administrative ‘shadow state’ success of the Maoists throughout the Nepalese 
countryside, and exploited the failures of the state itself. As the BBC reported at the time, 
‘The Maoists regard their court system as the heart of their “People’s Government”, running 
in parallel with the official government through much of the country.’592 An article in the 
Economist (also from late 2006) observed one such court  handling dozens of cases a day:  
 
People’s courts, which have mushroomed across Nepal in recent months, are only 
one sign that the country’s Maoist rebels are getting more organised – and that the 
government is failing. While Judge Chettri passed judgment in a humble shack, 
Kohalpur’s brand-new courthouse was closed for a two-week holiday.593  
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Courts acted as a key element in the objective of filling a gap left not only by what was 
perceived as a corrupt and inefficient state, but by a hiatus in the armed struggle. As people 
awaited the outcome of a prolonged negotiation process towards the end of the insurgency, 
following a ceasefire ‘the state is hardly functioning. Many policemen, for example, are 
sitting on their hands rather than enforcing the law until they see what kind of government 
will emerge.’594  
 
Once again, by contemporary standards, these ‘kangaroo-type court’ procedures were 
rough and ready, with often only rudimentary procedural safeguards.595 Judges were trained 
for only a few days, although many cases were anyway considered to be a matter of 
‘common sense’.596 The courts attracted a good deal of criticism from human rights groups 
and authorities – understandably so, given the savagery with which they dealt with those 
found guilty of crimes, with punishments often involving prolonged beating.597  
 
By 2006, Maoist rebels controlled most of the Nepalese countryside. Following a ceasefire, 
elections were held and the CPN-M took power, in due course sharing that power with 
other parties.  
 
All the above groups are either still in existence (in the case of the Karen National Liberation 
Movement, CPP/NPA and Polisario) or eventually took power (FMLN, CPN-M). It is perhaps 
instructive that neither the Mau Mau nor the MPLA in Malaya succeeded in their primary 
objectives, both being suppressed by the British, as we saw in the previous chapter. Neither 
was in possession of any effective shadow state system or any effective dispute resolution 
mechanisms approximating to courts. The question as to whether this is symptomatic of 
failure or partially causative is a tempting one; attempting to answer it, however, may not 
be fruitful. The MPLA, Mau Mau and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (the last of which had 
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perhaps the most sophisticated courts system of any insurgent group)598 were defeated 
militarily: not by superior governance, but by superior firepower and the ability to apply 
intense coercive force. It is difficult to see how the possession of a working courts system, 
however sophisticated, could change that dynamic.  
 
While possession of a working shadow state system, including a courts system, may not be 
sufficient for victory (or, more accurately, success), can the argument be made that it is 
necessary? To begin to attempt an answer to this, we now turn to arguably the most 
successful of all insurgencies in recent history. To do so we return to the British Isles.  
 
Ireland: ‘The first modern insurgency’599 
 
In the previous chapter, the use of ‘rupture strategy’ by Irish revolutionaries in the Irish War 
of Independence was briefly examined. The Irish were pioneers in exploiting weaknesses in 
the incumbent court system. They were also innovators in the use of their own courts as 
weapons.  
The Irish War of independence (1919–21) occurred nearly a century ago. However, a study 
of the way in which this struggle was conducted in the realm of ‘lawfare’ is entirely germane 
to the present thesis. In the words of a leading expert on insurgency, Ian F.W. Beckett, the 
war was ‘A true forerunner of modern revolutionary groups in terms of its politically 
inspired campaign.’600 That campaign was sophisticated and multi-layered. Its military 
aspects have been looked at closely, and they may have influenced insurgent leaders as 
diverse as Ba Maw in Burma and Menachem Begin in Israel.601 However, the lawfare 
techniques evolved during that conflict were arguably of equal significance to the military 
struggle. The system is well worth examining in detail. 
                                                          
598
 For a fine account of the sophistication of the courts system of the Tamil Tigers’ state, see Sivakumaran, 
‘Courts of armed opposition groups’, pp493ff. For a detailed account of this courts system from a senior Tamil 
official, see Kamalendran, C., ‘The inside story of “Eelam Courts”’, Sunday Times (Sri Lanka), 14 November 
2004, available at http://sundaytimes.lk/021208/news/courts.html  
599
 William Kraus in ‘The Encyclopaedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency’ (ed Tucker) at p 276 
600
 Beckett, Ian F.W., Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies (Routledge, 2001), p16 
601
 ibid., p17 
172 
 
The Ken Loach film The Wind That Shakes the Barley did not attract the approval of the 
establishment. It was criticised for portraying the British as sadists and the Irish as romantic, 
idealistic resistance fighters who take to violence only because there is no other ‘self-
respecting course’.602 That may well be so. It is also a picture of an ‘insurgency’ from the 
insurgent’s perspective – in this case the IRA. One scene from the film presents a key 
element of the Irish War of Independence. In that scene, set in what appears to be a village 
hall or school, a court has been set up. Its function is not to decide the fate of ‘traitors’ or 
collaborators. What is being decided is whether a particular debt should be paid. Putting 
aside the political aspect of this particular debt – it is owed to a loan shark who bankrolls 
the local IRA unit, which is trying to ensure that it is paid – this kind of case is the meat and 
bread of courts all over the world every day. 
What is being depicted is a key element of the IRA’s campaign to establish and sustain its 
authority, its legitimacy as the legitimate government of Ireland.  
The IRA’s judicial strategy 1916–22 
As observed above, the ‘arbitration courts’ had been in operation since the late nineteenth 
century, and were successors to the Land League Courts. After the 1916 Easter Rising, the 
British (the Unionist forces) had instituted what amounted to martial law.603 Insurgents who 
had been involved in the Easter Rising were tried under martial law at courts martial; 15 
were executed.604 The effect of these executions, incidentally, was to turn much of the 
previously pro-government Irish population against the government. The use of courts 
martial was treated as an opportunity for Irish Nationalist lawyers to challenge their 
jurisdiction and legality on the basis that the court hearings were wrongly held in secret.  
In November 1918, elections took place throughout the UK. There was an overwhelming 
majority of Sinn Fein MPs returned from Ireland, and these MPs decided to boycott the 
London Parliament and set up their own parliament in Dublin, known as the Dail Eireann. 
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Meanwhile the nascent IRA had begun to intensify action against British security forces. 
Local initiatives had given rise to a new brand of locally organised land courts – a reaction to 
the wave of agrarian land disturbances, some of them acting ‘in a haphazard and slipshod 
manner with grave possibilities of irregularity’, according to the committee set up by the 
Dail (itself, of course, a ‘shadow’ structure) to design a new courts system.605 Following a 
relatively full assessment of the ‘English courts’ and the challenges of formalising the 
already existing insurgent courts, the Dail announced the formation of national arbitration 
courts in August 1919. In due course, these became known as ‘Dail Courts’.  
Setting up the new system was expensive, since all its participants were paid. In March 
1920, it was assessed that the cost of the new system would amount to £113,000.606 There 
was the full panoply of parish courts, with appeal lying to district courts and finally a court of 
appeal. Legitimacy was assisted by the fact that judges at the parish courts were elected by 
those over whom they would minister. There was a scale of court fees, and all litigants had 
to sign a declaration that they would comply with the decision of the court and not submit 
to any ‘enemy tribunal’.607 Coupled with this, the campaign to boycott the Crown Courts 
gained momentum alongside a British effort to suppress the Dail Courts by force.608 The Dail 
authorities acted very quickly to deal with agitation over land issues by instituting dedicated 
Dail Land Courts,609 although the speed with which the new systems were gaining 
momentum certainly surprised even Sinn Fein.610 The new system of courts gained real 
purchase, especially when coupled with the effective withdrawal of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary from large parts of the country. At times there were serious derogations from 
regular procedure; but these were at a local level, particularly in the comparatively radical 
south west of the country, and were effectively a continuation of long-festering disputes.611 
John Brayden, an Irish barrister who was fully experienced in the ‘Crown Law’ observed the 
proceedings of some of these courts and wrote about them in the Journal of the American 
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Bar Association in 1920.612 As far as can be determined, he himself was not a Republican.613 
He describes the courts thus: 
 They have tried to focus on the merits. They have, according to all accounts derived 
 in many cases from men very hostile to Sinn Fein (Irish Republican) principles and 
 purposes, endeavoured to an impartial justice and have surprised hardened 
 Unionist [pro-British] practitioners by their willingness to decide in favour of an 
 unpopular landlord against an unpopular tenant, when the facts called for such a 
 decision.614  
Brayden goes on to describe a number of cases brought against those who might have been 
expected to gain little sympathy from a Republican forum. ‘The Sinn Feiners have been able 
to organise their courts, equip them with judges, attract the confidence of litigants and 
secure obedience to their decrees.’615 It is apparent that this was not an isolated 
assessment. 
Not only was there – to a considerable degree, if not uniformly – what might now be called 
‘procedural fairness’ (or more importantly perceived procedural fairness), to the extent that, 
particularly in matters involving land, Unionists were often content to use the Dail Courts.616 
But the courts were able to enforce their decisions. Brayden is pragmatic about the reasons 
for this: no litigant gaining a judgment from a ‘Crown’ court would be allowed to enjoy the 
fruits of that judgment in peace. If the litigant chose the Sinn Fein (Dail) Court, ‘she might 
live in peace’.617 The courts also dealt with criminal matters: ‘the Sinn Feiners arrest men for 
every sort of criminal offence, try them in their necessarily strictly secret courts, and fine, 
imprison or deport as they please’.618 Although initially these courts acted much as the 
arbitration courts had – which is to say essentially with the consent of the parties (the 
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caveat being that there was much ‘encouragement’ not to use the Crown Courts) – in 
August 1920 the Dail passed a decree giving coercive jurisdiction to the courts.619 
By now, particularly in Nationalist areas, the courts had largely displaced the work of those 
of the British state. There had been, in the words of one contemporary, ‘a steady 
encroachment of Sinn Fein Courts on the constituted domain of law’.620 Due to their 
increasing reach, they began to attract business from beyond the Nationalist community. 
Charles Townsend relates one Unionist landowner, Lord Monteagle, taking the view that the 
Nationalist courts had shown ‘extraordinary fairness’ and had been ‘extremely just’.621   
Barristers complained to Brayden that work in the state courts had dried up by late 1920, 
just at the time when the British armed forces were beginning to gain some grip over the 
military side of the conflict. By then a combination of perceived procedural fairness, the 
ability to enforce judgments, threats against those who continued to use Crown Courts 
(thereby breaking the boycott) and the destruction of courthouses had resulted in a 
situation where ‘Sinn Fein justice was alone available; the King’s writ had ceased to run; the 
Royal judges still went on circuit, but their courts, guarded by police and soldiers, were 
empty of litigants’, who had by now transferred their cases to the Dail Courts.622 Conor 
Maguire, a future Chief Justice of Ireland, remarked in a Radio interview, echoing those 
complaints to Brayden, that ‘In the end, in 1919 we [the Dail Court in County Mayo] took all 
the business of the county [civil] court.  In 1920, we took all the business of the Assize 
[Criminal] Court’.623 
As Tom Tyler puts it in Why People Obey the Law, ‘A judge’s ruling means little if the parties 
to the dispute feel that they can ignore it.’624 Similarly, courts will not work if the staff or key 
personnel in the procedure fail to attend. Witnesses were ‘encouraged’ to refuse to attend 
court hearings. Such encouragements included outright threats, such as a notice placed 
outside a petty sessions in Kerry stating that anyone who attended court as a witness that 
day would be shot. The court was adjourned. Attacks on courts and court officials were also 
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common and a policy was announced that ‘every person in the pay of England (magistrates 
and jurors, etc.) will be deemed to have forfeited his life’.625 Concerted attacks on the court 
system were to have been part of a strategy following on from the failure of talks in 1921, 
and the order was not executed on a national scale as the talks succeeded. However, Austin 
Stack, the Sinn Fein minister of justice and home affairs, said in 1921 that efforts to ‘empty 
the enemy courts’ should continue during the post-agreement truce, but that it should be 
done ‘unostentatiously’.626 
Judges were always heavily guarded, but the more senior judges were rarely targeted. 
However, concerted plans were made to target these more senior judges if negotiation 
efforts during the truce of 1921 broke down. In any event, judges were very often in 
sympathy with Sinn Fein aims. While threats contributed to mass resignations, the 
behaviour of elements of the British security forces, as well as the pervasive use of martial 
law, made a significant contribution as well. One magistrate resigned in August 1920, stating 
as his reason that ‘His Majesty’s government has determined on the substitution of military 
for civil law in Ireland.’627 He was joined by 148 magistrates in that month alone. 
At that stage, however, politically it might be argued that the British authorities had become 
the insurgents, as a new authority had established itself firmly, if not immovably. There was 
significant opposition, of course, from what might be termed ‘legal vested interests’. In a 
letter to the London Times, A.M. Sullivan, himself a barrister, though clearly sympathetic to 
the ideals of independence and highly critical of English rule regarded Sinn Fein as a criminal 
society that ‘bullied’ litigants into submission; no barrister ‘should soil himself by lending the 
sanction of his participation to the performance of a body which repudiates and denounces 
those principles of justice which constitute his creed’.628 Despite the somewhat chaotic 
military operations of the time, a moderate Irish politician, Horace Plunkett, could say that 
‘Order is being preserved with increasing success by Sinn Fein’629 – a remarkable judgement 
from a relatively conservative man. Independence was less than a year away (it came in 
December 1922) and the views of Sullivan, although by no means uncommon, were 
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becoming irrelevant. One avowed Unionist summed up in The Times the effect of the Dail 
Courts: 
An illegal government has become the de facto government. Its jurisdiction is 
recognised. It administers justice promptly and equitably and we are in this curious 
dilemma that the civil administration of the country is carried on under a system the 
existence of which the de iure government does not and cannot acknowledge and is 
carried on very well.630  
The courts and the ‘revolutionary legality’ of the Nationalist judicial strategy had acted 
simultaneously to subvert the state order and strengthen the authority of the Dail. The 
leading expert on the courts, Mary Kotsonouris, herself an Irish judge, takes the view that 
the Dail Courts ‘operated in an ordinary way and paralleled in their proceedings and 
procedures those of the courts they were intended to subvert. They were the promise and 
proof that the time for self-government had come.’631  
In his Rebel Rulers Zachariah Mampilly presents as his second (of seven) hypothesis 
concerning insurgent behaviour that: ‘If an insurgency emerges in a state with high 
penetration into society it is more likely to co-opt pre-existing institutions and networks into 
its civil administration thereby improving governance provision.’632 It is clear that his 
hypothesis is correct in the Irish case. Indeed the same seems to be occurring in Syria, and 
did occur in Libya. In all these cases, as Mampilly posits, the state had a high degree of 
penetration into society. In Ireland, however, the state had a high level of penetration to the 
extent that only a decade prior to the Irish War of Independence Ireland was, to all intents 
and purposes, a fairly settled part of the United Kingdom and its governmental systems 
(albeit with strong movements for devolution).  
In the later conflict in Northern Ireland (1968–98) the Provisional IRA, the self-declared 
successors to the Irish Republican Army of the War of Independence, attempted a system of 
community justice, on a relatively local scale, in the housing estates and Republican 
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communities of Northern Ireland.633 Ultimately, the Provisional IRA’s efforts at non-state 
justice failed to gain purchase. Despite the IRA’s regular denunciations of the authority of 
the British Crown in Northern Ireland, there was no effective overall civic strategy adopted 
by the Republicans of the late twentieth century. They set up no effective community-wide 
dispute resolution system. The acid test of such a system is not the number of knee-
cappings of petty criminals in Belfast housing estates, but rather the bodies to which 
litigants turn when they require adjudication of a legal dispute. In the Northern Ireland of 
the late twentieth century, the answer was that whether a litigant was Catholic or 
Protestant, he or she would bring their dispute to the county court.  
 
Here might be observed a link between late twentieth century Northern Ireland and the 
Malaya of the 1950s – or indeed the Kenya of the 1950s (for all except the Kikuyu, who in 
any event would bring civil disputes to the so-called ‘African courts’). The law reports show 
from those colonies, as they do from Northern Ireland, that the forum for such disputes was 
not an insurgent tribunal, as might be the case in Tamil Sri Lanka, Maoist Nepal or 
Nationalist revolutionary Ireland, but rather the British Crown Courts.  
 
The establishment of the Dail Courts was only one aspect of a multidimensional legal 
strategy adopted by the Nationalists in the War of Independence. It was arguably the first 
such concerted strategy, certainly in recent history. It combined the use of courts to 
undermine the legitimacy of the state, those courts themselves acting as levers to increase 
the power and reach of the Dail. In addition, they acted as indicators of that power and 
reach. The Nationalist strategy did not stop there, however. Certainly the major element of 
the strategy comprised the Dail Courts, but there was another dimension: using the Crown 
Courts to undermine their own legitimacy ‘at home’ in Ireland, in England, and indeed, with 
a rather modern-looking media strategy, abroad. In this, the Nationalists were probably the 
first successful practitioners of what was to become known as ‘rupture strategy’ (see 
Chapter 2).  
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Insurgent justice in ‘ungoverned space’: Afghanistan, 1979 to the present 
Ireland was an integral part of a well-developed Western polity a century ago, at the time of 
the ‘Republican Courts’. Afghanistan in the twenty-first century, by contrast, is an extremely 
poor, severely underdeveloped country in Central Asia. Yet despite the differences, 
insurgents in that country have used tactics similar to those once employed in Ireland to 
exploit their advantages in the operation of courts, in order to bolster their legitimacy and 
displace the incumbent government based in Kabul. There is nothing new in their approach. 
The pioneering journalist Jon Lee Anderson travelled with the Afghan Mujahedin in the 
1980s and wrote about them, and indeed other groups around the world, in Guerrillas:  
 
The Mujahedin of Afghanistan give little thought to winning over the population. In 
this isolated and tradition-bound country, Islam and the power of the local 
strongman stand virtually unopposed. If the Mujahedin are dominant in an area, 
their word is law. And this usually means Islamic law as interpreted by them and 
their mullahs.634 
 
He relates the setting up of a court in the Kandahar area by a shura, a council of elders:  
 
 … as a necessary alternative to the Afghan regime’s own discredited judiciary [this 
 shura] has come to exercise the Islamic authority throughout the province, 
 underpinning the military authority of the Mujahedin at the same time.635  
 
Of course, what was done here is what is done, as we have seen, in many insurgencies: what 
amounts to a shadow government was set up. Itinerant mullahs delivered judgment under a 
tree, not only on cases related to the war, such as the division of ammunition or the 
delineation of areas of control of the Mujahedin. They litigated thefts, adultery and 
murders. Anderson concluded his account of cases heard by Mullahs in the district of 
Arghandab with words that may be seen as equally applicable to Taliban courts today:  
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In Arghandab, the people know that if they follow the rules they will be treated 
fairly. There are no arbitrary punishments; nothing is meted out that is not already 
expected. In an Islamic land, the laws imposed by [the mullahs] are the ones the 
people have already learned to obey.636 
 
Twenty years on at the time of writing, Arghandab remains a district that is fiercely 
contested by ‘government’ forces’ (this time supported by the US) and the Taliban.  
 
The Mujahedin success in the field of the provision of justice has been inherited in full by 
the more recent Taliban. After the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, there ensued what is 
popularly regarded as a period of chaos. This, at least in the south of the country, is said to 
have ended in 1996, when the Taliban came to power. Insofar as one can distinguish the 
‘Taliban’ from other more opportunistic groups in places such as Helmand,637 if they have 
one ‘unique selling point’ it is their provision of a justice system.  
Part of this is based on the Taliban’s reputation from their period of rule, 1996–2001. The 
Taliban’s founding myth, as related by Abdul Salam Zaeef, the former Taliban foreign 
minister, goes as follows: 
 
The founding meeting of what became known as the Taliban was held in the autumn 
of 1994 ... Mohammed Omar took an oath from everyone present. Each man swore 
on the Quran to stand by him, and to fight against corruption and the criminals ... 
The Sharia would be our guiding law and would be implemented by us. We would 
prosecute vice and foster virtue, and we would stop those who were bleeding the 
land. Soon after the meeting, we established our own checkpoint ... and we 
immediately began to implement the Sharia in the surrounding area.638  
 
No name was chosen at that stage. The next night, the BBC reported the birth of the new 
movement. This foundation myth may have some grounding in reality. Another version is 
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‘that the Taliban were created by Pakistan’s ISI [Inter-Service Intelligence] and trained in ISI 
camps’.639 For present purposes, it is not important what actually happened, but rather how 
the Taliban have constructed their narrative of justice, grounding it in what may in fact be a 
myth, but one which is commonly felt to be true.  
 
I was ‘justice advisor’ to the United Kingdom security forces in Helmand in 2007. I recall 
speaking to a woman member of the Helmand provincial council who said that often, as she 
walked past the town stadium where, in Taliban days, criminals and other alleged 
malefactors were punished – often by death or amputation – she felt regret: ‘At least we 
could walk the streets in safety then.’640 As Clark and Carter confirm in a study of justice in 
Afghanistan, ‘Current efforts by the Taliban to provide justice tap into the same deep desire 
for security and rule of law that helped attract the country to their rule in the mid-1990s.’641 
 
When I deployed to Helmand in 2007, the Taliban already ran what seemed to be a 
relatively well-regarded system of courts. It was made clear to me very early on that the 
Taliban had been founded a decade earlier on a manifesto of justice, and it was a reputation 
that they were keen to maintain:  
 
A man was killed over a land dispute near Garmsir. He was arrested by police, and 
given a short prison sentence of six months. The victim’s family were not satisfied 
with this response of the state. They presented the case, when the man had been 
released, to the Taleban in Garmsir. The case was heard by four Taleban judges, with 
the accused present. The judgment was that the victim’s brother should have the 
opportunity to kill the murderer. He did, and professed himself very satisfied with 
the outcome.642 
 
Research at the time in Helmand revealed that the Taliban of Helmand were operating a 
‘circuit court’ system of four judges travelling the province settling cases. As the mission in 
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Helmand matured, these were to become known as ‘motorcycle courts’. The Taliban 
claimed to apply real justice. In addition to the fact that the official or formal system was 
widely perceived as moribund and corrupt, they asserted that the constitution as it now 
stands is simply un-Islamic. They would remove 70 articles from the constitution, not least 
because it implicitly excludes the harsher features of what they suppose to be pure Quranic 
justice of the Hanafi School of Islamic law, informed by the extremist Deobandi (essentially 
Wahhabist) form of Islam.643  
 
In Washir district, the application of what are (wrongly) regarded as the evidentiary rules 
pertaining to rape took an unusual turn: 
 
A woman was raped. No recourse to governmental authority was available. So the 
case was taken before the Taleban judges. They ruled that the necessary four 
witnesses for a rape case were not available and that therefore no crime could be 
proved. The victim’s family were unhappy with this, and took matters into their own 
hands. They kidnapped the perpetrator and raped him themselves. In turn he 
brought his own rapists before the Taleban Court. The ruling was the same. He could 
produce no witnesses and therefore the crime could not be proved.644  
 
The resident of Washir district who reported this case said that since the Taliban had arrived 
‘there had been no robbery or kidnappings. Indeed no crime.’ The kind of justice offered by 
the state was not encouraging. It was clearly beset by – indeed characterised by – 
corruption, incompetence and what might be baldly, if accurately, described as pure 
criminality.645 The Taliban had identified a key centre of gravity, a critical vulnerability, and 
attacked it. The ‘narrative’ of Taliban justice is central to their success, as is the equally 
powerful sense of governmental injustice.  
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The Taliban’s judicial strategy today   
 
The Taliban’s narrative of justice is prioritised as ‘practically the only quasi-state service that 
they provide’.646 It has been estimated that the Taliban justice system nationally comprises 
in the region of 500 judges, ranging in qualification from fully qualified religious scholars 
(called maulawis) to men with a local reputation for fairness.647 They are reputed to be paid 
in the region of $250 per month, which is a good salary in Afghanistan. 
The procedure involved in Taliban courts is full and comprehensive, but straightforward. 
Some of the following is drawn from a fine report, itself based on extensive interviewing by 
a team led by Antonio Giustozzi.648 The procedure is reported to be nationally consistent – 
from first instance courts (probably not unlike the ‘motorcycle courts’ mentioned above) to 
a Taliban ‘Central Court’ ( Supreme Court) which in theory has its location in Helmand, but 
probably in fact sits in Pakistan.649 At first instance, a judgment can be delivered 
immediately, or it may take up to a month if further witnesses need to be called. As will be 
seen below, this compares very favourably with the state court provision. The procedure 
itself requires no lawyers or specialist knowledge. It usually takes the form of a traditional 
Sharia court hearing, of the kind that has taken place in Afghanistan and throughout the 
Islamic world for centuries. This involves the parties being heard and the judges going on to 
hear whichever witnesses they deem relevant. Judges will make their own enquiries. 
Critically, Taliban justice is not likely to involve anything like the same degree of payment of 
large bribes which is a major problem for the state courts.650 Witnesses subpoenaed by the 
Taliban tend to turn up at court, out of fear, and torture may play a part in judicial 
interrogation.651 
Punishments are seen as strict and based on traditional Sharia law, although there is doubt 
about the extent to which the condign huddud (amputation, stoning to death, etc.) 
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punishments are in fact used. Enforcement is highly regarded: a judgment in a Taliban court, 
for example, following a land dispute, is regarded as in essence title to the land. Clearly 
records are kept of judgments.652 The Taliban have what is called in Sharia law tanfiz – the 
ability to enforce. As one state judge put it to Clark and Carter: 
They have the power to do. We don’t have the power to do; we only have the power 
just to say. If I was a Taliban judge in Paktia [a province in Eastern Afghanistan well 
known for its Taliban presence] I would be commander and judge and executioner 
and I’d be a very good judge.653 
As was observed in Chapter 1, legitimacy can be assessed as being at least in part a function 
of the adjudicative procedures being seen to be fair. This is partly based on the fact that the 
Taliban tap into societally acceptable norms of justice provision. They claim to base their 
judgments on the Sharia and their procedures are not seen as a departure from traditional 
Afghan judicial practice.  
In a remarkable documentary film made by Afghan-Danish journalist Nagieb Khaja in early 
2014 and broadcast on 4 April 2014,654 Khaja embeds with a Taliban unit in Charkh district, 
an area of Logar province just an hour’s drive from Kabul. In the second of the two-part 
series, Khaja films the procedure of one Taliban tribunal, this one in Logar province. Two 
cases are seen to be litigated: the first concerns a widow being ejected from her home by 
her stepsons following the death of her husband; the second involves the settling of a debt. 
In both cases, it is clear that none of the parties had considered trying to settle the case 
using the state. The procedure (or at least that part of it which was broadcast) was very 
similar to the informal Sharia hearings with which Muslims all over the world are familiar, 
and which are still common in Afghanistan, even under the state system. The difference 
between the government’s system in the province visited, and the Taliban’s was twofold: 
first, as various local commentators said on film and as has already been observed, the 
Taliban system, while by no means incorrupt, is seen as far more trustworthy than the 
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government’s system; secondly, it is amply clear that any summons or judgment will be 
obeyed, because it can be enforced. 
 It must be said that the kind of procedure seen in Logar (and indeed discussed in most of 
the literature) is distinct from the tribally based Pashtunwali, a system which the Taliban are 
said to permit alongside their own Sharia system.655  
Their legitimacy may in turn be impacted by appropriate transparency and oversight of the 
relevant systems. The Taliban are acutely aware of the competitive edge they have and the 
degree to which it depends on perception. Accordingly, great emphasis is placed in the 
system on oversight. Internal oversight of the Taliban justice system is based initially on the 
appeals system, although doubts have been raised as to its robustness, as people are said to 
be afraid to attempt to impugn local Taliban judges: ‘Only those who were well connected 
with the local Taliban leadership were likely to feel that lodging a complaint against a verdict 
was a real option.’656 Corruption is said to be a ‘constant challenge’.657 Supervision of judges 
who are not usually local to the areas over which they adjudicate, is also exercised by the 
Provincial Military Commissions, which act to forestall problems connected with excessive 
familiarity with a given area, which can result in the temptation to take bribes from persons 
known to the judges concerned. Accordingly judges are regularly rotated around districts, or 
indeed provinces. A comprehensive system of internal rules, known as the Layeha, govern 
(or are purported to govern) Taliban behaviour.658 
Ever conscious of the reputational risks of corruption, Taliban counter-intelligence is said to 
be tasked with collecting information on allegations about corrupt judges. The assessment 
of Giustozzi et al. is that ‘[r]obust internal oversight appears to have always featured in the 
Taliban’s judicial system since its beginnings; in a sense this is also the case of external 
oversight, whose effective weight seems to have been strengthening recently’.659 That 
external oversight takes the form of measures that range from the monitoring of rumours to 
the appointment of ombudsmen to deal with complaints against Taliban officials.  
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While maintaining a relatively close eye on their own image – just as the Irish Nationalists 
did – the Taliban discourage people from using the state courts. One state court judge in 
Wardak province, a contested area of the country, complained: ‘I am constantly being 
threatened when I’m in my office, when I’m in my home or on the road. In areas where the 
Taliban have control, the people are basically barred from coming to the courts in the 
capital.’660 It is clear that this is not an isolated instance, for several such cases have been 
reported in the south of the country, resulting in constant difficulty in recruiting qualified, 
willing staff.661 Government prosecutors in Helmand are said to work with the express 
consent of the Taliban. For example, Jonathan Steele, in his Ghosts of Afghanistan reports 
that the district prosecutor of Marjah (it is here that General McChrystal claimed to have 
installed a ‘government in a box’) ‘is believed to have obtained clearance from the Taliban 
before taking up his appointment’.662  
 
There are limitations to the Taliban’s juridical success. They have achieved limited 
penetration in the cities,663 and they are generally regarded by many as being too keen to 
rely on violence, or indeed the stricter end of the spectrum of Islamic justice. Their reach is 
also limited to the Pashtun areas of the country – that area, in other words, where the 
insurgency is – not coincidentally – strongest. However, the judgement of Antonio Giustozzi, 
who has studied the Taliban for over a decade, carries a great deal of weight: ‘Whatever 
individuals might think of the features of the Taliban’s judiciary, the Taliban’s success in 
bringing their judiciary to remote rural communities in thousands of Afghanistan’s villages is 
undisputed.’664  
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The next chapter will look at the problems faced by the Afghan incumbent government and, 
more specifically, their allies from the West in attempting to bolster that formal system. 
While the Taliban’s justice efforts are well known – indeed it might be argued that they are 
a mature and developed form of judicial organisation, at least by Afghan standards – 
another insurgency supposedly inspired by Islamic notions of justice is making real efforts to 
entrench its authority by using civil administration, and particularly courts.  
Contemporary Syria 
A New York Times article in May 2013 reported on a conflict between courts in Aleppo:  
The court system serves as a prime example of the contest for a postwar Syria. As 
crime has proliferated after government control vanished in many areas. Syrians 
clamored for security. Rebel leaders, particularly Islamists, responded by opening 
dozens of courts.665  
 
In this, of course, the rebels were, according to the New York Times, responding to a need 
for security following local conflict, itself against the background of an intense continuing 
civil war. It is instructive that once an element of control had been established, the first 
impulse, at least in this case, as reported, was to set up dispute resolution mechanisms – 
courts.  
 
The first such courts in Aleppo were run by a group of former judges and lawyers calling 
itself the ‘United Courts Council’, according to a CNN report from January 2013,666 or the 
‘United Court of the Judiciary Council’ (al-mahkama al-muwâhada lil-majlis al-qadhâ’i). The 
report gave the impression of a relatively ‘normal’ operation, complete with a notary 
service. The chief prosecutor, a former professional, described the court as an ‘emergency 
measure’. In the cells, presumably among others that the camera team were not allowed to 
see, were members of the Free Syrian Army, supposedly incarcerated for war crimes. One 
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inmate blithely says he tortured a regime officer to death. One judge says of his work ‘we 
believe that this will prepare us for the day the regime falls, for then there will be 
anarchy’.667 The impression given by this report is very much of a simple renaming of 
jurisdiction, with much the same procedure and personnel, of the kind seen in, for example, 
Libya or Iraq, rather than of a revolutionary court. Indeed the legal code used is the Unified 
Arab Code (al-qânûn al-‘arabî al-muwahhad), developed in Cairo in 1996 by a group of Arab 
jurists.668 
 
Very much the same dynamic was observed by me in Benghazi and Tripoli during the Libyan 
revolution of 2011–12. In both Benghazi (in the early days of the revolution) and (later) 
Tripoli, the state courts worked very much as they had during Qadhafi’s time. The same 
procedures were adopted and the same laws were used – based on post-colonial Italian and 
French models. Judges assured me that minimal disruption was taking place to normal 
judicial activities, and the only major controversies concerning reform revolved around 
details, albeit important to lawyers, of the Criminal Procedure Code.  
 
At the time of writing, there is insufficient information coming out of Syria to determine 
whether anything remains of the United Courts Council in Aleppo. Nonetheless we know 
enough to be able at least to identify relevant hypotheses. Was this the ‘shadow state’ at 
work, testing the ‘theory of competitive control’? Or is this the reflection of a normal human 
impulse to provide a sensible and accepted form of dispute resolution, doing exactly what 
the prosecutor said above – providing an antidote to anarchy. Do we see in this court the 
formation of a social contract in action? Or is the case simpler than that, merely the 
continuance of a necessary social good. Was there anything, truly, insurgent about this 
court at all?  
 
The question as to whether the ‘new’ courts in ‘moderate’ rebel Syria were ‘insurgent’ does 
not arise in the case of those run by Al Nusra, a militia closely linked to Al Qaeda. In the 
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latter part of 2013, in Aleppo, a French TV station filmed an extraordinary 15-minute piece 
on four courts which had been set up by the Jabhat al Nusra rebel armed group supported 
by an ‘Islamic Police Force’,669 which tried those suspected of involvement with regime 
forces. It is not clear whether this system eventually replaced or complemented the ‘United 
Courts Council’, perhaps in another part of Aleppo, but it was clearly a different kind of 
court. Named the ‘Legal Committee’ (haî’at ash-sharî‘a), it had clearly been operating at 
least since April of that year,670 complementing, but not necessarily competing with, the 
jurisdiction of the United Courts Council. The journalist reporting on the French 
documentary states that these courts, established in February 2013, are ‘at the centre of 
the new Islamist power’.  
 
The chief judge, who went by the nom de guerre Abu Suleiman, was ‘on a mission to install 
the foundation of an Islamist society in the city’.671 As interesting as the interviews are with 
the key players, it is the backdrop and some of the vignettes that are most striking. The 
court has the appearance of any such institution in the Arab world, with a stream of 
investigations being carried out by ‘prosecutors’ in busy offices, with witnesses waiting 
outside and men with rifles slung wandering the corridors. However, the differences are 
more striking. Adultery is one of the charges regularly litigated. No lawyers are allowed, as 
strict Sharia posits no such formal role. A looter is interrogated while being beaten on the 
soles of his feet with a cane; a man is questioned, threatened and beaten on camera for 
allegedly allowing his son to join Assad’s army; a captured Assad soldier is freed in exchange 
for some valuable tactical intelligence and a fine of 500 dollars; another is transferred to the 
Supreme Court for judgment and possible execution.  
 
In its Jabhat al Nusra iteration, the court was providing a basis for Islamic society – or, as 
otherwise framed, forming an ideological basis for a new polity. There are cosmetic 
similarities to the courts that preceded it, although the founding norms are entirely 
different. Whereas the United Courts Council uses secular law, with a leavening of Sharia (as 
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is common in Arab societies), the Al Nusra court is avowedly a Sharia court, with none of the 
accoutrements of civil law. There are no lawyers, and the judges seem to act not in 
accordance with any form of due process, but according to their own views of what Sharia 
is. Nonetheless, with a clear structure formed of district and appeal courts, this is a system 
that aspires to legitimacy and longevity.  
As of late 2013, these two jurisdictions seemed to be co-existing, albeit very uneasily. In late 
2013 it was reported that:  
 The Legal Committee is accusing the members of the civilian administration of being 
 bad Muslims – a strong argument in a time of jihad – while the institutions attached 
 to the Coalition [United Courts Council] consider their rivals incompetent. Last 
 August, men from the Legal Committee even encircled the United Court for one day 
 until they were forced to retreat by the Free Syrian Army combatants closely related 
 to the civil institutions.672  
However, there was clearly a threat emerging from a group even more potentially radical 
than Al Nusra and its close allies. This group – known in English as the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant or ISIL673 – refuses ‘to play this institutional game’.674 With the situation in 
Syria fluid and intensely dynamic, there can be no doubt that matters have moved on since 
late 2013.  
Islamic State 
Despite a considerable amount of interest and discourse on the so-called Islamic State, 
(hereinafter ‘IS’) its history, military capability, ideas and governance in general675 there is 
very little, if any, academic or even journalistic literature on IS courts at the time of the 
submission of this thesis partly due to the security risks in gaining any primary evidence.  
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At the outset it is worth asking the question as to whether Islamic State constitutes an 
insurgent entity at all.  Whilst formally, if the current borders of Syria and Iraq are accepted 
as valid, there is no question that it is.  On its own terms, in fairness like many insurgent 
entities, it is something entirely different.  Commentators are at one in stressing that the 
Islamic State attaches a great deal of importance to its ability to establish and enforce its 
authority and provide social goods. This is not the commonly seen aspect of IS rule, at least 
in western media.  Loretta Napoleoni in her late -2014 book on IS ‘The Rising Islamist 
Phoenix’  quotes an IS member who deals explicitly with the question of perspectives  
‘You look only at the executions, but every war has its executions, its traitors, its 
spies.  We set up soup kitchens, we rebuilt schools hospitals, we restored water and 
electricity, we paid for food and fuel.  While the UN wasn’t even able to deliver 
humanitarian aid we were vaccinating children against polio. Its just that some 
actions are more visible than others’676 
As Charles Lister says in his study for the Brookings Institute ‘Its explicit objective is to 
establish and maintain a self-sufficient Islamic state and, as such, IS has attached its ability 
to rule and govern as a determinant of success. Within a broader context of instability and 
conflict, IS’s combination of tough law and repression with the provision of key services and 
assistance has at times led to a measure of tacit acceptance on a local level’677  It has, in the 
words of Loretta Napoleoni ‘assimilated some of the characteristics of the modern state, 
such as domestic legitimacy gained by a rough social contract.678 Lister agrees; IS ‘offered 
much of what nation-state systems do, but with more intense oversight.’679  All writers are 
very clear that there is a keen stress on the appearance of governmental propriety implied 
by that ‘oversight’.   This against a background of serious instability that has persisted for 
over a decade in some places. As one journalist Aaron Zelin writes in a June 2014 article in 
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‘the Atlantic’ on the ‘softer’ aspects of its rule, ’IS is able to offer a semblance of stability in 
unstable and marginalized areas, even if many locals do not like its ideological program’.680   
 A major part of that programme, by all accounts, is the IS judicial system.  Little has been 
written on it, due largely to the security risks attached to any form of visit to IS territory.  
One journalist gained access to Raqqa, the capital of the self-styled Islamic State. In a 
remarkable article, Mariam Karouny writes that, after an initial crackdown, Islamic State 
began ‘setting up services and institutions – stating clearly that it intended to stay and use 
the area as a base. “We are a state,” one commander in the province said. “Things are great 
here because we are ruling based on God’s law.”’681 Karouny writes that some Sunnis who 
had worked for Asad (the president of the incumbent government of Syria) are said to have 
stayed on after they pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. ‘The civilians who do not have 
any political affiliations have adjusted to the presence of [Islamic State], because people got 
tired and exhausted, and also, to be honest, because they are doing institutional work in 
Raqqa’, said a Raqqa resident opposed to Islamic State.682  This would appear to buttress, in 
Napoleoni’s phrase, that ‘rough social contract’.   
Lister affirms that ‘the implementation of a strict form of sharia law is clearly central [my 
italics] to IS’s governance’.683  Details of the running of these courts are far sparser than for 
the Afghan Taliban, for the security reasons outlined above.  However, as with the Jabhat al 
Nusra and Taliban courts, some primary evidence is available in the form of television 
footage. This in itself may indicate an important factor in the priorities of Islamic State. They 
have shown themselves to be highly aware in their social media presence, of the potential 
of, from their perspective, positive coverage. Nowhere is this more apparent than in a 
documentary programme produced by Vice News on the emerging and intensely 
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controversial state. The documentary, called Inside the Islamic State in part follows the work 
of the ‘Hisbeh’, the Islamic police in Raqqa, in mid 2014.684  
The Hisbeh call their approach ‘positive intervention’, and one of their number states: ‘We 
aim to build an Islamic state in all aspects of people’s lives.’685 A key element of that control 
is the work of the courts – or the part of it that the Islamic State ‘media officer’ who 
accompanies the Vice News crew allows them to see. The courts are based in the old court 
building of Raqqa, and cases are brought and registered in much the same way as in any 
Arab state court. Indeed the building and routines as seen in the documentary are very 
similar to those seen in the Al Nusra courts. This, of course, is not surprising, given that both 
groups were using Syrian state court buildings. While the documentary shows the results of 
a murder trial in the form of a crucifixion, it also makes clear that most of the court’s work 
concerned arbitrating minor disputes. The court clerk to Judge Abu Al Bara’a, named 
‘Haidara’, is interviewed: ‘The court has returned rights to the people after the oppression 
they suffered under the regime’s courts.’686 It is explained that there are specialist judges 
for ‘all kinds of cases’. 
A particularly jarring, but significant, moment comes when ‘Haidara’ is asked: ‘Does this 
court meet international standards?’ To which ‘Haidara’ answers: ‘Of course not; we aim to 
satisfy God, we don’t care about international standards.’ The court, as portrayed in the 
documentary, was full and, as in Aleppo, busy and visually very similar to courts in any other 
part of the Arab – or indeed civil law (as distinct from common law) – world.  
Both these areas and the accounts above are gleaned from the media. All sets of journalists 
were escorted by press officers, the Islamic State media officer becoming something of a 
star of the documentary. The appearance of order, administration, accountability and 
legitimacy is more important than the reality, which is at best relevant only to the 
population of the city. The fact that these programmes were made at all is testament to the 
importance of this impression being made on target populations. Patrick Cockburn, a 
veteran journalist on the Middle East and author of The Jihadis Return sums up his 
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impression of the way Islamic State uses the media: ‘Followers of ISIS [sic] continually flood 
Twitter with pictures of the bodies of their enemies, but they also use the medium to show 
functioning hospitals and a consultative administrative process.’687 
At the time of writing, it seems unlikely that Islamic State will itself be accepted as a 
legitimate state, and even less likely that the judgments of its courts will be regarded as 
having legal integrity. The legality of insurgent courts is potentially an important issue, and 
we turn to it now. 
 
Section 3 
The legality of insurgent courts in international law 
The message of insurgents comes across more easily in the international forum of lawfare if 
their own systems of justice are in accordance with international standards, and indeed 
international law. Though, as we have just seen, the spokesman for the Islamic State’s court 
in their capital Raqqa is not in the least interested in whether his courts behave in 
accordance with international standards.  
That notwithstanding, there are provisions in international law relating to insurgent courts, 
although they are minimal and to an extent ambiguous. Accordingly, there is controversy 
over with what norms insurgent courts need to comply under international law in order that 
they might be properly regulated – or indeed whether it is right in terms of international 
stability that they should be accorded any implied legitimacy by setting standards at all.  
Clearly international legitimacy accorded by compliance with such standards can work in 
favour of insurgents. There is, however, another view, which may be characterised as the 
‘conservative view’, which believes that to accord insurgent courts legitimacy might result in 
the undermining of international security.  
Governments do not recognise their insurgents as combatants with legitimate objectives 
worthy of recognition. As one of the leading authorities on the law of non-international 
armed conflict, Sandesh Sivakumaran, says: ‘There were very few conflicts in which the 
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[insurgent] armed group was recognised as belligerent, thus bringing into play the law of 
international armed conflict.’688  
Clearly, as we saw in Chapter 1, to treat insurgents as belligerents essentially concedes to 
them a possibly critical degree of legitimacy. Instead, they are almost invariably treated as 
criminals worthy of prosecution and punishment under municipal criminal law. The essence 
of this approach is to ensure precisely that concentration of legal legitimacy in one authority 
– the so-called monopoly of force. To do otherwise would be to acknowledge that 
insurgents may have a practical claim to compete in legitimacy with the incumbent state as 
‘belligerents’. Even if a state were to concede the question of ‘belligerency’, to do so would 
be to accord insurgents a status which, from the legal practical perspective, would take 
them out of the legal control of the counterinsurgent power.  
The case for regulation of insurgent courts is founded on two key legal documents. The first 
is the so-called ‘Common Article 3’ of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.689 It is called 
‘Common Article 3’ because it appears in all four Geneva Conventions as Article 3. The usual 
shorthand for it is CA3. CA3 is primarily, or indeed exclusively, concerned with the 
protection of ‘persons taking no active part in hostilities’ in ‘conflicts not of an international 
character’. As well as civilians, such persons are said to include ‘members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention or other cause’.690 There is an overall obligation for such persons to be treated 
humanely.691 As such, it prohibits ‘violence to life and person’,692 the taking of hostages,693 
and humiliating and degrading treatment.694  
Crucially for present purposes is article 3.1(d), which states that ‘the passing of sentences 
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples’ shall be prohibited. 
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The key words here are ‘regularly constituted court’. What constitutes such a court and the 
implications of such tribunals has given rise to much debate.695 CA3 must be read in 
conjunction with another key provision in international humanitarian law. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, as has been seen, there was a great deal of ‘non-international armed conflict’, 
insurgencies, revolutions and the like. It was determined that the law concerning this kind of 
conflict was inadequate – specifically the rules relating to the victims of conflict.696 Over a 
period of about a decade, the Second Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions was 
drafted. It was promulgated in 1979, along with the First Additional Protocol, which largely 
concerned the protection of victims of international armed conflict.697  
The Second Protocol concerned the protection of victims of non-international armed 
conflict. For present purposes, the key provision is contained in article 6, which ‘applies to 
the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences related to the armed conflict’. It states 
that ‘No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty 
of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential 
guarantees of independence and impartiality.’ It sets out what minimum guarantees are 
required.698 
There is no mention of ‘insurgent’ or ‘government’. The objective of the article is clear. 
Indeed the objective of both articles taken together is clear. This is to avoid the possibility of 
some form of legal vacuum developing and the consequent high possibility of summary 
justice being applied in the form of executions, without any protection in the shape of some 
kind of legal procedure for the accused. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
Commentary on CA3 states this with its customary clarity: 
 Sentences and executions without previous trial are too open to error. ‘Summary 
 justice’ may be effective on account of the fear it arouses, though that has yet to be 
 proved; but it adds too many further innocent victims to all the other innocent 
 victims of the conflict. All civilised nations surround the administration of justice 
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 with safeguards aimed at eliminating the possibility of judicial errors. The 
 Convention has rightly proclaimed that is essential to do this even in time of war.699  
There is no further elaboration as to what a ‘court’ is, or under whose auspices such a court 
must be run. As Sivakumaran puts it: ‘this addresses the scope of the provision but not the 
actors to whom it is addressed’.700  
Two clear views have emerged in the discourse on this matter. Much of it has revolved 
around what a ‘regularly constituted court’ is in CA3. The arguments are long and 
complicated, and often turn on what intentions can be construed from the travaux 
préparatoires of Additional Protocol II (APII) in particular. The first view might be 
characterised as the ‘conservative approach’, and might be summarised as stating that to 
accept that an insurgent court can be ‘regularly constituted’ is to undermine international 
humanitarian law and could open the gates to great risks by conferring legitimacy on 
procedures that can never comply with international standards. As Gejji says: ‘At the end of 
the day, the real question is less a question of law than of policy: how much is the 
international community willing to risk in order to legitimize (and thus, hopefully engage) 
insurgent courts?’701 
 
The other view may equally be summarised as taking the pragmatic view that such courts 
cannot be ignored: they will be constituted and, although they may provide an absolute 
minimum of protection, such protection is better than none at all. From the legal 
perspective, they say, had the drafters wished to exclude insurgent courts, they could and 
would have done so. 
It is in places such as Afghanistan that, as Sivakumaran says: ‘The concern of affording 
courts of armed groups a certain legitimacy and armed groups themselves some semblance 
of status also forms part of the explanation as to why the international community fails to 
engage with these courts.’702 By way of illustration, there was no question whatsoever of 
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the Sri Lankan government accepting a Tamil Tiger judgment on land while the conflict in Sri 
Lanka was active, whether or not such a judgment had been enforced and accepted by all 
concerned.  
For the future there is the question of the degree to which the international community will 
(or indeed may) even in theory engage with insurgent courts. Clearly, for many countries 
this is more of a political than a legal question. There is, of course, also a ‘de facto’ element 
here which argues strongly in favour of greater engagement. As Sivakumaran says: ‘Rather 
than ignoring them [courts] or criticizing them without offering concrete suggestions for 
improvement, the international community needs to grapple with them and consider how 
best they may be utilized in order to aid enforcement of the law.’703 Caveat the arguments 
of those who have been termed here ‘conservatives’, the arguments surely argue strongly in 
favour of international law according some form of recognition to insurgent courts. 
 
These legal arguments concerning the extent to which insurgent courts are mandated under 
international humanitarian law have both historical and contemporary resonance. But they 
also tap closely into the question of legitimacy. The effect of the ‘cloak of legitimacy’ 
overseas conferred on such groups as the Irish Republicans or the Tamil Tigers by virtue of 
their effective system of courts has already been remarked upon. That legitimacy would 
only be extended were the ‘international community’ to accept such courts as having some 
legal validity.  
 
One of the arguments of what has been described here as the ‘conservative’ tendency 
regarding the legality of insurgent courts has been precisely that lending such courts some 
legal foundation will tend to reinforce their wider legitimacy. This is undoubtedly the case. It 
will give them something of a ‘cloak of legitimacy’,704 which may operate more effectively in 
the international domain than in the national political struggle, where arguments 
concerning the details of international humanitarian law may have less purchase than in 
other more academic fora. To some extent, the acceptance of insurgent courts as legitimate 
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– and the consequent bolstering of the legitimacy of the cause internationally – may depend 
rather more on how a media strategy is conducted than on legal debates.  
 
This external ‘cloak of legitimacy’ will tend to augment the internal legitimacy accorded to a 
group by the very fact that it is, as the UK Manual says, maintaining a degree of law and 
order where none might previously have been evident. This may well be present, as it is 
with the Taliban, for example, with or without academic legal support. External legitimacy is 
important – even vital. However, it may be argued, it is not dependent on the vagaries of 
international humanitarian law. 
Regularly constituted? 
The procedures for tribunals are minimally qualified by CA3 as needing to be ‘regularly 
constituted’ and to afford all judicial guarantees which are recognised as ‘indispensable’ by 
civilised peoples.705 The term ‘regularly constituted’ does not appear in APII. In APII, judicial 
guarantees are not seen as ‘indispensable’, but are rather ‘essential guarantees of 
independence and impartiality’.706 Gejji suggests that APII has thereby loosened the 
definition. Another view might be that between 1949 and 1979, a great deal of work was 
done on fair trial guarantees in the international legal world, notably the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) whose article 14 is reflected in the provisions 
of APII.707 Rather than ‘loosened’, it might be argued that the requirements are in fact 
extended. In no sense can APII be seen as ‘repealing’ the provisions of CA3; rather they 
modify and extend them. Can insurgent courts, then, be ‘regularly constituted’? Since there 
is no qualification as to such courts being ‘national’ in nature, it seems that the answer 
depends on whether or not they accord due process to those under their purported 
jurisdiction. 
Then there is the question of whose ‘law’ these ‘regularly constituted courts’ are to operate 
under. The question is further complicated by the construction of the term ‘law’ in APII, a 
word which appears several times. So whose law? The United Kingdom view may well be 
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contained in the UK ‘Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict’, which states that 
‘the use of the bare word “law” must be taken to include both national and international 
law. It could also be wide enough to cover “laws” passed by an insurgent authority.’708 This 
seems a sensible and measured view – especially since in neither provision (CA3 or APII) is 
‘national law’ specified. The Manual pragmatically summarises the legal controversy:  
 
The right of the established authorities to prosecute, try, and convict persons 
charged with such offences is left intact but the necessity for some form of minimal 
judicial guarantee is evident in that situations involving non-international armed 
conflict also often bring with them the suspension of constitutional guarantees, the 
promulgation of special laws, and the creation of special jurisdictions.709  
 
In other words, something is better than nothing. That pragmatic argument is reinforced by 
Sivakumaran: 
 
... in so establishing, these courts do act as a counterweight to the disorder and 
chaos that would otherwise rein [sic] in the territory under armed group control. 
Even in territory under governmental control, the existence of an armed conflict can 
lead to general lawlessness with criminal gangs flourishing in a climate of impunity. 
Significant benefits accrue to the civilian population if law and order is 
maintained.710  
 
That said, another article of the Conventions, article 64 of the Fourth Convention (relating to 
the protection of civilian persons in time of war), makes an important point not generally 
raised in this context.711 Where an occupying force is present, ‘the penal laws of the 
occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or 
suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or 
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an obstacle to the application of the present convention’. These provisions of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions only apply in situations of international armed conflict.  However, 
mutatis mutandis a strong argument could be made that insurgents are bound by that 
provision until they themselves attain statehood.    
 
The same article of the Geneva Conventions implicitly recognises the need to avoid a legal 
vacuum – a pragmatic recognition directly relevant to the status of insurgent courts. Aside 
from the arguments as to what constitutes ‘law’ or ‘regularly constituted courts’ deriving 
from the two articles discussed above, there are other obligations inherent in the Geneva 
Conventions. Article 64 goes on to state that in occupied territories there is a duty upon an 
occupying power ‘to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the 
orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of 
the members and property of the occupying forces or administration’. Read broadly, this 
provision would seem to go further than legitimising insurgent control in the form of courts 
and administration; indeed it might be interpreted as mandating it, in the admittedly 
unlikely event that insurgents were to be considered an ‘occupying power’ for the purposes 
of the convention.  
 
The implications of developing a ‘regularly constituted’ court go beyond maintaining ‘law 
and order’. For courts, as has been seen in this chapter, have roles that extend into every 
aspect of day-to-day life as regulators and validators of civil administration. The film Battle 
of Algiers contains a brief scene where a marriage of two insurgent operators takes place in 
the presence not of a French notary, but of an FLN official. It is perhaps a reflection of the 
priorities of international discourse concerning courts that much of the discussion involves 
not the actual day-to-day duties of most courts in most places, but the prosecution of war 
crimes and the enforcement of criminal laws. Yet it may well be that, for those who live in 
‘insurgent areas’, their civic role as regulators is of equal importance not only to their own 
lives but to the legitimacy of the insurgent campaign as a whole. Courts are, of course, at 
heart systems of dispute resolution. The absence of such systems itself creates instability in 
areas under ‘rebel’ control. Therefore, above and beyond the ‘law and order’ argument, 
there is a structural impetus behind the development of such courts, as well as sound 




By way of summary, as a leading expert on International Law told me ‘International 
Humanitarian Law does not really address whether insurgent courts are legal; rather they 
set out to regulate how they might be used.’712  In so doing, it is argued here, compliance 
with international law or the spirit thereof could ensure a degree of legitimacy which might 
otherwise be absent.  It could act to strengthen an insurgent narrative of fairness and 







In the words of Douglas Porch, ‘each insurgency is a contingent event in which doctrine, 
operations and tactics must support a viable policy and strategy and not the other way 
around’.713 As Michael Martin points out, what might have worked for Thompson in Malaya 
may not work for McChrystal in Afghanistan.714 This is as true for insurgents as it is for 
counterinsurgents: what may have worked for T.E. Lawrence (for he was an insurgent) will 
not have worked for Gerry Adams in Belfast. There are no failsafe formulae for success. 
However, it is clear that the creation of a shadow state – with its attendant administrative 
machineries – is essential for the success of insurgencies in most situations. As outlined in 
Chapter 1, it is equally clear that a key part of any administration is the ‘judiciary’. As Anne 
Marie Baylouny has written, ‘authority is tied to the provision of substantive services to the 
population’.715 However, courts have the potential to be far more than another social good 
provided by the insurgent government. While systems of taxation are often of a compulsory 
nature, the decision as to whether to take one’s dispute to a particular court depends on an 
assessment on whether that dispute will be fairly settled, and indeed on an assessment as 
to whether the judgment of the court can be executed or enforced. The provision of an 
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educational system, while it may be highly laudable (and indeed, in the long term, politically 
effective in terms of indoctrination), is not usually a competitive endeavour. Courts in such 
places as have been discussed in this chapter are, by their nature, usually acting in direct 
competition with state provision. This is at least equally evident with respect to the Taliban, 
whose system was examined above.  
The absence of such a system when disputes arise – particularly when disputes involve 
issues of such fundamental importance in agricultural societies as land – can itself be a 
driver of insurgency. This was surely the case in Kenya and Ireland in the periods looked at 
in this chapter. Whereas in Kenya the reaction was largely violent, with little or no attempt 
to set up a shadow administration, in Ireland it might well be argued that the key element of 
the struggle was in fact the judicial and administrative element. What may have been 
missing in the Kenyan case and present in the Irish one is again beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
Whereas in the Irish War of Independence the courts were highly contingent on a long and 
complex history of a battle for legal authority between arbitration courts and the state 
system, in Syria today such courts as appear to have arisen have done so as a reaction to the 
lack of ‘law and order’ in insurgent areas as well as a bolster to their own sense of 
legitimacy. In almost all cases discussed in this chapter, however, there has been something 
of a transference of style – and indeed often legal substance – from the previous regime to 
the new/insurgent regime.  
In Chapter 1, the idea of lawfare was linked explicitly to Clausewitz’s often quoted ideas of 
war as multidimensional. Nowhere is this more evident than in the world of insurgent 
lawfare. It is not argued here that using courts as weapons is an option open to all, or even 
most, insurgents. It is, however, a weapon whose potential has rarely been appreciated. For 
courts are more than just another social good to be provided. As was argued in the 
introduction to this thesis, they are theatres of narrative, as well as expressions of power 
and legitimacy.  
In one sense, the case of insurgent courts lies at the heart of this thesis, as they crystallise 
the issues raised in the research questions. The impact of lawfare in this form can be very 
great. This is clear from, at the very least, the Irish and recent Afghan cases. Similarly, 
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coupled with the successful use of ‘rupture’ (described in the last chapter), with the 
exploitation of free media and with the establishment of a strong narrative in the legal 
arena, this can be highly effective in undermining legitimacy on the ground in contested 
areas. In turn, this has demonstrated the potential of the development of what Verges has 
called a ‘judicial strategy’.  
What Mampilly says in his study of insurgent governance has been demonstrated in this 
thesis:  
 A variety of non-state actors, including insurgent organizations can and do control 
 the fate of civilian communities for substantial periods. Thus, international societies 
 must find ways to comprehend such territories or risk abandoning them.’716  
How counterinsurgents can develop appropriate strategies for such ‘ungoverned’ space is 
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Lawfare and Insurgency in ‘Ungoverned Space’ 
‘He lives in a land with a settled social system, where life is secure and where the rights of 
property are protected by laws which are obeyed. But his opponent has grown up in very 
different conditions. He has been accustomed, like his fathers before him, to look upon might 
as right and to trust to his own right hand for safety amid the turbulent surroundings in 
which his lot is cast.’717 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we turn to focus on how ‘exogenous’ actors have dealt with two problems: 
first of government in general; and second of the (intimately linked issue) of the provision of 
what in the West is called ‘justice’.  
Section 1 looks at the problematic concept of ‘ungoverned space’. Does it exist and what 
part might courts play in its government? The case of the ‘Islamic Courts’ movement is 
briefly addressed to illustrate both the centrality of dispute resolution in ungoverned space, 
and what can happen when organically evolved solutions are dismantled. It goes on to ask 
whether such places necessarily require the ‘rule of law’ approach advocated often in 
contemporary counterinsurgency and ‘stabilisation’ missions, or whether a more pluralistic 
approach can work. Does the history and experience of colonialism have any lessons for 
aspirant ‘exogenous’ rulers of differently governed space?  
Section 2 drills down into one such contemporary mission: Afghanistan today. In the 
previous chapter, the challenge of the Taliban was outlined. What has been the response of 
the incumbent government and particularly its foreign allies? The case of justice reform in a 
counterinsurgent environment is looked at primarily through the lens of the British 
experience in Helmand.  
Finally, Section 3 attempts to draw together some of the threads of the chapter by providing 
a series of ‘lessons from Afghanistan’ that I believe may be useful in other contexts. We 
then proceed to a conclusion, asking ‘who is the insurgent’ 
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Section 1  Courts, law and ‘ungoverned space’ 
The fiction of ‘ungoverned space’ 
Charles Callwell’s characterisation of war in what is now called ‘ungoverned space’ is 
common even a century after his iconic book was published. There is a polarisation between 
a ‘settled social system’ and a society where all are against all, and reliance must be placed 
on one’s ‘own right hand’. Thomas Barfield coined the phrase ‘clash of two goods’ to 
describe the conflict between state-formal systems and customary-tribal systems.718  
Some societies display few of the attributes of ‘rational legal’ government. Indeed it is 
argued that ‘ungoverned’ or ‘alternatively governed’ space is rather more the norm than the 
exception, as ‘the dominance of the Westphalian state in governance provision has steadily 
eroded since the end of the Cold War’.719 Societies such as this are often characterised as 
‘ungoverned’.  
To governments dominated by the rational ‘Westphalian’ state legal paradigm, such areas 
are seen as threatening, particularly against the background of the perceived growing threat 
of ‘terrorism’, which is often considered to centre itself in such areas. As Clunan and 
Trinkunas have put it: ‘If only from an evolutionary perspective it is normal to expect that all 
states will perceive ungoverned spaces as threatening, even if they contain no threats.’720 
Many of the West’s recent military engagements and its parallel civilian efforts have been 
predicated upon preventing the emergence of ungoverned space into which terrorists might 
fit. The essential narrative of this idea was summarised well by the former foreign secretary, 
Jack Straw, consciously referring to the Hobbesian dynamic already discussed in Chapter 1: 
[Places like] Somalia, Liberia and Congo invoke the Hobbesian image of a ‘state of 
nature’ without order, where continual fear and danger of violent death render life 
nasty, brutish and short … As well as bringing mass murder to the heart of 
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Manhattan, state-failure has brought terror and misery to large swathes of the 
African continent. And at home it has brought drugs, violence and crime to Britain’s 
streets … We need to remind ourselves that turning a blind eye to the breakdown of 
order in any part of the world, however distant, invites direct threats to our national 
security and well-being.721 
This kind of approach has had considerable scholarly support. For example, in 2007 the 
RAND Corporation produced a book on the topic, which took the following view: 
[U]ngoverned territories generate all manner of security problems, such as civil 
conflict and humanitarian crises, arms and drugs smuggling, piracy, and refugee 
flows. They threaten regional stability and security and generate demands on US 
military resources.722  
Whether or not those ‘demands on US military resources’ are self-generated depends to 
some extent on whether the authorities controlling the US military accept the premise that 
ungoverned space necessarily equates to a threat to the international order and national 
security. The RAND paper discusses in detail several areas of the world perceived to be 
‘ungoverned spaces’: those areas taken together constitute a considerable portion of the 
Earth’s surface.723  
Each of the extensive chapters in that paper is written on the understanding that military 
intervention may be required. The book itself is part of a series funded by the US Air Force. 
Much of the strategy of United States defence policy has been predicated on the need to 
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control such spaces. An entire ‘command’ of the US armed forces – Africa Command – was 
created explicitly to deal with the supposed risks attached to sub-Saharan governance.724  
Linking failed states causally to a story of terrorism and global instability is a further step, 
and many commentators have argued strongly against taking it.725 Hehir adopts a 
methodologically similar approach to RAND of surveying a large selection of countries, but 
comes to very different conclusions. He sees  
 … no causal link or pronounced correlation between failed states and the 
 proliferation of terrorism or between democratization and the negation of 
 terrorism.726  
Rather he sees the kind of assertion represented above as a ‘façade erected not because of 
its accuracy but because of its rhetorical impact’.727 
The question of whether there is in fact any ‘ungoverned territory’ in the world is itself 
problematic. In speaking about Afghanistan, Robert Johnson could have been discussing any 
one of several similar environments:  
 The absence of Western state structures of governance in large swathes of the tribal 
 areas should not be conflated ... with the absence of governance. Complex and 
 sophisticated conflict-resolution mechanisms, legal codes, and alternative forms of 
 governance have developed in the region over millennia. Moreover, the rural 
 Pashtuns prefer their own mechanisms to alien, external ones because, in their 
 perceptions, theirs are clearly superior. Depictions of the frontier as a lawless land of 
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 endless feuds and bloodthirsty tribal raids owe more to Victorian romanticism than 
 to objective reality.728  
Of course, de facto governments de facto exist in areas frequently claimed as ungoverned 
spaces. There are also, of course, the ‘differently governed spaces’, such as Somalia, parts of 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Africa. The fact of their being ‘differently governed’ should not 
necessarily imply the necessity of intervention of any kind. There are other forms of 
ungoverned space. So-called ‘feral cities’, even in some Western countries, offshore 
financial markets or marginally regulated reaches of the internet.729  
The reality is that a ‘variety of nonstate actors, including insurgent organizations can and do 
control the fate of civilian communities for substantial periods’.730 The extent to which the 
solution is the application of the seventeenth-century European (Westphalian/Hobbesian) 
state structure outlined in Chapter 1 is not clear. This is a question which will be addressed 
only in passing in this chapter. It is a truly vast problem summarised by Christopher 
Clapham:  
 The problem of failed states is most basically about whether the grafting of such 
 states ... onto unpromising rootstock can be made to take – even with the various 
 kinds of fertilizer provided by the international system in the form of universalist 
 ideologies, incorporation into the global economy and the provision of diplomatic 
 and military support.731  
What will be addressed in more detail is how states have successfully co-opted such 
structures as do exist to serve their own strategic purposes, essentially by co-opting existing 
dispute resolution systems, which, as has been argued, by definition both indicate and 
promote some level of, albeit subtle, control. As Zachariah Mampilly put it in his seminal 
Rebel Rulers (2011): 
 Current policy approaches for dealing with areas under rebel control too often treat 
 them as little more than terra nullius – territories devoid of any political or social 
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 order. This assumption renders such territories virtual black holes on the global 
 geopolitical map, places of mystery and chaos that are impenetrable by the 
 international community.732  
This chapter will seek to demonstrate the truth of that statement, with particular reference 
to the provision of what in the West is called ‘dispute resolution’. Differently framed, it will 
seek to show the inherent weaknesses in the way ‘lawfare’ is conducted in ‘ungoverned 
space’ at the ‘operational level’, and specifically in Afghanistan; look at how it has been 
done in the past; and offer suggestions for further consideration as to how it might better 
be done in the future.  
It is therefore argued here that the narrative of ‘failed states’ is flawed. Afghanistan was 
regarded as a failed state from 1994 to 2001. Yet, as will be seen, 13 years of state-building 
have rendered it (by one measure at least) the least governed society on Earth.733 However, 
even in Afghanistan the problem was not that the country was ‘ungoverned’ (which it most 
certainly was not). For the ‘international community’, the problem was rather by whom it 
was governed. Afghanistan, Somalia and North Korea share the title of ‘most corrupt 
country in the world’.734 Yet for some time in the early 2000s, there was a window of 
opportunity for the Somali state, and it took the form of what amounted to a judicial 
initiative.  
The case of the Union of Islamic Courts 
Looking briefly at the case of Somalia is instructive. It is no coincidence that the title of the 
movement was the ‘Union of Islamic Courts’. As will be seen, like the Taliban of Afghanistan, 
this was a reaction to rampant rapacious warlordism.735 
Whether the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was in fact ‘associated with Al Qaeda’ at the time 
it swept the country is a matter of serious doubt.736 What is certainly true is that its 
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successor as a de facto aspirant regime, the so-called shabab, which grew up in direct 
response to US actions, most certainly does.  
What is interesting and significant about the UIC is that it crystallised the importance of 
dispute resolution in societies such as that in Somalia. The extent to which it was both 
remarkable and significant warrants a little further elucidation, as the Somali world is a fine 
example of how important alternative dispute resolution structures can be politically.  
Interestingly, the commonly argued case of Somalia as a dangerous failed state may be true, 
but only because it became a self-fulfilling fear when the US aligned itself with Ethiopia to 
topple the UIC. Verhoeven links the failed state narrative of the dangers of states not 
supplying Weberian goods with post-Cold War ideas of hegemonism and interventionism.737 
Of course, Afghanistan has become the central player in this story of state against chaos. 
According to the view evinced in this world, ‘justice’ is seen as a service to be provided by 
the state, like any other, and is capable of being exported by technocratic experts. There is 
another way, however, and this, too, is addressed by Verhoeven:  
Only when bottom-up institutional responses to state-failure are taken seriously  can 
human security questions be addressed effectively, in Somalia and elsewhere and 
institutionalised in such outfits as the ‘Stabilisation Unit’... for the international 
community, legitimate authority quasi-automatically means a legitimate state; post-
conflict reconstruction always focuses on the rebuilding of state-institutions and 
state-authority, and seldom explores how in local communities non-state forms of 
governance might be considered to be far more legitimate than classical 
government.738  
The growth of the UIC was catalysed by a dispute over control of a port and was bound up in 
the intensely (for outsiders) complex world of Somali clan interests and commensurate 
territorial and business rivalry.739 Somali society, being clan based, is not necessarily 
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conducive to Western state models either of governance or indeed of dispute resolution: 
‘The basic social fabric of Somalia militates against centralisation, and for this reason it is 
characterised by parochial or sectarian interests.’740 For a short time, the UIC, if it did not 
quite transcend, then it at least managed these interests for the clear benefit of a society 
that had been destroyed as a political entity for the previous 16 years.  
 
The genius, if it may be called that, of the Union of Islamic Courts was that they combined 
Somali traditions of community justice (known as xeer) with Islamic legal practices.741 The 
courts were the product of Somalia’s  
 
two most common denominators: clan and the traditional Islamic faith. The Islamist 
section in the courts did not have a particular agenda and were not presided over by 
expert Islamic judges, nor were they supporters of any specific school of Islamic law. 
The authority vested in the courts emanated from the decisions of the clan elders 
who established the institution and for enforcement of the courts’ judgments they 
relied on militias recruited from the local clans. The authority, therefore, derived 
primarily from Somali customary law known as xeer. Sharia was applied by default 
since no other legal system had functioned well since the collapse of the government 
in 1991.742 
 
Aidan Hartley, in his Unreported World, reported that the UIC undertook  
 
… serious efforts to get the economy going again, arrested pirates, ended banditry, 
subjected pirates and bandits to Sharia. Sheikh Sharif declared the waters of Somalia 
safe. Crime was severely curtailed with its attendant effects on security and popular 
consent. The courts handed down severe huddud sentences. Initially the courts were 
localised and decentralised; this is not surprising. Every neighbourhood had its own 
court.743  
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The UIC brought basic social and Sharia legal services:  
 
UIC rule brought very tangible benefits to the population and gave the Islamists the 
aura of a national liberation movement; human security improved remarkably, as 
girls went back to school, transaction costs for business shrunk, entire 
neighbourhoods were thoroughly cleaned and Mogadishu’s streets became safe 
again at night.744  
 
Hartley found the courts dealing with civil matters and the return of property to owners 
who had been dispossessed. 
 
Governance, if it might be called that, was mainly confined to the provision of dispute 
resolution and the enforcement of decisions. While some courts were connected to 
jihadists, many centred on the various clans. All the courts, of whatever clan, answered to a 
Supreme Council. In June 2006, they defeated the incumbent warlords to create what 
amounted to a government. At the very least, they were seen to have provided security in a 
country where none had been available, save localised gang governance by warlords. ‘They 
restored peace for the first time in 15 years’, and as a result began to garner support from 
business and hitherto unaligned clan leaders.745  
 
But it lasted only six months. Unfortunately, the benefits that were clear to Somalis were 
less than attractive to US and Ethiopian interests. In the words of the assistant secretary of 
state for African affairs: 
We remain deeply troubled that foreign terrorists associated with al-Qaida have 
succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Somalia. Somalia’s continued exploitation 
by terrorist elements threatens the stability of the entire Horn of Africa. We will 
therefore take strong measures to deny terrorists safe haven in Somalia, as well as 
the ability to plan and operate from Somalia. In this regard, the US continues to work 
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with East African countries to build their capacity to counter terrorism and 
criminality that originates in Somalia.746  
 
In fairness to the United States and its client/ally, Ethiopia, developments in Somalia might 
from their perspective have been seen as threatening. One clan, the Darod (one of the five 
dominant Somali clans) had become influenced by jihadism and had declared war on 
Christian Ethiopia. The internal politics of the increased influence of the Al Shabab 
movement and its allied groups are very complex and beyond the scope of this thesis.747 
Nonetheless, what is a matter for debate is the extent to which the reaction on the part of 
the United States and its failure to understand not only the internal dynamics of Somalia, 
but also the intense and ancient rivalry of the ‘Highlanders’ of Ethiopia and Somalia, made 
the situation worse.  
Genuine Ethiopian fear of Somali jihadist influence in its Somali region resulted in a full-scale 
invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, supported by the United States.  This brought the end of the 
UIC and the relapse of Somalia into clan-driven political chaos.  In turn the situation was 
made worse by the greatly increased influence of al Shabab, which continues today 
throughout much of Somalia, especially its south.  
The challenge of pluralism  
 
The issue of having more than one legal or dispute resolution system in the same area is 
known as ‘legal pluralism’. Some theorists regarded ‘legal centralism’ as a counterpoint to 
pluralism – i.e. the idea that one, usually state law, ‘is and should be the law of the state, 
uniform for all persons exclusive of all other law and administered by a single set of state 
institutions’.748 Others see legal centralism as ‘a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion’.749 As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the fact is that, in most (or indeed all) societies, there are multiple 
sources of dispute resolution.  
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The field of legal pluralism is large. It is essentially considered (particularly since the 1980s) 
to be a discrete field of the Anthropology of Law. There is a great deal of literature on it. 
However, as was pointed out in the introduction, it is only in the last decade that attention 
has been directed at its role in conflict – and indeed particularly in post-conflict. However, 
while the term and the academic discourse are relatively recent, the study and practice of 
rule in pluralist society can be identified as far back as 1772. In that year, a regulation of the 
East India Company provided: ‘In all suits regarding inheritance, marriage, caste and other 
religious usages and institutions, the laws of the Koran with respect to the mohamedans 
[sic] [etc.] shall be adhered to.’750 
For the purposes of retaining a modicum of order in colonial territories with apparently 
multiple sources of legal power, there was an awareness of the need to ensure that conflict 
was kept to a minimum. For over a century there was extensive discourse and writing on 
how colonial administrators should deal (and indeed had dealt) with the challenges of what 
is now called ‘customary law’.  
In colonial times – essentially the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of 
the twentieth – effective rule (or rule that was effective enough to maintain authority) was 
maintained over huge areas by a small number of administrators with minimum effort in 
terms of the imposition of ‘formal’ judicial (or indeed other) governmental functions. Many 
of the lessons identified by such regimes as the British, French and Ottoman empires have 
been forgotten in recent ‘counterinsurgency’ campaigns, which have focused more on 
‘formal’ structures, at the expense of more effective ‘light touch’ informal provision. 
 
The essence of the technique became known as ‘indirect rule’ which  
came to require that indigenous law [what might now be called ‘customary law’] be 
discovered, written down and made available for implementation. The assumption 
was that ‘native law’ could be recorded as a set of rules about how social life should 
be ordered and then applied by magistrates in the settlement of disputes.751  
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In almost all the areas of Africa and Asia governed by the British, this was the technique 
used, and (as will be seen) its heritage in written law and constitutions worldwide is 
considerable.  
The key work on ‘indirect rule’ was Frederick Lugard’s Dual Mandate.752 This is a long 
discourse about the nature of the imperial task, particularly in Africa, based on a deep and 
long engagement as a colonial administrator – mainly, but not exclusively, in West Africa.753 
‘Indirect rule’, as outlined in the book (where the term itself is rarely applied) amounted at 
the political level to devolved authority.754  
Lugard himself stated that ‘[p]rinciples do not change, but their mode of application should 
vary with the customs, the traditions and the prejudices of each (administrative) unit’.755 
There has been much debate as to what value jurisprudentially or morally should be placed 
on this approach. One highly regarded commentator characterises it thus: ‘The “customary 
law” recognised in colonial legislation and applied in the new “native courts” was a 
tendentious montage. Insecurely linked to the past it was a system supportive of colonial 
rule entrenching elders over juniors, men over women.’756 While indirect rule was indeed a 
matter of ad hoc improvisation, it made ‘a virtue of necessity’.757 
There are considerable dangers in overemphasising the British imperial experience or 
indeed its success.  As senior World Bank official and academic commentator on 
development and law has said Doug Porter puts it the ‘Dual Mandate’ model of customary 
authority, with its inherent emphasis of ‘recognition’ of local authority ‘constituted a single 
model of customary authority across Africa that mirrored images of traditional European 
monarchy and patriarchy.’758   He points out that when this approach encountered such 
fiercely autocephalous non-state societies such as the Yoruba and Ibo ‘this model came to 
grief’.759  
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This may indeed be so. In addition, it was the case that unpalatable societal norms were 
entrenched and minorities subjugated – things that today are utterly unacceptable. 
However, what indirect rule also did (albeit virtue from necessity) was to maintain a 
modicum of control, and indeed retain a modicum of acceptability, so that insurgencies 
were not able to get the necessary purchase in terms of legitimacy to sustain themselves. 
The tension between quixotic maintenance of firmly held (if metropolitan) ideals and 
strategic objectives was almost always resolved in favour of the latter in the British imperial 
project. It is true, as Santos has said, that ‘there is nothing inherently good, progressive or 
emancipatory about legal pluralism’.760 Nonetheless, the same might be said of legal 
centralism. For the strategic purposes of fighting an insurgency – or indeed preventing 
insurgency, as the British and French colonial authorities wanted to do761  – what mattered 
was ‘does it work?’.  
It was not only European imperial rulers who arrived at versions of indirect rule. In Ottoman 
Albania, particularly in the north the customary law known as the Kanun Lekë Dukagjini762 
was deeply embedded in the culture and society. This was a system founded on notions of 
honour and was not at all dissimilar to that found in contemporary Pashtun Afghanistan. 
There was a sense of Islamic polity, at least in those areas where Albanians were Muslim (by 
no means all of the country).763 However, despite the largely hands-off rule of the 
Ottomans, they did take exception to the ‘blood feud’, which, according to some 
commentators, claimed up to 19 per cent of male deaths and certainly constituted the 
major single cause of death for young males.764 But there was little that could be done 
about it. The tribes of the north of Albania in particular were regarded as almost impossible 
to control. It was the same in Yemen, where notions of blood feud and revenge were far 
stronger than centralising Ottoman governance and law. The Ottoman form of governance 
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in such places was minimalist. It relied on co-optation of local elites. There were concerted 
efforts to eliminate the old ways of the Kanun during the reign of King Zog in the 1920s and 
1930s, accompanied by the deployment of some Western police experts.765 This had 
minimal success. When the communist government took power in 1945, there was a largely 
successful effort, largely accompanied by extensive repression, to extend the control of 
central government (including criminal legal jurisdiction) over the previously ‘ungoverned’ 
space of Albania, particularly in the north of the country.  
 
Thomas Kuehn, in his survey of Ottoman governance in Yemen in the nineteenth century, 
says:  
 
Ottoman administrators came to insist that because of their ‘backwardness’ the 
locals had to be governed according to their customs and dispositions. The claims 
that a ‘culturally inferior people’ could, however, be mastered through a knowledge 
of their ways can also be read as a compensatory strategy that helped Ottoman 
officials come to terms with the discrepancy between the ideology of a civilising 
mission and the realities on the ground.766 
 
The Ottoman approach to ‘ungoverned space’ was consequently very similar to the ideas 
implemented by British administrators. There are interesting cognates in the way that, after 
a long period of trial and error, Ethiopia has, for the moment at least, settled upon a system 
of de facto ‘indirect rule’ at least over the difficult Somali Region.767 This is an area described 
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by one commentator as ‘a shameful stain, the poison at the heart of the Horn of Africa’.768  
 
The ideas of indirect rule, then, are still very much alive. For them to succeed, in the words 
of a leading contemporary commentator on law and insurgency:  
 
The implicit bargain struck between the center and the communities is that the local 
actors recognize the authority of the central government and the central 
government grants the local actors considerable autonomy.769  
 
For that to occur in turn requires a relatively strong local polity, secure enough in its 
independence to ensure an adequate degree of obedience, and compliant enough with the 
centre to ensure minimum interference. It requires personnel who are intimately familiar 
with local norms and practices. This is particularly the case when those actors are 
themselves foreign. And as has been seen, the ‘exogenous’ ruler can himself become a 
cause of insurgency.  
 
The politicals 
The means by which the British and other colonial powers administered these policies was 
through the locally appointed ‘political officer’. In the British and French cases these men 
were carefully selected from an academic and often military elite.770 On occasion they might 
be picked from ‘native’ leaders who had undergone a Western education.771  
Rory Stewart, in his work on contemporary interventions, counterpoints the experience of 
today’s inheritors of the tradition of the ‘politicals’ of the Indian civil service. He relates the 
career of John Lawrence. Having studied Indian languages and literature in India for three 
years, he was given his first posting in the service – to Delhi, where he served for 16 years. 
‘He spent that posting taking measurements in agricultural fields and hearing domestic 
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court cases in local languages.’772 His next 14 years were spent in the Punjab, involved in all 
matters of governance. His bailiwick included the ‘frontier’: ‘He came from a system whose 
career structure repeatedly rewarded experience in country and promoted people who had 
served in remote posts and displayed detailed knowledge of specific cultures.’ Lawrence 
was by no means an isolated example.  
 
Stewart contrasts such expertise with a contemporary equivalent he met in Afghanistan: 
 
 He, like most international civilians, was an expert in fields that hardly existed as 
 recently as the 1950s, and which are hardly household names today: Governance, 
 gender, conflict resolution, civil society, and public administration. They were not 
 experts on gender and governance in Afghanistan; they were experts in gender and 
 governance in the abstract. They had studied ‘lessons learned’ by their colleagues in 
 other countries and were aware of international ‘best practice’.773  
 
 There is, though, here a real risk of orientalism. It has been alleged that the views of some 
historians on the prowess and efficacy of the ‘politicals’ have been clouded by established 
views. Douglas Porch suggests that the expertise of many of these ‘politicals’ amounted to 
‘parachute expertise’,774 applying imported imperial ‘best practices’, which consisted 
generally of alternating between bribes and severe repression, rather than being grounded 
in true cultural fluency. This is corroborated to some extent by Christian Tripodi, arguably 
the leading scholar on the history of the ‘politicals’ on the North West Frontiers of India.775 
None of the much-trumpeted ‘cultural fluency’ exonerates the ‘politicals’ of the charge that 
their actions often in fact amounted to ‘imposing incomprehensible decisions on the locals 
behind an imaginary facade of cultural knowledge’, The same applied, he says, to the French 
‘bureaux Arabes’, who were working under similar doctrines to the British in their North 
African possessions.776  
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According to Porch, ‘Knowing the country might translate into nothing more than superficial 
platitudes that more or less mirrored the racism and integral nationalism of the age.’777 He 
goes on to quote several of the luminaries of the profession, including Lawrence, Gertrude 
Bell (both of whom worked in the Arab world) and Lord Frederick Lugard, who worked in 
West Africa: 
The autonomy and power of the political transformed them into a military sub-
species who might develop a highly romanticised view of the people they 
administered, act as their spokesmen and advocate policies that might put them at 
odds with the military hierarchy, not to mention other advisors, with their own 
psychological and emotional attachments to ‘their’ tribe.778 
As Porch concedes, though, the aim and purpose of the ‘politicals’ was, in essence, not to 
act as exemplars of culturally assimilated experts or anthropologists of their day, but to 
‘keep a lid’ on violence and disruption.779 There can be little doubt that they tended to 
succeed in that aim, at least at the tactical level. It should also be said that their ‘cultural 
expertise’ was not intended to work only one way. Many of them, indeed the great 
majority, were former Army officers, and part of the trouble they often had with their 
former military colleagues was in mediating the ways of the British and British Indian armies 
to the ‘natives’. In other words, their cultural knowledge of their own side – with its limits 
and advantages – was at least as important as the (admittedly often somewhat 
romanticised) expertise concerning ‘their’ tribes. Porch’s criticisms have force, but perhaps 
while others have romanticised the role of the ‘politicals’, there is little benefit to be derived 
from denigrating what were (as few could deny – not even Porch) highly qualified men, 
expert in their fields. 
One such was the original ‘hearts and minds’ advocate – a man who had lived most of his 
life in Victorian India: Robert Sandeman.780 ‘During his time as District Officer and 
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subsequently Chief Commissioner (a role very similar to Regional Governor), he extended 
the rule – or, to be precise, influence – of the Raj into Baluchistan. The technique he 
developed became known as the ‘Forward Policy’. Previously this had been somewhat 
discredited after the disastrous defeat of the British Army in the defiles between the Khyber 
Pass and Kabul in 1842. Sandeman devised a more subtle way of extending and maintaining 
control. Using a judicious combination of pay-offs and occasionally force, he extended 
British rule deep into Baluchistan, rejecting entirely the old attitude of the ‘Close Border’, 
which meant defending only the borders and making no effort to extend either them or 
British influence. Nowadays the method of rule might be described as ‘soft touch’, as there 
was little attempt to supplant local governance or laws. Sandeman took the view that British 
interests and secure borders depended more on ensuring friendly neighbours than on 
threatening neutral or hostile ones, and conquest by military force was simply not going to 
achieve that.  
 
The Sandeman system seemed simple: ‘You made friends with the tribes, you dealt with 
them through their chiefs, you paid tribesmen to patrol your communications, you adhered 
to tribal custom and settled disputes by jirgas and not through law courts. You tried to solve 
all problems peacefully, but you kept an effective military force ready and visible; and from 
time to time you extended your control by the construction of roads and forts.’781  
Olaf Caroe, another British political officer, made a bold claim: ‘The Raj ticked because on 
the whole the people recognised the administration liked the people.’782 While now that 
claim may seem somewhat simplistic and perhaps even quixotic, it was based on many 
decades of hard-earned experience. One aspect of Porch’s criticism does, however, hit 
home and has resonance today, when matters of intelligence and their application to 
Afghanistan in particular are concerned: ‘As the Raj grew, information became mangled, 
fragmented, dated, increasingly esoteric and useless as it passed through congealed layers 
of bureaucracy. While the Mughals [the previous ruling dynasty in India] had used 
information to inform power, exercise moral suasion and increase legitimacy, the British 
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operationalised it in the police and army.’783 In other words, damagingly, intelligence began 
to be seen as a matter relevant primarily to security. The importance of wider knowledge 
and awareness was under-prioritised and continues to be under-prioritised.784 
 
Although General Templer believed he was responsible for that ‘nauseating phrase I think I 
invented’, he was not. The famous term ‘hearts and minds’ is not a recent invention. It was 
first coined in this context by one C.E. Bruce, a man who had spent 30 years on the Frontier 
as an administrator – even longer than Lawrence: ‘To be successful on the frontier, a man 
has to deal with the hearts and minds of the people and not their fears.’ Even if that 
somewhat overworked phrase is accepted on face value, surely in order to ‘deal with’ those 
hearts and minds, one should have some understanding of what such organs actually want, 
and to understand that such desires may not be in accordance with Western mores. 
Colonial legal solutions 
In some ways, the foregoing discussion is concerned at least as much with governance as it 
is with lawfare. That experience of the ‘politicals’ fed into profoundly informed debate on 
how ‘indirect’ the British policies should be. This debate , of which Lugard’s ‘Dual Mandate’ 
was an African expression, was especially fierce around the borders with Afghanistan. Much 
of this was caused by (or rather occasioned by) the legal means by which the Pashtun 
people govern themselves, based on the code which defines them, the Pashtunwali. There 
was no role for the state in this code. It certainly did not accept the basic tenets of British or 
Western law, whose central pillar is that it is for the state, not the individual, to correct 
criminal wrongs.  
 
The Raj dealt with this in legal terms: not by trying to impose an alien way of thought, but by 
accepting that it was not going to change and incorporating it into its own law, in the 
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR – see below), which allowed the tribes themselves to deal 
with crimes. This was a framework which exists, not without considerable controversy, even 
today. The cultural supremacism we see today in the form of legal centralism was, to all 
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practical purposes, virtually absent.  
 
The Frontier Crimes Regulations went through several iterations (in 1873 and 1876) before 
being redrafted in 1947, prior to the independence of India and Pakistan. As matters stand, 
constitutionally the President of Pakistan has direct executive authority.785 That authority is 
exercised though political agents, direct successors of the political officers of the Raj. Indeed 
the ‘agents’ were directly subordinate to the very few political officers. At the time of the 
Raj, the agents were almost always ethnically Indian (or now Pakistani) in any event. Clearly 
this ensured a relatively smooth transition of authority in the tribal areas. 
 The Frontier Crimes Regulations comprise lengthy and complex provisions, but may be 
summarised as permitting tribal authorities in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan786 to 
dispense justice in what outsiders would call criminal matters, in a manner that those across 
the border and working for the ‘international community’ would call ‘informal’. Because 
there is no separate category of ‘crime’ in Pashtunwali, the FCR rules often adjudicate in 
other disputes as well, by way of jirga. This is to say by means of jirgas. Those decisions are 
reported to the political agent for validation and approval. The FCR are the subject of 
constant criticism by Pakistani courts and NGOs for their failure to conform to any notion, 
national or international, of human rights standards.787 This has been the case for decades. 
However, workable alternatives are few indeed. For present purposes, what the FCR do is 
allow government to ensure some form of oversight in territories which have defied such 
oversight for centuries and continue to defy it today in Afghanistan.  
Two points arise out of the FCR and their application. First, they are founded on well over a 
century of negotiation, both literal and military, learned discussion and debate, and hard 
practical experience. This system is not burdened by any difficulty arising out of what legal 
development practitioner Thomas Carothers has termed the ‘problem of knowledge’:788 
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however beset it may be by other problems concerning human rights, the FCR have been 
shown to function.789 
This somewhat basic discussion of pre-1947 British practices on the North West Frontier of 
the Empire has two purposes. First, it illustrates a central argument of this thesis that 
dispute resolution is central to governance. The key role of the political was to mediate 
disputes. The central debate of the Frontier – ‘forward’ versus ‘close’ – revolved around 
how governance should be exercised. The solution arrived at – and the solution which, to a 
very great extent, still subsists – was what amounted to a modified ‘close’ policy, for the 
simple reason that it proved impossible to extend state structures, beginning with courts, to 
those frontier areas. To return to the quote above on the subject of the Sandeman system: 
‘You made friends with the tribes, you dealt with them through their chiefs, you paid 
tribesmen to patrol your communications, you adhered to tribal custom and settled 
disputes by jirgas and not through law courts. You tried to solve all problems peacefully, but 
you kept an effective military force ready and visible.’790 The only part of the Sandeman 
system in Baluchistan which did not comfortably translate to the Pashtun lands was the 
gradual extension of forts and military infrastructure.  
Similar approaches were taken to the continuation of indigenous legal practices throughout 
the British imperial project.  
In Sudan, for example, the analogue to the Frontier Crimes Regulations was the Chiefs 
Courts Ordinance of 1931.791 This followed the Civil Justice Ordinance 1929, which had 
similar effect. Rather than attempting the task of imposing a ‘state’ legal model, it accepted 
the authority of the Customary Courts of Sudan. There was a qualification to this 
acceptance: 
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The Chiefs’ Court shall administer the Native Law and Customs prevailing in the area 
over which the Court exercises its jurisdiction provided that such Native Law and 
Custom is not contrary to justice, morality or order.792 
The Chiefs Courts Ordinance was ‘the most important legal milestone in Sudanese history in 
the North as well as the South’, setting the tone for the approach to be taken in all parts of 
Sudan.793 Although repealed in 1977, after Sudanese independence, the central importance 
of customary law was recognised by the People’s Local Courts Act 1977. In South Sudan, the 
1929 Civil Justice Ordinance was absorbed in its essence into the New South Sudanese legal 
system with the introduction of the Local Government Act 2009, which codifies the role and 
function of customary courts.794 At the time of the British occupation of Sudan, there was no 
significant resistance, and therefore little or nothing in the way of ‘insurgency’. It is argued 
here that the fact that there was no attempt to impose ‘state’ forms of justice and 
governance on a society that centred on customary justice may have played a role in 
ensuring that there was no such insurgency, as the added casus belli of imposed rule was 
not present. To that extent, what was in fact an ‘exogenous’ government could credibly take 
the form of an endogenous one. As anthropologist of law Simon Roberts puts it:  
What was perhaps distinctive of the British colonial project was the concurrent 
imagination and reconstruction abroad of a metropolitan legal order and the making 
of explicit arrangements for the qualified survival of local governmental 
arrangements and normative orders.795  
In a chapter in Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War Torn Societies Francis Deng 
observes that the years since British rule ended have brought incremental Islamisation, civil 
war and intense, continuing conflict. Nonetheless the legacy of the Sudanese version of the 
Dual Mandate in the south of the country remains strong.796 He quotes a senior South 
Sudanese judge, Judge Biong Mijak Deng: ‘The first colonialists – the British, were to some 
extent more lenient, merciful and sympathetic to our traditions than our second colonialists 
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– the Arab, Muslim minority clique based in the capital Khartoum. I for one thank the British 
for protecting our culture, identity and customs.’797 Clearly that statement is rather loaded 
with presumptions and the legacy of recent conflict. Author Francis Deng however makes it 
very clear that customary law in Southern Sudan has retained a very strong influence in the 
country, despite the years of conflict.  
From the above it may be clear that developing and operating such a legal strategy requires 
a fairly deep knowledge of the environment in which the insurgency is taking place. This 
might be characterised in military terms as ‘intelligence preparation of the battlespace’. This 
is exactly the form of knowledge possessed by many of the ‘politicals’ of the British imperial 
effort. The case being made in this thesis is not a moral defence of colonial ‘Dual Mandate’ 
thinking. Nor does it advocate a particularly positive approach to the imperial legacy. Rather 
it aspires to demonstrate that in some areas the ‘Dual Mandate’ approach, as adopted in 
various forms by governors of ‘ungoverned space’, acted as a means of preventing 
insurgency, and indeed as a counterinsurgency weapon, devolving as it did a great degree of 
practical authority to deeply embedded and arguably legitimate institutions.798  
Notwithstanding Porch’s points, it is true that many advisors or politicals, at least when 
compared to those deployed on today’s operations, were knowledgeable and aware of the 
environment within which they worked and their approaches represented a real effort to 
innovate and adapt to their environments. However, a case can be made that Stewart’s 
complaint about the supposed ‘generic’ knowledge of current ‘experts’ might also be 
relevant to imperial administrators. 
In his study of the British experience in administering Iraq in the early twentieth century, 
Inventing Iraq, Toby Dodge expresses great reservations about the capabilities of such 
administrators:  
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 Inserted into an unfamiliar society and charged with building the institutions of a 
 modern state, British colonial officials had little choice but to strive to understand 
 Iraq in terms that were familiar to them.799  
What is particularly interesting about this observation is that it might almost have been 
made about contemporary ‘stabilisation’ officers and officials. Dodge’s particular point is 
that many of the colonial officers carried their experience of India with them to Iraq: ‘The 
general influence of colonial India on those serving in Iraq is hard to over-estimate.’800 They 
did so, Dodge argues compellingly, with extremely damaging effect, particularly with respect 
to the way they imported ideas and approaches concerning land tenure and law. As briefly 
noted in the previous chapter, this, Dodge suggests, laid the foundation for problems in land 
tenure that persist to this day. Such experience as British-Indian administrators had was no 
more applicable in post-Ottoman Mesopotamia than it was in Victorian Britain. 
As observed above, other commentators have attacked the characterisation of these 
officers as highly effective operators. As we have seen, Douglas Porch calls their knowledge 
‘parachute expertise’, replete with orientalist presumptions. Nonetheless, the Pakistani, 
West African and Sudanese experiences would tend to show that the solutions arrived at 
(admittedly after many decades of controversy) were and are sustained in their essence. 
Why this may be is beyond the remit of this thesis; however, though as individuals these 
officials may have had their faults, at least the corporate knowledge of the institutions they 
served was very great. Furthermore, there was clearly an element of trial and error that 
took place over many decades in all imperial possessions, and this institutional learning fed 
into the legal approach taken to support the aims of the missions. This applies particularly in 
areas where the ‘counterinsurgents’ are indeed of the same nationality and background as 
the ‘insurgents’. 
The current approach: stabilisation and the ‘rule of law’ 
The contemporary avatar of the imperial state-building project in conflict-affected states is 
called ‘stabilisation’. This in turn is currently, in doctrine, carried out by means of what was, 
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until recently, named the ‘comprehensive approach’ (and is now generally termed the 
‘integrated’ approach). Such an ‘approach’  
 
 refers to people from different institutions (with particular reference to civilian and 
 military institutions) working together at several levels to achieve common aims. An 
 integrated approach recognises that no one government department has a 
 monopoly over responses to the challenges of stabilisation contexts and that by 
 making best use of the broad range of knowledge, skills and assets of government 
 departments, integrated efforts should be mutually reinforcing.801 
 
Western doctrine and practice in dealing with all civilian aspects of conflict is extensively 
expounded in military802 and, to a lesser extent, civilian803 doctrine. The ‘comprehensive 
approach’, which entered the vocabulary of British government in 2006, tended to be 
viewed with suspicion by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and also (perhaps 
surprisingly) the Department for International Development. Although its central idea is a 
‘whole of government approach’, Professor Hew Strachan observed that: ‘For them it was 
stamped “Made in the Ministry of Defence”.’ The Ministry of Defence enjoyed a much larger 
budget than either the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or DFID, and Strachan suggested 
that it may be trying to take them over.804 
Critics of British efforts Robert Egnell and David Ucko agree:  
We are left with the ‘comprehensive approach’, a mere rhetorical device that 
purports to mobilize a massive interdepartmental bureaucracy, much of which is 
domestically focused, for the purpose of co-ordinated campaigns conducted 
abroad.805  
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There can be little doubt about the extensive ambition inherent in the idea of ‘stabilisation’. 
In his Counterinsurgent’s Constitution, Ganesh Sitaraman, while generally accepting many of 
the premises of ‘rule of law development’, albeit with a highly nuanced perspective, 
acknowledges that ‘[c]reating a resilient full-spectrum order may appear virtually impossible 
across a vast territory’.806 The necessary resources for state-building are substantial, but are 
rarely forthcoming, either in terms of material or human resources. Time is also a major 
issue – perhaps the most important, as most Western-type polities took centuries to 
develop. In current interventions ‘external actors often seek to exit immediately despite the 
fact that state-building is a long term process’.807  An advisor to a senior Afghan minister 
responsible for the justice sector told me ‘helping a country with its justice system is so 
fraught with conflict risks it has to have a long term approach and a consistency of multi 
agency donor and international community effort.  However it is vital to understand that 
ownership of these dynamics must be local.  It is also important to see that ‘stabilisation’ is 
not state-building.’808  
While they are present in their theatres of operation, the current approach is strongly 
focused on notions of ‘the rule of law’, which is said to be ‘fundamental to legitimate 
governance’.809  
 
What is ‘rule of law’? 
The term ‘rule of law’ has been referred to several times in this thesis. What is the ‘rule of 
law’ and how does it fit into an idea of lawfare in the context of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, as understood today?  
Credit for the term ‘rule of law’ in English has generally been given to the nineteenth-
century jurist, Professor A.V. Dicey. He traced the idea back to Aristotle, who said that it was 
‘better for the law to rule than one of the citizens’, and went on ‘so that even the guardians 
of the laws are obeying the laws’.810  
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Since Dicey, these principles have come in for significant criticism and have undergone 
change, although the general ideas remain. Lord Bingham, arguably the leading British judge 
of the late twentieth century has drawn eight general characteristics of ‘rule of law’ which 
are now commonly quoted: 
 The law must be accessible and intelligible. 
 Questions of rights and liability should be settled by law and not discretion. 
 Laws should apply equally to all. 
 The law should afford protection for basic human rights. 
 There should be reasonable access to courts and mechanisms of justice. 
 Ministers should exercise their powers in good faith without exceeding the 
prescribed limits. 
 Adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair. 
 The state should comply with its obligations in international legal treaty and 
practice.811 
Other leading thinkers have come up with slightly different formulations.812 It may well be 
that these definitions of ‘rule of law’ are adequate for Western, or Western-type systems, 
but simply not applicable to systems and societal norms outside the ‘Western paradigm’. 
There is extensive debate in the legal developmental literature concerning the validity of the 
‘Rule of Law’ in societies where the state has no legitimate monopoly of force.  H Patrick 
Glenn, a Canadian professor of law and noted expert on legal systems identifies four 
objections to ideas of the universality of the ‘rule of law’.813  First, as stated above, there is 
no agreement as to what it is; second, even in its heartland of what he calls the ‘Western 
jurisdictions’ the ‘rule of law’ seems to be failing, especially for the poor due to the sheer 
costs of going to court; third he claims that there is a disconnect between the idea of ‘rule of 
law’ from its implementation in that it is essentially institution-focussed; fourth, it is 
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‘unquestionably Western in origin and in content’.814  Some of these ideas will be explored 
below in Section 3 below.  
In its classical definitions however ‘Rule of law’ is thought to promote legitimacy in two 
ways: first, by restraining and defining the parameters of the state, thereby ensuring that a 
sense of justice is at least possible; and second, by providing a service. That service in turn 
affects and promotes the idea of a state by reinforcing the state’s power. Or so the theory 
would suggest:  
Thus, when the government provides dispute resolution services it is both providing 
a beneficial service and simultaneously claiming the authority to resolve disputes. If 
the population accepts that claim by using the government’s dispute resolution 
services, their perception of the government is likely enhanced by the value of the 
service and the government’s legitimacy is simultaneously enhanced as against all 
rivals.815  
 
Rule of law and the problem of knowledge 
 
‘And most difficult of all they came armed with laws and regulations which had not 
necessarily any relevance whatever to the standards by which a Pathan society lived.’816 
Moving from governance in general to the specifics of legal reform in the contemporary 
context, the field of assistance related to the justice systems of ‘countries in transition’ is 
known as ‘rule of law development’.  
This was a strongly evolving activity throughout the 1970s–1990s, with much work done 
particularly in Latin America. It was with the fall of the Soviet Union and the consequent 
opening up of the former satellite states of Eastern Europe that the field really began to 
expand. In some ways, the golden age of ‘rule of law development’ was the 1990s. During 
this period, there was a rapid evolution of ideas, as it became clear to many, if not all, 
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practitioners that simply transposing apparently successful Western systems onto evidently 
unsuccessful ‘eastern’ justice systems was not working. Even in countries with strong 
European legal traditions, it became clear that there was more to this task than cutting and 
pasting constitutions or, even worse, systems of litigation and justice. It was, in fact, entirely 
analogous to transplanting organs without troubling to assess such matters as blood group. 
 In the former Soviet Union itself, this idea of simple transplant caused lasting damage, with 
US-style property systems, derived from medieval English law, being applied in Russia, a 
country with a legal tradition equal to any other. As experience began to grow in the late 
1990s, a more nuanced attitude began to take root, with far more attention being paid to 
the traditions of the countries themselves. The idea of the ‘cookie-cutter approach’ as an 
actively destructive mechanism began to take hold. Rule of law justice development 
providers ‘do not have much interest in non-Western forms of law, in traditional systems of 
justice, or, in the case of some American rule of law experts, even in civil law’. The result is 
the ‘cookie cutter syndrome’817 – a ‘breathtakingly mechanistic approach involving drafting, 
construction and training’.818 In recent interventions, matters have not improved: ‘practices 
… have come to have an almost template-like quality’.819  
 One of the leading theorists and practitioners of ‘rule of law development’ is Thomas 
Carothers, who took the view that ‘law is not just the sum of courts, legislatures, police, 
prosecutions and other formal institutions with some direct connection to law’; it is also a 
‘normative system that resides in the minds of the citizens of a society’.820 This is as true, 
incidentally, in the United Kingdom as it is in Afghanistan. It is surely the case that most 
disputes are resolved before they ever get near the courts, through negotiation or 
compromise. 
Fashions in ‘rule of law’ 
In an essay in Foreign Affairs as long ago as 1998, Thomas Carothers observed: ‘One cannot 
get through a foreign policy debate these days without someone proposing the ‘rule of law’ 
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as a solution to the world’s problems.’821 Yet over the decades it has become very clear that 
there is little agreement on what ‘rule of law’ is, although there has been rather more, 
paradoxically, on how it should be imposed. What ‘rule of law’ is and its rationale depends 
to a large degree on who you are. For those who place stress on commercial development, 
particularly market advocates, ‘rule of law’ must promote market ideals, such as sanctity of 
contract and property. One leading advocate of this is the Peruvian activist Hernando De 
Soto: ‘Simply put, formal law is the foundation of the market system, essential to the 
development of corporations, limited liability contracts and an adequate business 
environment.’822 It has ‘become a new credo in the development field that if developing and 
post-communist countries wish to succeed economically they must develop the rule of 
law’.823 
For human rights activists, ‘rule of law’ is necessary and should be founded on the basic 
principles to which most Western societies are contracted. This approach focuses on the 
need for due process, equality before the law, accountability, etc. The focus for human 
rights advocates is safeguards against executive power.  
There is another perspective, in no way recent: what might now be called the ‘security’ 
perspective. Within counterinsurgency operations, this is usually packaged under the catch-
all shibboleth of ‘security sector reform’, within which ‘rule of law development’ is, in 
practice, subverted to the extent that police and security apparatuses are given the 
preponderance of attention, often at the expense of the mechanisms necessary to make 
those apparatuses work in a way consistent with COIN principles. As will be seen, I initially 
deployed under a ‘rule of law’ flag (the UK’s) that was concerned predominantly with 
counternarcotics.  
Most ‘rule of law’ specialists are lawyers. The significance of this is that ‘lawyers often have 
relatively formalistic views of legal change and are slow to take up the developmental, 
process-oriented issues that have come to inform work in other areas of socioeconomic or 
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socio-political change’. The assumption among lawyers newly involved in the field, 
understandably perhaps, has been that ‘if we build it they will come’.824 An example of this 
approach is the case of Major Mullins, outlined below. 
Thomas Carothers coined the phrase ‘problem of knowledge’, and identified several 
ingredients that would ensure the failure of ‘rule of law development’ to meet its 
objectives.825 
First there is the inherent complexity of ‘rule of law development’ itself. In any society, the 
theory and practice of law and legality, or of the settlement of disputes, is intensely 
complex. That complexity is all the greater when the requirement is to attempt to reform 
the ‘rule of law’ – or, as we will see in Afghanistan, to create it in another country. This is the 
essence of the closely related second problem – the particularity of legal systems,826 in that 
most mature systems have evolved organically over many years, sometimes centuries.  Such 
evolution cannot be replicated in a few years.  
Third, there is an acute problem of institutional learning. The British armed forces 
differentiate between a lesson being learned and one being identified, and this distinction is 
as evident in the ‘rule of law’ world as it is in the military. The difficulty of institutional 
learning is compounded by the regular turnover of positions and personnel. In turn, this has 
a tendency to produce staccato and inconsistent approaches.  
Fourth, there is the problem of a lack of applied research: those who write on this topic, 
says Carothers, have tended not to have been practitioners. Finally, there is the problem 
that most practitioners in ‘rule of law development’ have tended to be lawyers, who are 
trained and conditioned to take formalistic and process-oriented approaches to almost any 
question. Even the most broad-minded and informed theorists and practitioners make 
deeply cultural assumptions, and this is as true of lawyers as of any other profession. 
Supplementing that problem there are the internal tensions of assistance missions 
themselves, which may contain members with little experience of legal or any other form of 
development work. 
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These complexities may have contributed to a ‘template’ approach to ‘rule of law 
development’. In a landmark essay, Golub summarised the problem as follows: 
this ‘top-down’, state-centered approach concentrates on law reform and 
government institutions, particularly judiciaries, to build business-friendly legal 
systems that presumably spur poverty alleviation. Other development organizations 
use the rule of law (ROL) orthodoxy’s state-centered approach to promote such 
additional goals as good governance and public safety. The problems with the 
paradigm are not these economic and political goals, per se, but rather its 
questionable assumptions, unproven impact, and insufficient attention to the legal 
needs of the disadvantaged.827  
As will be seen, it is evident that ten years after those words were written, this is the 
dominant approach to counterinsurgent lawfare in insurgency zones. 
Military lawyers have become heavily involved in the ‘rule of law’ development world, 
particularly, but not exclusively, in operational combat zones. ‘Rule of law’ became 
something of a fashionable additional construct to the counterinsurgency campaign in 
Afghanistan in 2009. Handbooks were drafted and printed.828 ‘Rule of law green zones’829 
were proposed and a ‘rule of law ambassador’ appointed.830 Vast resources were ploughed 
into this activity, which acquired a far higher profile in the overall effort. A ‘rule of law field 
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force’ was developed,831 with a highly conservative approach to ‘rule of law’ and a strong 
adherence to the ‘rule of law orthodoxy’.  
The United States ‘Rule of Law Handbook’ was produced in at least two editions.832 This is a 
comprehensive guide for Judge Advocates of the US Army who are to be deployed on ‘rule 
of law operations’. As an introduction to legal systems that such officers may encounter, it is 
indeed a comprehensive guide. There are extensive sections on ‘key players in rule of law’ 
and ‘fiscal considerations’ (the systems used by United States government agencies). There 
are ‘theater-specific’ sections on Iraq and Afghanistan. There is little, however, on the 
challenge posed by insurgents and their own countervailing courts systems;833 nor, 
interestingly, is there any extended reference to other US doctrine on insurgency, 
particularly FM 3-24 (necessarily the 2006 edition),834 with its extensive focus on legitimacy. 
The result is that there is little linkage made between the ‘rule of law’ element of operations 
and the rest of the counterinsurgent effort. Overall, the handbook is a straightforward 
military restatement of civilian ‘rule of law development’ ideas, with a strong emphasis on 
Golub’s ‘rule of law orthodoxy’.  
Section 2 : Contemporary counterinsurgency lawfare: the case of Afghanistan 
The Afghan background 
The early twentieth-century controversies concerning the ‘forward’ or ‘close’ policies in 
what would now be called the ‘ungoverned space’ of the North West Frontier have, to some 
extent, replayed themselves in Afghanistan, as will be seen.835 The insurgency in Afghanistan 
over the 13 years from 2001 to 2014 provides an example of how the lack of a coherent and 
informed ‘lawfare’ strategy, dovetailing with the absence of a political and military strategy, 
can allow insurgents to take the conceptual space which counterinsurgency theorists 
believe to be decisive.  
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Afghanistan’s first effective constitution was approved in 1923 under Amanullah Khan. 
Subsequently, a more comprehensive constitution was passed in 1964 by King Zahir Shah. It 
is that constitution which formed the basis for the current (2004) version, although there 
were others in 1977 and 1990. It is fair to say that the only time the country had anything 
approaching a working judicial system, however ramshackle, was during the reign of Zahir 
Shah (1933–73). Formal justice was, however, something of an urban phenomenon, with 
traditional mechanisms continuing to operate at the village level, where the great majority 
of Afghans live.836 
 
The country is now an Islamic republic, where the default legal position (if specific laws or 
constitutional provisions do not apply) is use of the Sharia. To that extent, the legal system 
is similar to that of Egypt, and indeed the same Islamic jurisprudential line of authority 
(Hanafi) is consulted where there are no provisions in the state law. This is the same system 
that was in use until the late 1970s – essentially until President Daoud was deposed. 
Quranic punishments were used (huddud) and the system more or less functioned, 
presumably with notional central control. There was a network of judges in each province, 
some of whom were qualified, but all of whom were (to a greater or lesser extent) 
knowledgeable about Sharia. It is this Sharia-based system from which the Taliban draw 
their procedure. 
 
The Soviet invasion 
 
In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded, or intervened to preserve order, depending on one’s 
perspective. The following decade brought the most costly war in terms of lives in 
Afghanistan’s bloody history. The Soviet 40th Army supported an Afghan government and 
army in what might be called stabilisation operations. While the damage that the Soviets did 
to Afghanistan is often rightly stressed, what is less frequently related is the commitment 
the Soviet Union had to the civilian effort. Some of the accounts from the time are redolent 
of more recent activities. The following was written by a Soviet civilian who had deployed to 
Afghanistan in support of military efforts: 
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 But now a power had arisen in this land that wanted to drag the people from out of 
their superstition, to give children the chance to go to school, peasants the 
possibility to plough their fields with tractors instead of oxen, sworn to see the world 
directly instead of through the eye slits of the chador.837 
 
The Soviet civilian efforts in what would now be called ‘stabilisation’ were of a scale and 
nature far greater than that deployed by the more recent coalition. Hundreds of 
infrastructural projects were completed, and they trained tens of thousands of experts in 
the Soviet Union.838 Security was at least manageable in the larger centres. However, as 
recent events have shown, inputs are not necessarily related to outputs or outcomes. In the 
justice sector there is little evidence of any remaining legacy of Soviet efforts – save for the 
many officials with excellent Russian language skills.839 
 
How counterinsurgency has met the challenge in Afghanistan 
Traditional counterinsurgency of the kind practised in Afghanistan and elsewhere over the 
last decade has seen justice as part of the entire governmental ‘piece’: as simply another 
form of service provision by the government, and one that fits within another huge 
construct, the ‘security sector’. As this thesis attempted to demonstrate in Chapter 3, 
insurgents often see justice as rather more than that: they see it as a key part of their 
project to insinuate their control into the society they aspire to rule. 
The problems of culture and knowledge are multi-layered and wickedly complex. This is true 
at the most basic level of ‘cultures’ and the assumptions carried within them – the 
imperium, so to speak, of anthropology and, in military terms ‘human terrain’. As Carothers 
points out, however, those cultural assumptions can go deeper. It is here that we get into 
the deep waters of jurisprudence and the analysis of legal systems. For present purposes we 
need not wade out too far into those waters.  
                                                          
837
 Quoted in Braithwaite, Rod, Afghantsy (Profile Books, 2011), p149 
838
 Robinson, Paul and Dixon, Jay, Aiding Afghanistan (Hurst, 2012), p1 
839
 As an anecdotal point, almost all the author’s contacts in Helmand’s security and justice institutions had 
been trained, often for years, in the Soviet Union and spoke fluent Russian 
240 
 
As seen above, the Western ‘rule of law’ paradigm is based around some apparently 
anodyne and straightforward ideas. In most state-based systems these are, at the very least, 
a recognisable aspiration. Unfortunately, in practice the ideal of an independent and 
impartial tribunal is far from common. Indeed, east of Vienna it is far more the exception 
than the reality, with judges and courts being bywords for corruption and venality, and all 
too often regarded as part of the problem of crime rather than an element in its solution.840  
‘If we build it they will come’: the case of Major Mullins 
Major Jeffrey Mullins appointed Judge Advocate for the 101st Airborne Division’s 4th 
Brigade Combat Team from March 2008 to March 2009.841 The Brigade Combat Team was 
deployed to Regional Command East and based in the Afghan province of Khost. As a 
military lawyer, Mullins’ role was slightly different from the usual operational legal 
attachment. It is normal on operations for military lawyers to be confined to advising 
commanders on the legality of their units’ actions. This can take many forms: an operational 
lawyer is often concerned with the legality of the application of armed force in combat, 
advising on targets and, on occasion, the degree or even type of force that might be legal. 
There are usually tetchy issues connected to detention practice or policy. British operational 
lawyers, for example, spend a very great deal of their time writing reports on whether 
particular use of force has been justified.  
Major Mullins’ task presumably included all these tasks. Additionally, he was specifically 
deployed in support of the counterinsurgency mission of his brigade, as part of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). They perceived their task in classic 
counterinsurgency terms, to separate the insurgents from the population. This was 
interpreted as requiring the brigade to ‘support the Afghan government in a manner where 
the Afghan leaders were at the forefront’. He was granted authority to ‘move out 
aggressively’ in developing his ‘rule of law’ programmes. On the third day of his 15 month 
deployment, he left his base on a convoy to see for himself what he describes as ‘one of the 
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largest rule of law programmes ever initiated in Afghanistan’ – the Khost Law Centre, set up 
as a ‘one-stop shop’ for judicial and legal services. The centre was funded under the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). This is a scheme under which field 
commanders are given a considerable sum of money for projects that they feel will be 
‘consent winning’. There were several other ‘rule of law’ related activities. One was a 
continuing legal education project to assist local lawyers in maintaining their skills. 
Significant investment was made in books and equipment, although, in keeping with the 
ideal of having as much as possible ‘Afghan led’, the instruction was delivered by Afghan 
lawyers. In due course, it was assessed that this training was better delivered in Kabul. 
There was also an innovative plan to ensure that ‘jingly truck’ drivers caught stealing 
promised not to do so again.  
Mullins regarded the Khost Justice Centre as his highest-priority project: ‘it was the most 
necessary of the ‘rule of law’ projects. Insurgents need to be prosecuted and convicted if 
guilty. Judges and prosecutors need a safe work environment where they are not gunned 
down walking to work.
 
Afghanistan needs provincial level justice centers in each province.’  
There had been attacks on several legal figures in Khost, most notably the fatal shooting of 
the provincial chief judge. The centre itself was to be constructed in an area 300 yards long 
and 150 yards wide. It was to contain 13 judicial buildings, including offices for judges, 
defence lawyers, a pre-trial detention facility for those awaiting trial and disposal, a 
conference facility and administrative block. There would be a new courthouse, separate 
office space for lawyers involved in trials and an office for court clerks. ‘This became my pet 
project’, Mullins states. After some difficulties gaining approval from the Afghan and US 
authorities, Mullins began his task. 
 It was agreed that this was to be an entirely Afghan-run operation, once it was constructed. 
The US military would have no involvement whatsoever. The project was briefed to Afghan 
national legal figures in Kabul, including the attorney general and the director of the 
Supreme Court. It took several months from the last of these meetings for the Afghan 
figures, in Mullins’ words, to ‘contemplate the memorandum of agreement that had been 
presented to them’. There were serious problems with co-ordination of almost every 
organisational matter, ranging from which department would fund the running costs, to 
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who was responsible for the security of judges. It seems that these questions were in due 
course resolved.  
One other issue, typical of the practical problems that arise late in such projects, was that 
there was no well. The Americans solved this problem quickly. In December 2008, the 
formal agreement handing over the centre to Afghan control was signed. This was now an 
official Afghan judicial compound: ‘The only problem is, no-one is using it.’ With a candour 
quite extraordinary in what amounts to a military manual, Mullins reflects on the failure to 
make this flagship development work: 
 Failing to use the Khost Justice Center has a cost that goes beyond the wasted time 
 and resources that went into building it; building the justice center and not using it is 
 likely worse than not building it in the first place. If, even with a safe, secure location 
 for prosecutions, insurgents are still not being prosecuted, the insurgents have 
 won.842   
A tactical lawfare perspective: the case of the British in Helmand 2006–14 
As if in direct reproach to the Weberian paradigms discussed in Chapter 1, there are and 
were at least five different entities providing dispute resolution in Helmand and the rest of 
southern Afghanistan.843  
 
1. The Afghan Government’s formal judicial system (judges, prosecutors and other 
Ministry of Justice staff), including Hukkuk – a state-funded system of mediation and 
settlement, largely using Islamic Sharia law as its foundation. It is often the first port 
of call for those in dispute. 
2. Afghan Government officials (usually the District Governor (DG) and District Chief of 
Police (DCOP)). These officials act to resolve disputes in a similar way to elders. 
3. The tribal elders themselves, in the form of jirgas or shuras. It was this system that 
was used in the dispute over the treatment of people by police officer ‘Khan’ (see 
below). They use Pashtunwali and its procedures to ground their decisions. 
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4. The mullahs, in their de officio capacity as interpreters of Sharia. This is the 
traditional method used in Afghanistan for the resolution of legal disputes. Disputes 
are settled using much the same procedure as that used by the Taliban. This system, 
however, like the Pashtunwali, has fallen into disuse, as traditional society has 
fragmented due to the constant wars, which have resulted in a constant flow of 
refugees.844  
5. The Taliban, who, as has been seen, have taken advantage of the weaknesses of the 
other forms of justice provision. 
 
An illustration of the way in which there can be what amounts to ‘forum-shopping’ in this 
kind of legal and judicial environment is illustrated by the example of ‘Abdul’ in 2007:  
 
‘Abdul’, an employee of the Provincial Reconstruction Team run by British civilian 
and military ‘development’ experts found himself in a dispute with his mother-in-
law, who had formed the view that he had kidnapped his wife (her daughter) by 
virtue of having failed to pay the full bride price. In fact, the woman concerned was 
mentally ill and had forgotten that Abdul had in fact married her daughter and paid 
the bride price some months previously. She reported Abdul to the local Afghan 
National Police checkpoint in Lashkar Gah, alleging kidnap and rape. The checkpoint 
commander, ‘Khan’ and several of his men apprehended Abdul, and over several 
hours beat him, causing acute pain and some internal and external injury. ‘Abdul’ 
reported the matter to the police training unit of the PRT. They considered that the 
matter would provide a good test case for a police complaints procedure they had 
instituted as part of their reform programme.  
 
The perpetrator (the checkpoint commander) requested the intervention of a group 
of elders from his own tribe and that of ‘Abdul’. The group, or shura, met and 
discussed the case, suggesting that the police commander apologise. ‘Abdul’ was 
told that the formal system suggested by the foreign police advisors was 
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inappropriate. He accepted, as he was absolutely bound to do, that he had to let the 
matter rest and withdrew his formal complaint. 
 
It was made very clear to him that if he elected to pursue this matter through formal 
channels his life would be threatened. In view of that, and not wishing to move to 
Pakistan, ‘Abdul’ did not proceed any further with his complaint. ‘Abdul’ states that 
he would not have begun to consider reporting the matter to the police had he not 
been an employee of the PRT and supported by police mentors. 
 
‘Khan’s’ checkpoint was regarded by the people living near it as a serious menace. 
‘Abdul’ was one of many who had been dealt with in a similar fashion. As a 
postscript, the perpetrator of this beating, ‘Khan’, was killed along with six other 
policemen (he was the main target of the killing) some three weeks later. It is said 
that local people were supportive of this killing.845 
 
No doubt many such cases were brought to such a conclusion. This one did not, at least as 
reported, involve the Taliban in resolving the dispute, though it was resolved in a violent 
manner. However, it was clear to all concerned that the state authorities, with whom 
‘Abdul’ was working, were not considered to be the appropriate forum. One reason for this 
was that the matter was well suited for resolution in the traditional way. For this was not 
simply an example of what in the West might be called ‘mediation’: it represented 
Pashtunwali at work. All participants in the process were clear as to the procedure and what 
each party would be required to do. The politics of the perpetrators, insofar as they may 
have had any, were not relevant. Of rather more importance were their utility in resolving 
disputes. 
However, ‘Khan’ was killed. He was killed not by the other party (or at least there is no 
evidence that he was) and there was no subsequent blood feud; he was killed, along with 
his team of Afghan National Police, by the Taliban. As one British policeman remarked at the 
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time, ‘this is exactly what would have happened in Cork in 1921’.846 Here the Taliban were 
seen as enforcers, and their action was popular because they had removed a threat to the 
local people – and indeed probably to local commerce.  
In her review of the ‘informal’ justice sector in Helmand, Kate Fearon points out that:  
Not only do the five justice providers [listed above] regularly engage in dispute 
resolution by themselves, but also it is more common than not to find combinations 
of these five involved in any given dispute.  
She goes on to describe this as ‘a la carte’.847 There is a further problem for the ‘formal’ or 
state courts. As Fearon puts it:  
… in Helmand, the public conflates the court sector with the Government. There is a 
strong perception that they are one and the same. Taking a case ‘to the government’ 
or referring to the judges as ‘the government side’ are comments consistently and 
frequently heard when discussing these matters with Elders and with ordinary 
members of the community, both male and female. The concept of actual or even 
aspirational separation of powers between the Executive and the Judiciary simply 
does not exist in the public’s mind. There was a strong view that the court was doing 
the bidding of the government, that the court was ‘the government side’ of justice 
provision.848 
David Kilcullen, the writer and expert on traditional counterinsurgency, says: ‘We can beat 
the Taliban in any military engagement, but we’re losing in Afghanistan not because we’re 
being outfought but because the Afghan government is being outgoverned.’849 The most 
evident manifestation of that is in the field of dispute resolution. However, it is clearly the 
case that the Afghan government is only one of several players. Western culture is heavily 
influenced by the Weberian idea of a government having a monopoly of force. Accordingly, 
the ‘government’ or the state is seen as the de facto, or perhaps default, dominant source 
of power and consequently justice provision.  
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In societies such as the Pashtun, this is not the case. Power and the legitimacy to settle 
disputes do not necessarily – or even usually – derive from the state, as is clear. However, 
nor is there always, as Fearon suggests, a single direct competitor. Rather, the situation may 
be characterised as a market, where, for some purposes, a dispute may be settled by the 
Taliban – a matter concerning land, perhaps, since in some provinces (as we saw in Chapter 
3) a Taliban judgment has the effect of title. For a divorce case, however, the forum of 
choice may be the mullahs’ courts in local mosques. The situation is not one, therefore, of 
binary conflict. One difficulty faced by counterinsurgents has been excessive adherence to 
the Western, urban notion of ‘rule of law’, as described and defined above. It might well be 
argued that a major error of Western intervention was to identify legitimate courts with 
state courts. A paradigm example of how this occurred was in Helmand.    
 
At the beginning of extensive foreign involvement in Helmand in 2006, the formal justice 
institutions in the province had no presence outside the urban centres of Lashkar Gah and 
Gereshk.850 It took several years for the importance of the ‘justice sector’ to be realised.  
‘The development of the judiciary and the rule of law is an increasing focus of ISAF’, as Peter 
Watkins, Director Operational Policy, Ministry of Defence, put it to a session of the House of 
Commons Defence Committee in 2010.851 From an ancillary element of the 
‘counternarcotics’ effort in 2007, when I was justice advisor, justice and ‘rule of law’ became 
a major priority of the overall effort. However, whether the international effort had 
demonstrated a continuity of approach, or even an internal consistency, was open to 
question. Whether the approach that was taken was concordant with Afghan priorities is 
also a matter of debate.  
When asked whether it was realistic to try to build a justice system in a relatively short 
period, using an approach that appeared to prioritise a Western approach to ‘rule of law’, 
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Peter Rundell, the former Head of the UK’s Department for International Development 
operations in Helmand and an extremely experienced international aid official, told me: 
 We started from the Kilcullen/Petraeus idea that justice is a vital part of COIN 
 practice. That is the why. The how was a combination of a number of things. There 
 was a sense that there is a corpus of law, there were Afghan lawyers attached to the 
 body of law and a certain amount of respect for it. I was struck by the way that 
 judges talked about it: ‘We are there so that the law is applied.’852  
His view is reflected by the approach taken by the overall British mission, both military and 
civilian: ‘The trouble is that PRT officials are often taken in by local officials ... who often see 
foreign officials not so much as occupiers as milch cows.’853  
The implicit, and in Rundell’s case, explicit view is that if you control the land, you control 
the means of delivering justice. He concedes that:  
quite a lot of the rule of law programme was a bit template based, so ‘this is the 
establishment that a district should have’. There was indeed a lot of ‘if we build it 
they will come’. However, we did see cases coming through the system once it was 
set up; but it was not possible to assess the degree of corruption ... Still, we started 
with only one court, and now we have courts in nine districts.854  
The approach of international actors in counterinsurgency is to accept the fiction that the 
state is automatically to be aligned with counterinsurgent sentiment: ‘The problem is that 
the conventional approach assumes that government authority and anti-insurgency 
sentiment go together … As a logical conclusion this conclusion may be unwarranted; a local 
community could be both anti-insurgency and antigovernment.’855 The relevance of this to 
lawfare in insurgency zones is that, paradoxically perhaps, a release from the obligation to 
identify incumbent government with counterinsurgent will allow far greater flexibility of 
response in approach. There is no doubt that this was recognised in Helmand at least.  
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Professor Graham Woodman suggests that attempting to impose state law in place of 
customary law can in fact act to increase conflict.856 Indeed, he suggests that reducing the 
application of state law will act to reduce conflict.  Should efforts be made to harmonise the 
two kinds of law, the ‘two goods’, then this should be accomplished through community 
action, i.e. bottom-up. Although he is concerned primarily with African mechanisms, it is 
argued here that the same applies in other cultures where customary law, such as the 
Pashtunwali, applies. 
 
Section 3:  Lessons from Afghanistan 
Lack of planning for a judicial strategy 
There has been a lack of planning for the judicial element of counterinsurgency. This is an 
issue from the highest levels of military planning to the lowest. One former senior military 
legal officer, who has served with UK and US military ‘rule of law’ missions and has dealt at 
the highest levels in such matters, has said:  
Rule of law is not part of the comprehensive military planning piece. It is planned, if 
at all, bit by bit. We need to develop a proper integrated planning process. During 
that process we need to have people who understand the pragmatic need for such 
an approach. Right now we don’t have pragmatism in planning. We don’t have 
planning at all. It is only at the last minute, or even after the last minute that military 
commanders get forced into this kind of planning. I don’t think legal experts have 
been included at a high enough level.857  
Lack of doctrinal coherence 
In order for such planning to have positive effect, it needs to be integrated into a well-
understood strategy, which, in turn, must be based on a practically oriented doctrine. As 
matters stand, counterinsurgency theory and practice is not situated within the very 
extensive scholarship on pluralism, based on over a century of colonial experience and on 
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more than 50 years of development work. Much of the colonial experience was founded on 
decades of thinking and practical strategic calculation. Much of it was geared to preventing, 
exploiting or ignoring what might (had current streams of counterinsurgent theory been 
established then) have been termed dangerous currents of ‘insurgent’ governance. It is not 
only in the counterinsurgency field that there has been a failure properly to engage with 
legal pluralism. 
Underlying much of the West’s recent efforts at justice within a counterinsurgency has been 
a strategic incoherence at several levels. There has first been what might be described as 
‘vertical incoherence’, in that efforts at the provincial level were rarely (if ever) fully co-
ordinated with the Afghan national plans and priorities. A British advisor to a senior Afghan 
minister put it like this: ‘Look, the Afghan national plans are ramshackle and rickety. But 
they are there, and with effort could have begun to work. The countries, and I do mean here 
the British and Americans, carry on with their own work as if the central government did not 
exist.’858 In fairness, Naina Patel, justice advisor in Helmand from 2010–11, recalls that 
efforts were also made to harmonise the British strategy with national strategies. There 
were, however, problems: ‘Afghan strategies often said little, were not actually adhered to 
at Kabul level or were out of synch with the demands and capabilities of a province such as 
Helmand.’859  
Lack of co-ordination with other activities 
There is also ‘horizontal incoherence’ – which is to say that within the mission in Helmand 
itself there has been a lack of a consistent or informed approach. At the military levels, 
there was never a single, continuous strategic approach. For example, in Helmand the 
British military presence deployed in six-monthly increments of brigades,860 each of which 
had different perspectives, objectives and focuses.861 Similarly, the various civilian advisors – 
on justice, as on other matters – were changed at intervals of 6–18 months. The degree to 
which these advisors were briefed on their roles and the strategic objectives being pursued 
(if any) was very variable. There was no system of structured handover from one to the 
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next; often it was done on a personally organised basis. One of the six justice advisors 
deployed to the province by the UK was given no briefings, save ‘offer the people of 
Helmand a better deal’;862 others were given a half-page document.863 Some justice advisors 
were instructed to assist the military effort in attempting to regularise detention policy; 
others had no involvement at all.864 Even if the work had been coherent and consistent with 
an established strategy, there was little evidence of any link between proclaimed objectives 
of military counterinsurgency and civilian ‘stabilisation’ efforts. Awareness of the legal 
environment into which these advisors were placed was patchy at best. The tensions and 
dilemmas of trying to develop a coherent judicial strategy within an already intensely 
complex environment were perhaps exacerbated by the needs of the military 
counterinsurgent effort. 
Naina Patel related that, insofar as there was a judicial strategy, ‘It was informed by these 
[counterinsurgency] strategies ... However, the extent to which we should focus on other 
issues such as gender-based violence in the context of counterinsurgency was never really 
resolved.865  
Failure to engage with the ‘facts on the ground’ 
Corruption  
 
Looking at matters from a Western European perspective, we assume that judges exercise 
judicial function and that the police are concerned with enforcing law and order. Jonathan 
Foreman, a researcher and expert on aid policy, calls this ‘the nomenclatural fallacy’:  
 
The term refers to the way aid officials and other foreigners often make the naive 
mistake of assuming that officials in poorer/developing countries who possess such 
titles as ‘policeman’, ‘judge’ or ‘minister’ have the same function as officials who 
bear those titles in their home countries. This is sometimes a matter of cultural 
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arrogance; at other times it reflects the triumph of politically correct piety over 
experience.866  
 
One UN justice advisor said that ‘there was a real artificiality of office. A police chief may be 
called that, but he is not a police chief in the way that anyone in Europe would recognise in 
terms of his actual role.’867  
 
A former ‘stabilisation officer’ in southern Afghanistan is blunt about the reality of the 
West’s efforts:  
 
The predations of the state here are so extreme that no-one could reasonably expect 
anything other than a negative response from ordinary people who really just want 
to be left alone in peace with the means to make a basic living, supported by some 
form of locally accountable justice and, fundamentally, order. We might have done 
better to have bothered to figure out what such people wanted, instead of trying to 
impose a ‘best practice’ governance solution for them in the way that we have.868 
 
Consequent illegitimacy  
The suggestion made in some quarters that informal justice acts to undermine government 
legitimacy has been accepted implicitly.869 Indeed it can undermine government legitimacy, 
if thought is not given to how it is used and supported. It might equally well be argued that 
the imposition of a system which was regarded as corrupt, yet seen as the showcase of 
government, did more damage. A shrewder approach to lawfare might be to take the 
lessons of Lugard and the British systems on the North West Frontier and adapt them to 
today’s strictures. 
One UN justice advisor with five years’ experience in Central Afghanistan, and with many 
more years’ work in Albania, the former Soviet Union and China, Jeffrey Rustand, said:  
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 I realised I knew nothing pretty quickly. But then I had the distinct advantage of 
 having worked, after ten years as a lawyer, in Albania. Even there it took me six 
 months to figure out what was going on – that the chief justice was not like the chief 
 justice in Canada … I came to Afghanistan with the full awareness that I knew 
 absolutely nothing. Most military and many civilian officials have no experience of 
 work in systems outside the western legal world. Many never acquire real 
 knowledge or even an awareness of their lack of knowledge.870 
 
As may be recalled, this encapsulates Thomas Carothers’ ‘problem of knowledge’ described 
earlier in this chapter.  
 
Rustand went on: 
 
Then there is the fact that most rule of law officers are lawyers. Many of these 
lawyers believe that you can abstract from all countries with ‘rule of law’ and 
pretend it’s all a matter of engineering. There are also ideological reasons. For 
example, a shura’s conclusions may be rejected because they are insufficiently 
‘human rights compliant’. One issue which is raised time and again is gender, which 
is a very hard sell indeed in the Pashtun world.871  
 
Focus on Western priorities  
Gender is one area where the clash between traditional Afghan and Western priorities is 
particularly evident. Clearly, Pashtun notions of gender relations – which might be 
summarised as defining women as possessions – do not sit well with Western priorities. This 
can have very positive effects. Fearon relates the case of one local judicial council set up by 
the British mission to resolve disputes. Here two women were installed as members on the 
insistence of the British advisor. In at least one case, their presence was instrumental in 
avoiding appalling consequences for a very young woman. The girl concerned was being 
forced to marry an opium addict against her will. She stated – and this is not unusual – that 
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if forced to do so, she would kill herself, the common method being self-immolation. The 
case was brought to the judicial council. The initial decision to confirm the marriage was 
overturned on the insistence of one of the female members of the committee and the girl 
went to school.872  
Peter Rundell, former head of DFID in Helmand, stated that at least one justice advisor  
had a background in community dispute resolution and worked on expanding our 
understanding of ‘community-based dispute resolution’. She put into effect 
consciousness raising of their obligations under Afghan law, Sharia and human rights. 
Not Pashtunwali. We had a conference of elders in to spend three days talking about 
what they simply could not deal with. They were particularly annoyed when they 
were told they could not deal with murder. Trying to bring in human rights was 
difficult.873 
A successor to me (and indeed to Kate Fearon) as justice advisor to the British mission, 
Naina Patel, recalls one seminar:  
A heated debate erupted between an elderly Pashtun judge and a persistent young 
man from the national human rights commission. ‘Why were women in prison for 
running away from home?’ the young man asked. It was not a crime that appeared 
in the penal code. ‘Sharia,’ answered the judge from under his imposing turban, with 
a glance that told the young man not to ask any more. A worried training co-
ordinator, concerned at the way this exchange was going, decided to call a tea break 
while we discussed with the trainer how to respond. Understanding the importance 
of clarifying the issue, the trainer spent the remainder of the afternoon with both 
the code and religious text, explaining where one began and the other ended, and 
the centrality to both of asking why the woman had run away – adultery was clearly 
problematic, abuse was a very different matter. And custom, he made clear, had no 
basis in law.874  
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However one reads this, one is left with the distinct impression that the ‘persistent young 
man’ may not quite have gained the traction with the ‘elderly Pashtun judge’ that was 
desired by the PRT and its staff.  
Yet another justice advisor, Sarah Maguire, an expert on gender rights, stressed the primacy 
of the formal system and, within that, particularly the vital importance of women’s rights. A 
blog entry indicates her priorities: ‘The other day, I was working with a middle-aged Afghan 
man discussing a forthcoming conference. Out of 100 representatives there wasn’t a single 
woman on the list. We discussed it and he realised with a shock that he hadn’t even thought 
to include women.’875 The priority attached to ‘gender’ issues by key Afghan leaders is not 
the same as that attached to it by Western technical experts.  
 
Jeffrey Rustand, the UN official quoted above, concluded his interview with me by saying:  
A big strategic mistake the West made was to try to replicate our systems; apart 
from the obvious stupidity of that, a second mistake was not to match our legal 
reforms with the Sharia. An Afghan sees the reforms – including the constitution – as 
a foreign imposition. Most people only know Sharia – so the Taliban come in and 
whatever we may think of its harshness, it is obviously Sharia. They know that. It is 
familiar; it is quick and you don’t have to pay. We cannot compete with it. What we 
should have done is the really simple, but really vital stuff. We should have focused 
on one big, simple thing: fair dealing.876 
On the other hand, the British government argues that there has been extensive 
development in its efforts to bring ‘a better deal’ in Helmand:  
Today, access to formal justice in Helmand is greater than it has ever been. The 
presence of formal justice outside the provincial capital Lashkar Gah has grown from 
two justice officials in 2 of the 13 districts in 2010 to 40 justice officials in 10 districts. 
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We have also funded the construction and maintenance of secure and better run 
prisons that conform to international standards.877  
This may be so, and it is undoubtedly true that the base from which work was begun was 
very low. How sustainable it is in an extremely corrupt, still-embattled province is unclear.878  
 
The ‘clash of two goods’ – centralism vs pluralism879  
In his essay on legal pluralism, the scholar on jurisprudence Ronald Janse identifies seven 
reasons why ideas of legal pluralism have not caught on as they might have done in legal 
and ‘rule of law development’.880 An overriding problem, he suggests, is that legal and rule 
of law reform ‘can briefly be summarised as “decades of stubborn refusal to learn”’, an 
observation exactly replicated by Jeffrey Rustand: 
 I don’t want to take these people’s money away, but maybe someone should say 
 ‘none of this works’.881  
One serious problem identified to me by highly experienced ‘rule of law’ development 
advisor and US law school professor Cynthia Alkon in connection with Rustand’s comment is 
that ‘practitioners say “this doesn’t work” all the time.’ 882 She goes on to state that ‘the 
problem is that they say it to each other and largely in private.  There are no incentives for 
proclaiming failure in the development world, so it is very rare for failure to be admitted.’  It 
seems that Multi-million dollar projects must succeed, or the perception will be that the 
money has been wasted and that is simply not acceptable to governmental donors.  Further, 
it is rare, with notable exceptions such as Carothers and Golub, for practitioners to enter the 
academic discourse with serious doubts to the effect that “none of this works”’   
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 Secondly, the fact that most of those dealing with ‘rule of law’ reform are lawyers tends to 
predispose them to solutions that seem straightforward and to which they are 
professionally disposed, such as building courts. Third, and closely connected is the fact that 
this kind of work has always been based on the ‘empirical [for them] assertion that only the 
state is capable of providing social order ... or on the ideological claim that the state offers 
the best hope for the realisation of economic development, democracy and rule of law’.883  
There are echoes here of H Patrick Glenn’s observations on the invalidity of ideas of ‘rule of 
law’ outside, or indeed he claims, inside the Western paradigm.884 
Fourth is the political pressure imposed by the fact that most such operations are founded 
on negotiations between the ‘exogenous’ (donor) interveners and their agents and 
governments, sometimes including judiciary and legislature. It is consequently 
understandable that high-level government officials seek assistance that helps them to 
strengthen the legal institutions of which they are in charge.  
Fifth is the geopolitical factor of distrust of, for example, Islamic means of dispute 
resolution, which were seen as not sufficiently ‘human rights compliant’, or, even worse, 
may be perceived as presenting a threat cognate to terrorism.  
The sixth (and closely linked to the fifth) is the normative understanding that the so-called 
‘thick’ definition of ‘rule of law’, which implies the inclusion of various civil, social and 
political rights, is the appropriate mechanism for the delivery of dispute resolution. Ganesh 
Sitaraman’s Counterinsurgent’s Constitution outlines the dilemma. On the one hand: ‘The 
rule of law is one of those few but fortunate concepts that has universal support ... To stand 
against the rule of law is to stand with absolutism – against democracy, prosperity, peace, 
order, human rights, and liberty.’885 On the other, however, it is ‘enforced by central 
bureaucratic institutions like national police forces and court systems. The rule of law 
therefore looks much like a Western legal system.’886 As was seen in the previous chapter, 
at the more extreme ends of the insurgent spectrum, ideas of ‘human rights’ or 
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‘international standards’ which cohere around the ‘rule of law’ are seriously contested 
ideas.  
Finally, the seventh factor that Janse identifies is the question of mandates – a matter 
closely linked with the fourth factor. All organisations, such as the United Nations or the 
United Kingdom Government, which are involved in this kind of activity have specific 
mandates which render it ‘difficult to engage with non-state justice systems because these 
are regarded as falling short of international human rights law’.887  
I would add an eighth and connected issue – that of the pervasiveness of Western cultural 
assumptions, or indeed ‘political correctness’: ‘... there is an element of “right thinking”’ and 
if you don’t think that way, you’re out. In private everyone knows it won’t work. They know 
what’s going on.’888  
Behind all these features lies the ‘problem of knowledge’. There is an inadequate basic 
knowledge of the issues which really play into the causes of insurgency and that pertain to 
the ‘justice sector.’ This is particularly the case in places that do not in any way conform to 
the paradigms of Western political and legal theory. 
Chapter conclusion: who is the insurgent? 
‘There is a common assumption that strengthening states is the primary solution for a range 
of global and local ills, such as insurgencies.’889 
Whether or not ‘ungoverned space’ is a legitimate term, the reality of intervention in 
differently governed places requires a deep knowledge of the nuances and practices of the 
area into which outsiders stray with the ambition of quelling rebellion and assisting in 
setting up ‘governance’.  
In Afghanistan, ‘legal experts from North America and Western Europe frequently come 
across as more interested in promoting the merit of the latest legal contrivances than in 
making a genuine effort to promote civilian welfare’.890 The British effort in Helmand 
demonstrated this at the provincial level, with regular shifts in focus, matched by an equally 
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incoherent Afghan national effort. The Taliban, however, were not encumbered by these 
‘contrivances’ and maintained an entirely consistent, indeed improving, approach.  Recent 
examples of attempts to provide a ‘rule of law’ element in counterinsurgency have 
demonstrated that, as Thomas Carothers said:  
 there is a disturbingly thin basis of knowledge at every level – with respect to the 
 core rationale of the work, the question of where the essence of the rule of law 
 resides in different societies, how change in the rule of law occurs and what the real 
 effects are of changes that are produced.891  
His views are echoed by a recent UK advisor to the ‘rule of law’ mission in Helmand: ‘We 
needed to understand the pushes and pulls that run the place ... we dabbled with little or no 
understanding of the second or third-order consequences of our actions.’892 
Thus, the ‘rule of law’ practitioners have duplicated the efforts of military COIN 
practitioners. As Whit Mason, editor of the leading study on ‘rule of law’ efforts in 
Afghanistan, Lost in Inaction, told me, foreign rule of law experts were concerned with 
‘shaping the environment instead of shaping themselves around the environment’.893 They 
were concerned with altering the status quo, whether or not they realised it. The role of 
‘rebel’ – the agent of change – is usually that of the insurgent. Who, then, is the insurgent? 
In an article in a 2013 edition of the US Joint Force Quarterly, Dr Robert Egnell 
acknowledged that ‘major counterinsurgency operations have historically achieved few 
successes. While it is indeed possible to learn from these few successes and numerous 
failures, counterinsurgency principles of the past are accepted outright a bit too easily in the 
21st century.’894 His further insight was that the nature of COIN operations, particularly in 
Afghanistan, were not in fact counterinsurgency; rather they were themselves rather more 
in the nature of insurgencies. There was a ‘litany of assumptions’ concerning the COIN 
campaign in Afghanistan.895 He acknowledges that there was a serious problem concerning 
the legitimacy of the Afghan government and that Weberian democracy is not evident as an 
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objective good for all populations of the world. The ’societal transformation’ that seemed to 
be the purpose of the mission was, in fact, a revolutionary programme and therefore was 
more by way of an insurgency than a counterinsurgency. 
 
This in itself is a sound insight. Egnell goes further, however, to prescribe the conceptual 
tactics of insurgents as an option for future operation of ‘regime change’, should such 
operations take place again. It is argued here that, howsoever reframed, Robert Pape’s ‘It’s 
the occupation, stupid’ will still apply.896 In other words, we return to the problem of 
exogenous intervention. Ashtri Surke situates ‘the history of state-formation in Europe’ as 
typically ‘forged in opposition to the other’, rather than imposed by that ‘other’.897 She 
looks at several examples of endogenous state-building, such as the Meiji in Japan or the 
construction of the post-imperial Turkish state, and contrasts those with what she describes 
as the ‘extreme case of international state-building’ in Afghanistan.898 This was 
characterised by a lack of ownership, failing Afghan leadership and an excess of possibly 
unfounded optimism and a deficiency of understanding of the practical need for 
sustainability. 
 
Yet state-building in the West has taken centuries. Much of the foregoing has been 
concerned with the sliver of ‘state-building’ or at the local level, what was termed 
‘stabilisation’, as it affects the construction of a ‘justice sector’. This has often been placed 
within the context of ‘security sector reform’ (SSR) a truly vast industry within the 
international development world. It is argued here that this is a category error of an 
archetypical kind.  ‘Justice’ in societies such as Afghanistan, Somalia or indeed any culture 
with a strong customary strain, is far more than an arm of the security forces, as indeed it is 
in Western societies. This category error has in turn bred an approach which has tended to 
relegate to the margins the far more important function of internal societal dispute 
resolution. Introducing elements foreign to the ‘target’ society – such as overlaying a formal 
justice sector along Western lines – has produced instabilities and internal conflicts, and has 
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in fact made the security situation worse. It has built in, for example, further opportunities 
for theft, graft and corruption by state officials.899 One former ‘stabilisation officer’, 
speaking about Afghanistan (where he works) expresses the views of some who have 
worked in such places:  
 In short, public office is not regarded as a service to the people but as a means to 
 extract resources from them. The state is a predatory, self-serving and hostile actor 
 and not something that adds value to people’s lives through the provision of public 
 goods.900 
The combination of officials knowing that this is the case and yet continuing to add 
resources and opportunities for the same officials within that system may be considered to 
be an example of cognitive dissonance. This, in turn, has acted to reduce the legitimacy of 
the ‘formal’ state, which was already at avery low ebb. ‘To be legitimate and effective, legal 
reform has to relate to the normative basis of justice in Afghanistan.’901 This was realised by 
legal reformers after the unfortunate experiences in the former Soviet Union in the late 
1990s. The lessons of colonial authorities were never (or only rarely) examined. The 
‘breathtakingly mechanistic approach’902 based on the notion that ‘a country achieves the 
rule of law by reshaping its key institutions to match those of countries that are considered 
to have the rule of law’903 has resulted in the Taliban taking the lawfare initiative and using 
their considerable edge to great strategic effect, both in terms of the operational effect on 
the ground, where the formal sector has essentially been defeated in key areas, and in 
terms of the wider narrative of ‘justice’, which is dominated by their rhetoric and indeed to 
a very great extent backed up by reality.  
The problems and questions arising from ‘rule of law’ activities in places such as Afghanistan 
could and will arise in other areas of governance, such as education. Those areas, however – 
important and indeed vital though they are – are unlikely to impact on the fight for 
legitimacy that lies at the heart of the recent Afghan war and that has lain at the heart of 
other military and ‘stabilisation’ missions for much of the last decade. 
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The main research question seeks to determine: How does the use of courts and dispute 
resolution systems as characterised in the term ‘lawfare’ impact on the conduct and 
outcome of insurgency? 
 
‘In large measure, our modern politics is legal politics. The terms of engagement are legal, 
and the players are legal institutions, their powers expanded and limited by law. To say that 
war is a legal institution is not only to say that war has also become an affair of rules or the 
military a legal bureaucracy; it is also to say something about the nature of the politics 
continued by military means.’904  
Wars are horrific ways of making decisions, but they are ways of making decisions; and for 
that reason they can be thought of as a form of legal procedure. After all, law is nothing 
other than the science of making decisions.905 At the outset of this thesis, the objective was 
to attempt to show that if war was once a form of legal process, then might the law not now 
be seen as at least a form of war? Perhaps even, as the father of the term ‘lawfare’, Charles 
Dunlap, has said, the ‘decisive element’?906  
 
Ultimately, insurgency and counterinsurgency are political acts; they constitute a form of 
warfare – indeed arguably the dominant form of warfare in the current international 
strategic environment. As such, if they are to succeed there should be a strategic 
appreciation made of the objectives, means and methods suited to the conflict. This has 
rarely been done in recent years. However, over the decades of the colonial period there 
developed a close appreciation of the need for such a strategy. There was a lengthy debate 
conducted by all levels of those involved, ranging from the practitioners on the frontiers 
themselves to the politicians deciding upon such strategies. Such awareness has not been 
evident over the last two decades.  
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The question is raised in Chapter 1 as to whether there is a relationship between successful 
counterinsurgents and fair procedure. The case made in this thesis is not that this is a silver 
bullet or an undiscovered mine of counterinsurgency treasure; rather that there should be a 
legal policy that goes beyond the rhetorical and that moves into the practical. This is where 
an overall strategic perspective may help. 
 
This comes against the background of an awareness of war as a multidimensional 
endeavour. The consequences of appreciating this are severe, if ruthlessly logical. If the 
courts of the ‘occupying power’ lack legitimacy, then they must be attacked. Clearly this can 
be done virtually, by setting up insurgent courts. The Irish Nationalists showed that it must 
also be done physically, by ensuring that the courts could not function – either by 
threatening or suborning staff or witnesses, or by destroying the buildings.  
In Northern Ireland in the 1970s to the 1990s, this was always an option for the IRA. There 
was a key practical obstacle to this. Northern Ireland was over 60 per cent Unionist, and to 
have followed that route would have served no purpose but to alienate even further an 
already hostile majority. The Ireland of the early twentieth century was essentially 
Nationalist in nature, at least in those areas where the IRA and Sinn Fein, along with their 
courts, operated – not coincidentally with some success. The mechanisms in formal justice 
and the strategic options available to counterinsurgents in a more traditional setting are 
discussed in Chapter 2. The evidence would seem to indicate that it is important to have fair 
dealing in detention and trial procedures. For example, there was little scope left in Malaya 
for MPLA insurgents to fill a gap in justice provision, although, as pointed out in Chapter 2, 
this may have had more to do with the constant military and police pressure to which they 
were subject.  
 
However, not ‘dealing fairly’ leaves the way open for the insurgent to move in with what 
might now be called ‘information operations’, as we have seen at the grand strategic level 
with respect to Guantanamo and other detention issues in the ‘Long War’. In a rather earlier 
generation in Northern Ireland, the Diplock Courts were presented (not without some 
justification) as being a derogation from basic notions of fairness, as understood in British 
law. Did the costs in legitimacy outweigh the gains from putting terrorists in jail? It may be 
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so. This is a contingent circumstance and a clear-eyed stance needs to be taken at the 
outset to the legal approach to fighting insurgents. Taking an ad hoc approach to matters of 
detention and interrogation and the litigation procedures to which insurgents are subject 
lays the counterinsurgents open to the threat of legal action at home, lawfare in the way 
that it is traditionally understood. 
 
As Porch has said in his recent Counterinsurgency, each war (and its results) is contingent 
upon circumstances. Each is, as it were, a law unto itself. Lessons to be drawn from Kenya 
are not necessarily to be applied to Malaya, or vice versa, save and insofar as it is necessary 
to have complete familiarity with the drivers and issues that the enemy relies upon.  
 
The importance of procedural fairness lies in the sources of a conflict. For example, the land 
issues in Ireland, which for centuries drove many of the problems, were of a different nature 
from those in Afghanistan. However, mechanisms needed to be in place in order for those 
root causes to be dealt with. Failure to do so in Kenya and Ireland opened the way, 
especially in Ireland, for insurgent authority to begin to gain purchase on dispute resolution 
mechanisms, courts, which eventually became a key strategic weapon, as seen in Chapter 3. 
A similar gap in legitimacy opened the way for the Taliban in Afghanistan, both in the 1990s 
and more recently, to build their own ‘brand’ and to start (or continue) the process of 
developing a message that they were to be preferred to the government by those engaged 
of necessity in ‘forum-shopping’. While from the Western perspective the Afghan War is 
over, it certainly is not over for the Afghans. That theatre of justice will continue to play 
itself out. The nostrums of ‘formal justice’ on the Western model have clearly failed, as they 
do not live sufficiently well with Afghan culture and are considered to be part of the 
intensely corrupt Afghan government.  
 
What was and is the ‘message’ of insurgent courts? It is simple: by these instruments, 
insurgents demonstrate that they have the legitimacy to exercise one of the key functions of 
government. They demonstrate that they possess the authority to dispose of disputes, not 
only among the members of their own groups, but among the members of the community 
they serve. The judicial system is where the mettle of claims to legitimacy and the right to 
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govern is proved. It is, as it were, where the rubber of government meets the road of the 
people.  
Once a belligerent group has got hold of the courts in a particular disputed area, it is very 
difficult for the opposing party to dislodge it. By ‘courts’, one means here the ability to 
decide disputes. The reason, as Ireland and Afghanistan have shown, is that the ability to 
decide disputes is an indicator of public trust not so much in propriety, as in ability to 
enforce, and is therefore an indicator of legitimacy. Commercial, farming and business 
interests understand the situation better than ‘COIN practitioners’. In one sense, courts are 
an expression of the ‘wisdom of crowds’, as to some extent the decision as to what forum to 
use is a speculative one. For example, in the key issue of land, there is no interest in 
decisions that are only of temporary effectiveness. The party that aspires to ‘win’ in an 
insurgency needs to be able to enforce its will, and one vital characteristic of that is the 
ability to enforce the judgments of their courts. 
Overall, however, counterinsurgents, whether conducting their campaigns as endogenous 
or exogenous interveners, need to be aware of the requirement for a legal strategy – not 
just of how to use courts to counter insurgents, in other words as part of a security 
apparatus. They also need to look at what may be needed to deal with the edge that 
insurgents may have in the area of dispute resolution. The ideas presented in current 
doctrinal documents are clearly inadequate, and have been shown to be so in Afghanistan. 
This gap in policy has been shown to be particularly obvious in relation to ‘ungoverned 
space’. In fighting wars of this nature, doctrinaire approaches based on Western notions of 
‘rule of law’ are ineffective, based as they are on premises that simply do not apply in 
‘ungoverned space’. More thinking is required as to how the lessons of recent campaigns 
(and indeed older campaigns) can be developed. Much of that may draw on scholarship in 
legal anthropology.  
It is also argued here that, regarded through the lens of justice, the kind of thinking that 
founds such documents as FM 3-24 is also profoundly conceptually flawed. This problem 
goes deeper than merely being an update of tired and anachronistic notions of ‘hearts and 
minds’ or ‘winning the population’ or, for that matter, ‘governance’. Those templates are 
irrelevant in places where ‘government’ is not seen as a solution. 
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How should counterinsurgency theory cope with ‘rupture strategy’, forms of which range 
from the simple denial of authority or legitimacy, to using the courts to set a narrative tone 
for the conduct of counterinsurgency (as some may argue has happened pursuant to the 
cases in the UK dealing with detention)? One obvious tactic would be to ensure that this 
particular vulnerability, in this case concerning detention, is properly legally founded both at 
home and in the area of operations.  
Such essential matters are not dealt with in current doctrine. The version of judicial strategy 
preferred by current ‘counterinsurgency doctrine’ is the standard ‘rule of law’ model, which 
is inappropriate in pluralist settings.  
Yet there is very extensive scholarship, indeed a whole field of academic discourse, which is 
inclined to show precisely the contrary – the field of legal pluralism:907 namely that ‘the 
absence of a strong state will necessarily be followed by anarchic conditions’.908 This is not 
necessarily so.  
The second research question asks: What does the use of courts and dispute resolution 
mechanisms tell us about the validity of contemporary counterinsurgency ideas as a 
doctrine or set of tactics? One simple answer is that there needs to be a profound rethink. 
Perhaps on the following framework: 
 
1 Counterinsurgents must understand that insurgents have agency, and will seek 
to out-govern, too. That is the nature of subversion and it is probably beginning 
to be understood. The counterinsurgent also needs to understand that ‘the 
people’ are not objects: they too have agency and dynamism. 
2 It pays insurgents to set up fair dispute resolution systems with enforcement 
mechanisms and minimal corruption; they thus parlay local dispute resolution 
into ‘rule of law’ and political power. They are engaged in garnering legitimacy 
gained through resolving disputes, delivering judgments in a way that is felt to be 
fair, and ensuring that those decisions are enforced by their own rule of law. 
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This, in due course, has the potential to grow into political power, the objective 
of insurgency.  
3 Accordingly, to deny insurgents the purchase they require and (if they receive it) 
will exploit, it pays counterinsurgents to deal fairly with land or other pressing 
legal issues, either with strong, relevant, well-informed legislation, or else 
appropriate mechanisms of redress. It pays counterinsurgents to deal apparently 
fairly with security cases. 
4 It pays counterinsurgents to ensure that a dispute resolution system goes with 
the grain of the country within which it is situated. This will require an 
understanding of the legal ecology of the environment within which they work. 
5 It pays counterinsurgents to ensure that the legal framework within which they 
operate is as legally watertight as possible, both at home and in the area of 
operations.  
6 It pays counterinsurgents to ensure that decisions fairly arrived at, in compliance 
with local custom, are enforced. 
 
Implications for policy 
 
The third research question examines: What in terms of ‘judicial strategy’ can assist 
intervening powers to succeed in their objectives? 
 
Clearly there needs to be a full awareness of what it is that the counterinsurgent is trying to 
achieve, and a clear-eyed understanding that there may be internally conflicting objectives: 
for example, a national policy of gender promotion that is in direct opposition to the 
interest in ensuring that deeply held ideas are not challenged to the detriment of the overall 
mission.  
 





 To say counterinsurgents can use law to fight insurgents is not to say that they 
 should ... Both law and war have been around for as long as there have been 
 governments, and the lessons we are learning in today’s counterinsurgency and 
 counterterrorism campaigns will likely play out for generations as, in each new 
 conflict, law finds its place as both a constraint on war and a means of warfare.909  
 
It is clear that there is far more awareness than there was of the importance of developing a 
soundly based judicial strategy. What is equally clear from recent practice is that, while this 
need has been identified by counterinsurgents, or many counterinsurgents, it has not been 
fulfilled in practice. Another scholar of counterinsurgency criticises Western 
counterinsurgency more generally, but his critique is just as valid for present purposes: 
‘When a state gets its strategy right in war, tactical problems tend to be subsumed and 
improved within it ... But when a state fights a war under a botched strategy – as the United 




It may well be that, even after the setbacks of the last decades, there remains some validity 
in the dicta of counterinsurgency theory. However, as observed in Chapter 1, there remains 
very little coverage of the legal means available to insurgents, or indeed counterinsurgents, 
in prosecuting their operations. While there are the beginnings in stabilisation theory of an 
understanding of the importance of law and institutions of dispute resolution, this has not 
yet migrated across to the world of counterinsurgency beyond tired notions of ‘rule of law’ 
development and ‘security sector reform’.  
 
Equally, while there is most certainly a greatly increased global awareness of the potential 
for lawfare within the context of state-to-state conflict, the discussion of lawfare has largely 
been confined to questions surrounding detention and interrogation of ‘terrorist’ suspects 
or the methods available to human rights activists in restraining the use, for example, of 
drones. Certainly these have relevance to the prosecution of counterinsurgency, but they do 
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not speak of the need to deal with insurgency at the operational legal level, let alone the 
strategic level. To adopt an aphorism: while we have been playing draughts, our adversaries 
have been playing chess. 
 
At that level, the discourse remains at the default of building legal institutions (‘rule of law 
field force’, etc.). As was seen in Chapter 1, in the case of occupations current international 
law allows a great deal of latitude, and therefore scope for initiative and original thought for 
the occupying power.  
 
To get beyond that paradigm there will need to be a new approach to the planning of 
operations. A start could be made by including a legal element within ‘intelligence 
preparation of the battlespace’. This idea lives well within advanced conceptions of 
intelligence. For example, in his ‘Fixing Intel’, General Michael Flynn, former ISAF Chief of 
Intelligence and current head of the Defence Intelligence Agency, advocates taking 
intelligence away from the centrality of ‘covert intelligence’ and rendering it far more 
‘holistic’ in nature, to include the legal battlespace.911  
 
Finally, there must be an increased awareness of the multidimensional nature of war and 
along with it an increasing awareness of the multidimensional implications of law and war. 
Potential conventional opponents already have this awareness,912 and insurgent opponents 
have been, as this thesis has sought to demonstrate, been aware of it for far longer. 
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